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	PAGE
I—Atmanism P N Srinivasachari	1
II—Indian Philosophy and the Present Situation PPS Sastri	24
III—The Growth of Ethics S G Sathe	30
IV—Suggestions for a New Theory of Emotion Dr Suhrit Chandra Mitra	45
V—The Possibility of a New Morality—I(A Symposium) J Mackenzie	64
VI—On the Possibility of a New Ethic—II H M Bhattacharyya	79
VII—The New Morality—III Prof G C Chatterji	95
VIII—The Possibility of a New Morality—IV Hanumanto Rao	97

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TO LET

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY.

Atmanism.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
(Metaphysics & Logic Section)

By

P. N. SRINIVASACHARI.

(Pnchatiyappa's College, Madras)

Metaphysics is the comprehensive intellectual effort to form a theory of reality by the thinking together of all the sides of experience and is the self-discovery of the absolute or the underlying source of all thinking and material things. Owing to the coincidence of existence and value, it postulates a faith in the apprehension of reality in its integral wholeness and the appreciation of its values. Philosophic criticism is an immanent criterion of reality based on logical stability and the will to truth. It is thus a synthetic unity of the methodology of Science with its passion for disinterestedness and the spiritual effort for the conservation of all intrinsic-values. The stirring problems of the "philosophy of to-day" or "contemporary philosophy" are the age long problems, Eastern as well as Western. The immortal formulation of the Upanishads "What is that by knowing which everything else is known?" is echoed in the *samnvaya* method of the Vedānta Sūtras and the synoptic view of Plato. The philosophy of Atmanism follows the great tradition of absolutism and is based on the following fundamental truths:—

1. Reality is realisable. To ask ultimate questions and elicit answers for them is the vitalizing principle of thought—thought not as discursive thinking nor pure act, but as purified, atmanised consciousness can break through the confines of finiteness and intuit the infinite.

2. As Aristotle says, there is nothing in the end which was not present in kind in the beginning. What is enfolded as a possibility in the absolute is unfolded as an actuality.

3. "It takes the whole reality to elicit the whole mind."—Plato. The whole self can know the whole reality. As the Veda puts it, the ground of existence is the goal of experience; the object of *Brahmajijñāsā* is *na cha punarāvartate*. The whole of metaphysics is the hope of religion. The principle of comprehensiveness which is the criterion of philosophic criticism demands that reality should be metaphysically satisfactory and spiritually satisfying, and it thus requires a synthetic effort and a synoptic vision. By a review and criticism of the fundamental categories of reality which are now employed by naturalism, vitalism, phenomenalism, personalism and theology, philosophy discovers the Ātman as the all-pervasive unity and self-explanation of the forms or kingdoms of experience. It is the endeavour of the Ātmanistic philosophy to examine the validity and value of these concepts by the method of negation by fulfilment, and reveal the informing principle which is their foundation and fruition.

THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF MATTER.

The scientific attempt at the systematic connection of particulars is rooted in the deterministic postulate of the reign of causal law, and, when it brings out all its quantitative implications, it becomes a materialistic metaphysic. The scientist with a synoptic view thus becomes a scientific metaphysician. When Lewis asserts that in the new era of science, man and the world are explained by an all-embracing system, he forgets that a science which co-ordinates the sciences is really a philosophy. Matter refers (1) to sense-objects, ✓

(2) perceptual objects, (3) scientific objects, and (4) the unknown substratum that causes sensations in the mind in a mechanical way. It is this fourth view of the material reality that is really physical philosophy or the philosophy of the Charvakas, which insists on the priority of matter to mind and regards consciousness as a merely incidental phosphorescence, as Ward puts it. As the liver secretes bile, the brain secretes consciousness. Laplace said to Napoleon that the physicist in his nebular theory has no need for the hypothesis of God. The spiritual is the epi-phenomenal and is a superfluity. Matter is the mother of the universe and is the promise and potency of life. Mechanistic biology gives a physico-chemical interpretation of life and mechanistic psychology traces the phenomenon of conscious behaviour to physical and physiological conditions.

It is said that we now know too much about matter to be any longer materialists. The materialistic theory is the result of the scientific methodology of selection and abstraction. In the interest of exactitude the scientist restricts the subject-matter. The theory of matter as the cause of sense-data, of space-time without consciousness, is merely the result of hypostatizing an abstraction. Matter as the unthinking mother of the world is unthinkable. As Eddington says, matter of the physicist is a cycle like the house that Jack built. Smuts thinks that the make-up of matter should be explained as an inner activity holistically and not arithmetically as a whole of parts. It is the abstract intelligence that explains the physical world as a closed system and fails to explain creative efficiency and the reality of moral and spiritual life. The mechanistic theory of the visible and the tangible world as an aggregation of atoms and electrical constellation is said to refer only to conceptual constructions and not real entities. It is true that matter can be weighed ;

but, as Joad asks, who can weigh the inspiration that produced a Shelleyan lyric?

Naturalism, as a more refined type of materialism finds its most articulate expression in the scientific attitude, which protests against the anthropomorphic and animistic ways of interpreting reality, and is hostile to the theologising tendency of the mind which has faith in supernatural intervention. It interprets the more evolved in terms of the less evolved and explains the self in terms of sensation, sensation in terms of cellular activity and cellular activity in physico-chemical terms and thus traces the wisdom of a Socrates to the whirling of atoms. The tension in matter, according to Smuts, becomes the attention of psychology; the chemical affinities become appetite in life, purposiveness of will, and finally, the ideals of life. The holistic activity starts with the dynamic creativity of matter, and ends with the self as the last term in the series. Scientific intellectualism, as a still more refined form of naturalism, seeks to avoid the risks of materialism by allying itself with agnosticism. In Spencer's theory, naturalism ends in agnosticism and its antinomies, and agnosticism often leads to superstition.

In explaining the higher by the lower, the end by the origin, naturalism puts the cart before the horse. As Smuts himself says, the naturalist wrongly infers the primacy of matter from its priority, and, in the name of simplicity, the concrete becomes shadowy and the abstract becomes real; the physical is the primary and the metaphysical secondary. The scientific understanding in its excessive zeal for objectivity has an aversion for the metapsychical. But, as Ward points out, we can never divest ourselves from our consciousness. In ignoring the work of thought, it presupposes thought. Naturalism deals more with the mechanical cause than with reason and it rules out teleology, denies moral freedom and banishes

epiritual autonomy and its metaphysical meaning. In seeking the object the scientist forgets the subject which is his own self, and his thinking is therefore only sectional. Naturalism, as a method, is thus ship-wrecked on the rock of creative evolution and, as a philosophy, it mistakes the empirical for the transcendental. According to Jeans, the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality and the universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine.

There is a third type of physical philosophy represented by Eddington, Einstein and Whitehead. As Muirhead remarks, mathematicians have not been for some time on speaking terms with metaphysicians, but now, there is an attempt at a searching criticism of the scientific pre-suppositions and the co-ordination of results. The fundamental postulates of science have become the problems of philosophy and the scientist has turned a metaphysician. "If science is not to degenerate into a medley of *ad hoc* hypotheses, it must become philosophical and enter on a thorough criticism of its foundations".—Whitehead. According to Northrop, Greek thought as the pattern of all later thought gave a threefold solution of matter,—the mathematical, the physical and the functional. The mathematical lays stress on rationality, the physical emphasises atomic motion and the functional, teleology. This triple movement is discernible in our own time in the mathematical theory of Eddington, the physical theory of Einstein and the functional theory of Whitehead. Muirhead is glad that the concept of nature is now affiliated with the idealistic philosophy. To Eddington, the world of space-time is a system of mathematical or logical relations, but a genuine law is transcendental and there is something in us that has value for the eternal. But as Hoernle says, metaphysics cannot be modelled on mathematics. In the words of C. D. Broad,

"It is a bad thing where a science and the philosophy of that science are mixed up."

Einstein's physical theory of space-time or the four dimensional continuum denies the Newtonian view of the homogeneity and absoluteness of space and time, which Kant regarded as final, and insists on the relativity of space-time. The structure of space time varies with its contents. The view of nature as a system of events in space-time related to the mind has changed the orientation, but it is on the borderland of relativism and subjectivism and the Jain philosopher may seek affinities between relativity and his theory of *nayas* or standpoints of knowledge.

In his philosophy of organic mechanism, Whitehead constructs an objective theory adapted to the scientific view of space-time as a system of changing relations and claims to bring together Descartes and Leibnitz. In his philosophy of nature, he concludes, in a rather Newtonian way, that space time is more uniform or homaloidal than relative. His doctrine of organism as a systematic correlation of events in nature claims to free philosophy from materialistic mechanism with which science has so long saddled it. In interpreting events as unities, which are self identical in change, actuality in terms of eternal patterns or forms, he leans towards the Platonic reality of the universal and intrinsic value. But there cannot be a self-complete philosophy of nature as perception of things pre-supposes the existence of the percipient.

As Broad points out, science has an aversion for the intrusions of metaphysics, and, we may add, metaphysics has an aversion for the intrusions of science, but it utilises the method of science while rejecting its fractional views. The philosophy of nature, as re-interpreted by Atmanism, insists on the reality of the world of space-time-causality as a fleeting flux of events and its relative externality to the finite self. The

self as the subject of experience and nature as the object of experience are distinguishable, but not divisible. Nature serves as an environment or opportunity for, and not the cause of, the moulding or perfection of the self, and it is the Ātman alone that sustains nature and is its driving power. A physical absolutism, as Muirhead says, which sets up a physical thing in itself is an abstraction. While matter is real, the materialist outlook which identifies the self with the space-time series is false.

"The world of fact is not volatilised, but has its place in the scheme of values."—Bosanquet.

BIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Life has no mechanistic origin, but is *sui generis* and is more comprehensive than matter. Bergson and Driesch bring out the inadequacy of the materialist hypothesis by referring to the phenomena of mutation and metamorphosis. Life is not a physico-chemical mechanism but an autonomous whole which is the same in all its parts. Smuts thinks that life has an inner character of self-maintenance and self-multiplication. It is a controlling and cooperating inner activity and not an external determination of self-repeating parts. No laboratory can produce life. J. S. Haldane is led to the same idea that life, as studied by physiology and biology, can alone explain the phenomena of self-maintenance and heredity. No mechanism can reproduce or maintain itself. When the biologist refers to the vital principle as the essence of reality, he becomes a biological philosopher or vitalist. Miss Underhill selects Driesch, Bergson and Eucken as the exponents of that theory. Driesch, in his philosophy of organism, applies it to the organic side of life, Bergson to the metaphysical side and Eucken to the spiritual. Driesch postulates a special imperceptible factor or agency, called *entelechy*,

midway between the physical and the psychical. It is a non-mechanical or unconscious soul hidden in all living beings, and is based on the logical view that there is more content in the effect than in the cause. But Haeckel criticises the theory of entelechy as too hypothetical a creature to command conviction. Needham observes that vitalism fills gaps in mechanistic descriptions like the map-maker of Columbus who said "Where unknown, place terrors." The entelechy is an immaterial ghost which is neither body nor mind. As Haldane says, Driesch is wrong when he assumes that life can develop independently of the environment. Entelechy is thus a mystery, a *deus ex machina*.

The vitalistic philosophy of Bergson starts with the distinction between intellect and intuition. While the intellect inflects time, spatialises and mechanises reality and makes sections of it, intuition seizes the whole of it as *élan vital*. The intellect is selective and practical as the instrument of action, but intuition is pure duration. Though life is confronted or loaded by matter, it enters into it and magnetises it. Reality is not a repetition but a creative evolution having its own spontaneity and supernal value. But the view of the practical intellect and pure duration creates a dualism and ends in subjective idealism. When the idea of life is replaced by that of universal spirit, the vitalist becomes an absolutist and this thesis is worked out by Dr. Radhakrishnan in his *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*.

The vitalism of Eucken is spiritualistic or activist philosophy which emphasises spiritual vitality and the intuitions of experience. It insists on the primacy of spiritual life and evolution and is therefore opposed to naturalism and intellectualism. Life is more than logic, and evolution of spiritual life contains the assurance of its victory over nature. Ulti-

mately it lays stress on the mystic consciousness as the fulfilment and freedom of spiritual life and the vision of wholeness is opposed to quietism.

Biological philosophy is really no philosophy at all because it tries to expound the nature of ultimate reality by an empirical category. The idea that there is more content in the effect than in the cause savours of the naturalistic fallacy. Wisdom is more than vital efficiency or the vital impulse. As J. A. Thompson says, the biologist has to steer clear of the metaphysical Scylla of entelechy and élan vital and the materialistic Charybdis. But as he himself speculates, biosis may be psycho-biosis.

PHENOMENALISM.

Psychology, till now the child of philosophy, has, owing to its insistence on experimentation, emerged into an independent science—a psychology without self or consciousness,—and it is anxious to affiliate itself with the physico-chemical sciences and biology. And Broad emphatically says that it is a natural science and not philosophy. But psychology cannot be an annexe of physics and biology as consciousness is not a superaddition to life but is *sui generis* and more comprehensive than matter and life. (The behaviourists explain animal behaviour psychically as sensori-motor and not centrally aroused and deny that mind is a *vera causa*; but, as Hoernle observes, mind cannot be fitted into the context of nature. "Purposiveness cannot be explained as a material response to stimuli".—Joad. And McDougall's Hormic Psychology lays stress on purposivism as a corrective to behaviorism. The behaviour of a living organism is blind as it does not exhibit any evidence of learning by experience. Behaviourism is sometimes criticised as only a "muscle-twitch psychology" which)

relies more on environment than on endowment; and Woodworth's claim that it is a religion which can take the place of Religion is not justifiable. Consciousness cannot be explained as a mere aggregate of atoms or a by-product of the bodily process. To affirm that matter emerges from brain, and that, when it becomes conscious of itself, it glows as mind is to ignore the primacy of consciousness. In an article by A. Wenzl on Psychology in *Philosophy To-Day* and in *The Contemporary Schools of Psychology* by R. S. Woodworth, the current psychological theories are classified. The old atomistic psychology which refers to the states of consciousness as a bundle of faculties or an aggregation of self-existent sensations in terms of association is not seriously maintained at present. It is now only academic psychology. Kant exposed the futility of this atomistic and associationist school very much as Śaṅkara did in the case of Buddhist phenomenalism. *The sensory psychology applying the method of experimentation studies the problems of light and colour, speech sounds, tonal theory and the world of touch. The psychology of thought, feeling and volition is described as uniform mental coordination. *The existentialist who studies the sensory analysis and series forgets the self which is their real subject. *Gestalt psychology revolts against associationism based on analysis of atomic sensations and is concerned with perceptions and configurations which are more than the combination of parts. The organism is not a sum of parts, but a complex unit. But this is also a form of materialism like the atomism which it seeks to onst and it is anxious to be an ally of behaviourism. *Psycho analysis is the exploration of the suppressed complexes imprisoned in the depths or the interior of the unconscious and the development of the conscious from the unconscious. The libido or the sexual instinct together with the ego instinct is the dominating pleasure-principle of life, and the other impulses are evolved out

of it genetically. Moral and religious life can be traced to repressed infantile sexuality and oedipus complex. As Haldane truly observes, psycho-analysis is had physics and had physiology. Love is too sacred a thing for psycho-analysis and the theory of wish-fulfilment is only an instruction in nastiness and is retrograde. C. J. Jung also condemns the theory of psycho-sexuality and the "incestuous craving for the mother" as decidedly poisonous, and the sexual theory as merely figurative. This theory has the effect of undermining the basis of moral responsibility. The life of the soul is not the libido, as the libido is only the self soiled by its false bodily feeling. Smuts truly remarks that psychologists have not stressed the subject of a general sensibility or *sensus communis* which corresponds more or less to *antahkarana* in Indian thought, and that is the unique service of Kant to psychology to discover this unifying function in the synthetic unity of apperception. Says Joad, mind overflows the brain, is creative and dynamic and the brain is according to Bergson the organ of pantomime. Eugene Osty, in *Philosophy To-Day*, refers to metapsychics as the phenomenology of the unknown functions of intelligence or super-normal knowledge like the transference of thought from mind to mind and the fore-knowledge of our individual future. (There is an intra-mental relation which implies the spatial and temporal extension of the mind which official psychology has not yet recognised. The splendid speculation of Bergson which has revolutionised thought is reared on the slender foundation of the study of instinct. But if the infinite intelligence of man is developed by yoga, it would extend in space and time to other minds and become one with them in a universal psychic organism. Then metaphysics will shrink under metapsychics. The reality of inter-subjective intercourse does not eliminate the nature of the self as a centre of experience. (The phenomenistic theory of consciousness as a continuum without a

cognising subject was developed in British empiricism and the Buddhist school. But Kant and Sankara have conclusively proved the futility of the phenomenal without the noumenal.

PERSONALISM.

Metaphysical psychology or personology deals with the ultimate meaning of the mental life, the freedom of the will and personal immortality. Psychology without the self is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. The self is central to experience and is therefore a new orientation of reality. It is not a mere assemblage of atoms or a colony of sensations or a synthetic unity. It is not a fresh of matter, but has its own spiritual flavour. The problem of the self is, as Smuts says, the great mystery of the universe. It is at present a "wide and wild no man's land, an unexplored region and may in future be the key-stone of all knowledge." Science in its zeal for averaging and generalisation ignores the uniqueness of the self and its moral and spiritual values. As the body consciousness, it is an infinitesimal speck in the infinity of space-time, but spiritually it is the very image of the infinite and the eternal. Both naturalism and absolutism depersonalise and despiritualise the self and make it a series, and thus ignore its inner work. The law of variation and self-persistence which is a mystery can be explained only biographically and not biologically, and then it would be the basis or pivot of a truer metaphysics. Smuts suggests the name of personology as more comprehensive than the term characterology coined by Ward, but his view that personality is the last term in the holistic series or a fresh emergence of holism is entirely opposed to the idealistic view. Personalism and the humanistic sciences are concerned with the same problem. Humanist voluntarism, as Schiller says, should supersede absolutism and emphasise the dignity of human life.

The self is the prius and pre-supposition of all knowledge and is its own evidence. Its existence is proved not by physical evidence or metaphysical speculation but by direct intuitive experience based on what the mystics call introversion and self-naughting. Owing to its mistaken identity with mind-body, the self suffers from the materialistic consciousness. But by the subjugation of the empirical self of sensibility or mind-body, the self realises its spiritual and transcendental nature or *kaivalya*. Evaluative metaphysics insists on values that are intrinsic and eternal. As the image of eternity, the self thinks God's thoughts after Him and seeks the logical, ethical and aesthetic values. Truth, goodness and beauty form the content of spiritual consciousness and are eternally conserved in its nature. Humanism is justified in its repudiation of naturalism, but its tendency to secularise and socialise spiritual life and balance the extremes in the Greek way is rooted in its distrust of the absolute value of soul-culture. These values have infinite worth which cannot be translated into mere workability. The self as the subject of experience is eternally distinct from nature which is the object of experience and forms the environment for realising its infinite possibility. The self has moral freedom and can obtain sovereignty by transcending the empirical and eliminating it. And this self-realisation is followed by self-satisfaction. Owing to its uniqueness and inner work it is not only immortal but also eternal. McDougall's theory of a belief in individual immortality is dismissed by Haldane as the animistic conception of a soul separable from a material body. The theory of soul-survival "as a bloodless, fleshless thing" is against the bodily basis of consciousness and the animistic view. Likewise, Pringle-Pattison's idea of conditional immortality fails to do justice to the eternal values of personality. Eternity is rooted in the temporal, but it is not endless duration. Ward's panpsychism as a realm of ends consisting of a

hierarchy of self acting and self realising individuals is a form of mentalism. Stern is wrong when he says that atoms and molecules are persons. The sphere of the self is different from the world of nature. The real problem of the self is the reconciliation of the uniqueness of the finite self with intersubjective intercourse and the universality of the all self. If the self is windowless then it cannot mirror the universe. Though it has self direction it is not a self contained monad. The philosophy of Atmanism corrects the one sided views by its theory of an indwelling reality that is the informing principle of matter and self and gives them substantiality. Though the world of space-time cause emerges and the self subject to space time evolves and is in the making in an infinite series the Ātman is the absolute consciousness and indeterminate activity and freedom. *The finite self exists but it connotes the absolute and freed from self idolatry and self-centred consciousness, it shifts the centre of reference.* Its being and blending with the absolute is a sacred mystery. Panpsychism, like monadism is a purely spiritualistic view of reality which starts with the bare life of the plant and ends with Brahman. It is the self that contracts as a microbe and expands as a mahatma, owing to its moral freedom it can grow into a God or sink into the vegetative and the sensitive world. (Panpsychism ignores the philosophy of nature which insists on the externality and eternity of the natural order. Matter is external to the finite self but not to the universal consciousness.

THEOLOGY

Theology is a deduction from scriptural authority and is therefore dogmatic, compelling and coercive. It is the protest which the believer makes against naturalism, vitalism and intuitionism in the name of authoritarianism. But the self respect of thought has to pursue every tangle of thought to its

final unravelment." (Whitehead, p. 266.) And the philosophy of religion has to mediate between these extremes and bring out the central truths of spiritual experience and it is not a compromise like humanism, positivism and pragmatism. While rejecting the mythological as irrelevant, philosophic criticism accepts the foundational facts of the spiritual life. When Russell traces religion to fear and asks us to abandon its consolations, which are ideal and not actual, he fails to reach the heart of religion. Freud's theory that religion is an illusion based on pan-sexualism is itself an illusion; in the name of culture it glorifies sex. Religion is not a subjective or social need which elevates fancy to the level of objective reality. James, in his immortal work on religious experience, has once for all established the case for a philosophy of religion by refuting the dogmatism of medical materialists who attribute religion to physical and mental diseases, and by a systematic study of the genuine mystic experience of all countries. Positivism in its attempt to free science from religion has yet founded the religion of humanity. Likewise, meliorism, which insists on philanthropy, moulds religion entirely on a moralistic pattern. But as James himself says, religion is a specific spiritual experience, which should not be evaluated by a non-religious standard. James Ward and Dean Rashdall think of God as finite will and infinite goodness on the ground that omnipotence and goodness cannot co-exist. James believes in a kind of polytheism and pluralism, which has faith in a finite God and the chance of salvation. Berst is mistaken in his view that the universe is fashioned *causatum ab extra* and by an external Designer.

Theism, as explained by Webb, repudiates this view and insists upon the absoluteness of the one personal God entering into personal relations with the finite self. The absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet recognises the self-contradictions of the finite-infinite life and regards the theistic God as an

appearance of the absolute and a finite category. The absolute transcends and transforms within itself the opposition of good and evil and evil is finally absorbed in the whole. But the absolute is not a sponge that endlessly sucks its own selfhood. The philosophic agnosticism of Kant, which was developed by Hamilton and Mansel, culminated in that of Bradley and the only logical conclusion of the self-contradiction of relational thought is its abolition and not transcendence. Haldane thinks that spiritual unity is the loss of individuality. Pringle Pattison is more or less on the fence or a razor-edge balance between personalism and absolutism, when he says that the finite self is not an element but a member of the absolute which is the ground of being and the whole of value. It has not, as Bosanquet says, formal distinctness or unique focalisation which contributes to the absolute but is a separate centre of experience and religion is a two-sided affair. Bosanquet's principle of totality does not contain the idea of self at all, as the world is dissolved in a collection of qualities. Values alone survive in the absolute, but not persons. But the absolute is circumference without centre, and its appearances should be saved, as insisted on by Hoernle. Dean Inge, therefore, protested against the idea of absorption in the absolute, and insists on personality as the home of all values, as conservation belongs only to the time-series. Professor Royce recognises the value of individualism and rejects the idea of re-blending and absorption. To Webb and Sir Henry Jones, religion is not a foot-note to philosophy, but the personal God of religion is the absolute of metaphysics. The historic theory, that God works out his increasing purpose with our help, takes away from the freedom of the absolute. The Atmanistic theory saves the finite existent, but destroys its externality. The absolute Atman pulsates through the finite and vivifies it without being infected by finiteness and its imperfections, and when it realises that it is an organ of the absolute, the self remains

without selfishness and is immersed in the *ānanda* of the Ātman. Hoernle is anxious to save the appearances and the saving experience is the eternal gift of the universal to the universe.

The accounts of the origin of the universe are conflicting and have no finality. Smuts' holistic evolution is opposed to materialism, monadism and absolutism and is a *vera causa* implying creativeness and novelty. The universe is not the explication or unfolding of implicit content but is the record of the whole-making activity in its progressive development. It starts as realism and ends as idealism and both are at the heart of things. Matter is an inner activity which is not additive but creative and the mother of the universe, and the holistic progression is exhibited in the following scale :—

The physical reality which is a mechanical togetherness of self-repeating things externally related. Organic unity, involving inner coordination and selective activity. The emergence of consciousness as a new synthetic activity.

The self is the apex of the holistic universe though it is only a recent arrival. Here holism is not only creative but also self-creative. Wholeness thus starts with the small centres and ends with the self or the all-whole. The absolute of metaphysics is not static but creative. It is a monism employing the immanent ideal, but it does not refer to a block universe, but is progressive and pluralistic. It is the emergence of the absolute values of personality. While Smuts thus recognises the existence of the main concepts of reality, he does not, owing to his naturalistic bias, bring out the primacy of spiritual values and wholeness of the whole, which alone avoids the polar disparities of the series. It is the Ātman and not matter that has the promise and potency of perfection, and creativity and spirituality is the actualising of the spiritual possibility of the Ātman. Progress is in reality and not of reality. The universe is not a whole-making but

soul-making or Ātmanising process and though the word 'holy' may have the same origin as the word 'whole', the idea of the Holy which belongs to spiritual reality is absolutely different from the whole of space-time. The naturalistic view of emergence should be replaced by the metaphysical view of self unfolding and spontaneity. "The western idea of mobility—of a breathless career towards novelty—should be supplemented by the eastern idea of immobility." The absolute Ātman is the only explanation of the validity and value of the concepts of matter, life, consciousness and self, and it alone satisfies the intellectual demand of comprehensiveness by recognising the values of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. Alexander's theory of the deity as the goal of the evolutionary nisus, in which God as having the quality of deity is yet to be, is simply deification of space-time and making deity spatio-temporal. It is naturalistic fallacy to explain the universe as the hierarchy with space-time event at the bottom and deity at the apex. His theory, as Dr. Radhakrishnan says, suffers from an anti-metaphysical bias. It is a mere tautology and 'verbal sedative', as it says that life and mind emerge because they emerge. The emergence of matter, life, mind, etc., is abrupt and unintelligible. Hoernle has no faith in the progression as it may be beyond deity, and Haldane observes that Alexander produces the real world very much as a conjurer produces rabbits from a hat. No one worships space-time as the absolute and finds saving experiences in it; it is an unorthodox messianic hope expressed in modern thought. Lloyd Morgan has faith more in a finished value-frame as foundational to spiritual reality than in a space-time frame, but his theory, as Broad points out, has the leaven of Alexander working in a Huxleian meal. Space-time emerges from God and not God from space-time. Whitehead lays stress on immanence and creativity, but his God is only the primordial accident of the Absolute. But God cannot be both the

accident as well as its cause. Mr. W. T. Stace propounds a novel view that the universe is not the construction of a universal mind, but a colony of billions of human and pre-human minds which work ant-like through the æons, each making its own contribution.

Absolutism has the merit of explaining the lower by the higher. But the theory of the absolute unfolding itself by a dialectic or emanational process and the idea of the possible becoming the actual, in which the whole harmonises and transcends all discord, suffers from the defect of predicating imperfections to reality and making evil a necessity. The theory of creationism has likewise failed to reconcile the goodness of God with the reality of sin and unmerited suffering. How the one evolved into the many or how the absolute divides itself into finite centres is ultimately inexplicable. The co-existence of the absolute and the self is a sacred mystery. Creative evolution rejects the idea of the cast-iron or block universe, but it is against the view *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Moral and religious consciousness requires us to throw the responsibility of contingency, contradiction and other imperfections on the finite self rather than on the absolute, which is immanent in the finite without being infected by its imperfections. While the finite relies on the infinite Atman for its life, the infinite is self-related and perfect. Valno is more important than genesis and to know the way up to the absolute is said to be more relevant to our moral and spiritual needs than to trace the way down from it.

The absolute is the ground of existence and the goal of experience. This view recognises the world of existence and values and thus reconciles realism and idealism from the point of view of relevancy and comprehensiveness. Every judgment, logical, ethical and aesthetic, ultimately refers to the whole of reality. In an epistemological analysis of a perceptive judg-

ment like "This is a lotus" there are four factors : the physical theory refers to the things given in sense perception, physiology to the neural process, psychology to the sensation and panlogism to reason. But neither realism, subjective idealism nor objective idealism can bridge the gap or the saltus in these sectional points of view. The ultimate unifying factor is the inner ātman or real reality that alone gives a meaning to matter, life, sensation and self. And it is the universal that underlies the particulars and gives them substantiality. Likewise in an ethical judgment, the ultimate self is not the body or life or reason or the finite self but the inner controller of all thinkers and things ; and this view offers the right perspective to hedonism, rationalism and eudaemonism. Divine possibility functions through moral freedom. In the aesthetic judgment also the realistic, the rationalistic and the intuitional views of the Beautiful find their adequacy in Ātman as the transcendently beautiful. Beauty is not on sea or land, nor is it in the self, but it is in the absolute which imparts beauty to nature and makes its togetherness into a symphony and at the same time transcends it. Thus the logical, ethical and aesthetic values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty have a cosmic meaning and are ultimately housed in the absolute Ātman. Atmanism thus satisfies the demands of metaphysics for unifying experience, the ethical need of the *summum bonum* and the aesthetic aspiration for absolute beauty and bliss. The absolute Ātman is thus the only self-explanation of the validity and value of the concepts of matter, life, consciousness and self, and it alone satisfies the intellectual demands of comprehensiveness by recognising the equal values of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics and it is no disaster to philosophy to pay these metaphysical compliments to the absolute.

The absolute Ātman alone explains the subject-object relation and the pluralistic experience. While extreme pluralism

insists on the manyness and the unrelatdness of the elements of reality and explains away its unity, monism relies on the self-identity of reality and the absoluteness of the one, and dismisses the world as an illusion. But Bosanquet observes in another context, there can be no unity without the universe or the universe without unity, and Ātmanism recognises the claims of both and offers the true perspective. They are the ultimate facts or factors of reality and neither can be resolved into the other and both are distincts and not opposites. The ever-changing physical world serves as a suitable opportunity for the evolving self and the self seeks its own subject, the real reality, which environs and vivifies all things. As Broad says, the realist is unable to see the wood for the trees and the idealist the trees for the wood. In the words of Sorley, the monist, is in truth the essential dualist and the downward way of the monist is as uncertain and treacherous as the upward way of the pluralist. But Ātmanism, as a speculative philosophy, sees the pervading identity in the persisting facts. It is the absolute that is immanent in the finite, but the finite cannot exhaust its infinity. The reals of nature and self coexist as ultimate factors of reality and nature is external to the self but not to the indwelling self which informs both and infuses them with reality. As the eternal is rooted in the temporal, all development is *in* and not *of* reality. At the naturalistic level, the self becomes an off-shoot of matter; when it rises to the spiritual level, it realises its eternal nature by spiritual induction, and lastly, when it intuits the absolute, it is ātmanised, and attains its eternal bliss. The heart has its reasons, which the reason knows not, and intuition is not an irrational and fugitive feeling or any psychological state, but is the integral experience of reality, and is therefore the fulfilment of reason. Mysticism thus removes the breach between metaphysics and theology. We may modify the statement of

Bradley that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct and say that the self with its instinct for the infinite intuits it in its absoluteness, and metaphysics is the finding of good reasons for this integral knowledge. Philosophy makes intuition intelligible and makes it the most articulate expression of experience.

Thus all the views of reality ultimately converge in Ātmanism. The term Ātmanism is preferred to the terms Holism, Organism, Harmonism and Absolutism. While Holism has a naturalistic bias, Organism a biological accent, Harmonism has an ethical flavour. The synoptic view is not synoptic enough. The words soul, spirit and self lack definiteness and are not free from animistic and spiritualistic difficulties. Ātmanism is more comprehensive than any of these expressions. It recognises the relative positions and perspectives of the various theories but corrects their tendency to sectional thinking by using a 'large scale map' of reality. Ātman is Jñānam, Satyam and Ānandam. When metaphysics is based on science and mathematics, it illumines the intellect, but when it is allied to ethics it lays stress on will and its values, and exalts life. In its aesthetic aspect, it is applied to art, and insists on the appreciation of Reality as the absolute Beauty. When it is the philosophy of mysticism and saving experience, it thinks of the eternal ecstasy of the unity-consciousness. It is not a new spiritual adventure after the unattainable, but is the stability and safety in which aspiration is crowned with achievement. When the philosopher develops this Ātma-Dṛṣṭi, he sees all things in the self and the self in all things under the form of eternity.

As the self-actualisation of the cosmic possibility, the absolute

Ātman realises its sportive spontaneity and, as the cosmic goal or hope, it is the *home of all values* and its Ānanda or saving love is fulfilled only when the whole series of selves is ātmanised.

Indian Philosophy and the Present Situation

By

Prof. P.P.S. SASTRI, B.A. (Oxon), M.A.

(President, Indian Philosophy Section).

I am indeed deeply obliged to the Executive Committee for bestowing this great honour on me. As I have been called upon to deliver the address at a very short notice I am certain that of your indulgence for all the shortcomings in my address I shall have a good measure. His Highness The Maharaja truly remarked that all look to the Philosophers for the immediate solution of some of the more outstanding problems of to-day. To-day we are happily in a position when it is no longer necessary to attempt any justification for the study of Indian Philosophy in our Universities; but we are yet far from having reached any satisfactory scheme where the study is correlated to other studies or, what is much more important, to the life of the student. It should be a truism to say that philosophy is an expression of wisdom that is not academic but the product of fullness of experience. In the case of Indian philosophy in particular, speculation divorced from life and its needs is peculiarly unreal. And yet unfortunately we find that the study of Indian philosophy is still largely mechanical, a kind of observation of an archaic specimen, not an introduction to the waters of life-giving spring. That such a state of affairs exists is partly due to the dominance of Western notions of metaphysics as a peculiar intellectual game. That such a game can be interesting, that it may have valuable reserves of its own, that if pursued to its very limits it may fulfil itself in a vision that is more vital—there is no gainsaying. But such a process is needless waste in the case of us, inheritors of the vastly different Indian tradition. As

the Hindu Scholiast would say, it is to infer from the foot-mark the existence of the elephant seen with one's own eyes. If now we turn from the evil to its remedies, two considerations present themselves straight away. One is that the systems—I do not mean merely the recognised schools—should be studied in the language in which they have been expounded. The other is that the study should be not merely of the dry bones of the systems but also of the flesh and blood which clothed them and continue to clothe them even to-day in however emaciated a condition. The student of philosophy, a few years ago, presumably had a body of philosophic doctrines in his mind with little or no coordination either with his inherited orthodox beliefs or the more or less heterodox practices he had to adopt in social and official life. If the position is the same to-day too, when the study of Indian Philosophy in some part or other has become compulsory, the state of affairs is really deplorable. What we try to learn is what our ancients said, not why they said it. We treat our seers as intellectual machines grinding out dogmas more or less true and fail to realise that they were human beings reacting in definite ways to concrete situations, from the study of whose reactions we can derive profitable lessons for our present and future. We remember the logic-chopping of the Naiyāyika, we forget his intense fervour for a personal God, the feeling of divine companionship that prompted an Udayana even to censure the deity for an alleged act of neglect. We remember the interminable discussions of the Mīmāṃsakas over what element should be carried over to the *vikṛti* rites and what should not, in what order animals are to be tied to the stake or are to be sacrificed; we forget the soul-searching of an Appaya who, with a revulsion not unlike that attributed to Asoka, foreswore the religion of sacrifice because of the pain it involved and was at last convinced only when he heard the divine voice assuring him in something like the words of the

Gita that he was but merely the Nimitta for the working out of the proper destinies of the souls of those sacrificed. We remember that the Advaitin begins and ends with a colourless Absolute which is beyond good and evil, whose attainment can come by no external activity; we forget that this Brahman which is no other than the soul of the seer can be realised only by him of purified intellect, the purification involving most rigorous and arduous exercise that can be conceived of in any moral code. We remember that India is apparently the land of ascetics, of people who conveniently elude the obligations of social life, we forget what qualifications were prescribed for asceticism by our law-givers, what stringent regulations they laid down for the maintenance and conduct of society in which alone life is possible for the vast majority of the people. The externalism that characterised our study of Indian History some time ago, consisting as it did in memorising the names of battles, places and rulers, is unfortunately characteristic of our study of Indian Philosophy to-day. Add to all these, there is the very regrettable fact that the few who take up the study on more orthodox lines,—for example, the students who take an advanced course of Sanskrit in our Universities, fail to realise that the horizon has been widened, that the world of Vyavahāra has become wider and more closely knitted together, that the cultural influence of the West is a fact to be intelligently reckoned with and made use of; they have little or no knowledge of Western speculation and have shown little desire to profit themselves by the study of it. It is no wonder in these circumstances if the cultural contact of the East and the West has proved to be what Bradley would call "a marriage attempted without a *modus vivendi*".

Our Philosophy Courses and our Sanskrit Courses then should be made to go together hand in hand, any distinction between them being based solely on the stress on the linguistic

or the doctrinal side. Secondly, Indian Philosophy in the Philosophy course should be taught not as one among other subjects but as basic to the study of other subjects. Thirdly, a student of Sanskrit should learn not merely one or more of the Indian Schools but some one school of European Philosophy besides acquiring a general knowledge of its history. It is only such a correlated study that will lead to a revitalising of the philosophic current of our country.

Some point may perhaps be given to the above apparent platitudes by showing their application to some of our practical problems. Take, for instance, the sore question of Temple-entry, agitating the minds of our countrymen, great and small. One form in which the question is most usually put is whether it can be right to recognise certain persons to be Hindus and yet exclude them from Hindu forms of worship. Before such a contention can be accepted or rejected, it surely behoves us to enquire what is meant by Hindunism. One fact at least stands out clear—the universality of Karma and of Adhikāra-Bheda. I am not aware personally of any Hindu system other than that of the Cārvāka, if it can be called Hindu, which does not recognise the working of the law of Karma. What does this tell us? That every creature is bound in its due station because of its own acts in a previous life, that the inevitable consequences of that life have to be worked out in particular stations in this life through duties, obligations, enjoyments and sufferings incidental thereto. If then birth in a particular caste is determined by a previous life, if the disabilities of this particular birth are but the necessary consequences of that life, how does it follow that the enforcement of the disabilities is contrary to the spirit of Hinduism? It is again an undoubted truth that while truth and goodness are unitary, not all truths are true for all nor all goods good for all. The acquisition of fresh knowledge depends on the previous existence of a suitable apperceptive system. The acquisition of greater

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moral worth depends upon moral sanctity already achieved. "To him that hath, to him shall be given". Is there then no helpful message which Hinduism can give. Is the voice of conservative orthodoxy also the final voice of Hinduism? Not necessarily. Hinduism does say that the world from one point of view is a prison and that life is prison-routine. But it does not require either the prison or the routine to be conducted in a manner that the moral conscience of the age would condemn as inhuman. So long as humanity is not perfect, we shall always have jails and jailors. But they need not and do not continue in the same conditions of barbarous unsympathetic tyranny. If the unfortunate brother who is born to greater disabilities can be made to realise that his disabilities, such as they are, are due to his own past life—that is all that the law of Karma, conceived as a moral force, need achieve. This being achieved, its task of purification is done. And it would be unphilosophical to insist on a physical death and rebirth to mark his spiritual rebirth. Adhikāra again is not fixed for all time. It is capable of growth, of education. To purify, sanctify and educate should be our mission, not to dispense spiritual favours after the fashion of granting political franchises. And in this matter of Adhikāra we have also to remember that it is not merely the depressed that are defective but also the conservatively orthodox. The former clamour mostly for they know not what and the latter mostly refuse they know not why. If we would be wise in dealing with both sections of the community, we should devise means which would alienate neither. Would it not be better to create a new cult or to invent a deity than arbitrarily force the one into the society of the other. Such a synthetic reform is not unknown to Hinduism. Have we not admitted even a Buddha, the greatest reformer of ancient India, into the Hindu pantheon and profited by it by enlarging the scope of Hinduism and forcing Buddhism itself to seek refuge in fresh pastures under

other climes? Should we not proceed by the time-honoured method of a synthetic growth, welding opposites into itself rather than by the arbitrary methods of referendum and democratic legislation? What shall it profit our depressed brethren if they enter our temples but depart from our hearts? Surely Divine presence is more marked in the band of human friendship than in the forbidden physical proximity to an image of stone and metal. Those of us who believe that these are our brethren truly in spiritual kinship, that these in spite of their birth have by God-given talent and by education acquired the competency to apprehend and worship the Most High in the very same way that we do, let us knit ourselves if we can into a closer society; let us build new temples, devise new forms of worship, where brethren will really be brethren, where there will be no feeling either of condescension or of discomfort, where the spirit of non-violence will really prevail because while good is done for those who are worthy of it, the less good is left intact for those who comprehend that alone. And in this we have the high authority and noble example of Sri Saṅkara who distributes the emphasis equally on tradition as well as individual experience. For he says, "Scripture as well as experience are equally authoritative in the quest of ours". For his own guidance he was not found wanting in welcoming every one, even our depressed brother, into his fold. For he has said, "Be he the lowliest born or the highest born; he shall indeed be my preceptor." If humanity has a birth-right and a goal, it cannot be cheated of either. But the attainment of it can be hastened and made less tortuous by efforts inspired with insight. And if philosophy is studied in correlation to practices as mentioned above, if fractional thinking is not introduced even into the study that is meant to correct that mode of thinking, then we may find solutions for our problems by a mode of synthesis which while giving unto each part its due will yet quicken the evolution of the whole.

The Growth of Ethics

BY

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In Greece, Ethics came after Philosophy (in the sense of metaphysics). Socrates was practically the first to deal with ethical problems. He made virtue identical with (in the sense of following from) knowledge. "One who knows his interest or good is bound to follow it," he argued. As a corollary from this tenet, he held that virtue could be taught. If virtue is knowledge, vice must be ignorance. But if vice is ignorance, you cannot blame or censure a bad man. Immorality must accordingly be considered to be, in principle, the same as a physical malady. (Punishment with Socrates was only curative or deterrent, not retributive.)

The position of Plato is essentially the same as that of Socrates, though it is solidified by its being given a substantial metaphysical basis. (Socrates contented himself with proving the truth of the proposition, virtue is knowledge of the good.) He did not address himself to the question what exactly is the good of man. That question was taken up by Plato. Now this is a metaphysical question. For, the good of man must be his being what he really should be, in relation to other things, as they really are. The enquiry about the good of man must therefore, be prefaced by an enquiry as to what Reality is. It is in this connection that Plato elaborated his Doctrine of Ideas, which culminated in the establishment of the Idea of the Good as the all-absorbing Reality. (Plato shows that the knowledge of the Idea of the Good rid Reality of all darkness, caused by ignorance, and dispels all false shows or appearances. One who has achieved this knowledge is a

Philosopher and is both good and blessed.) It is in this way that the good of man is linked up with knowledge. This knowledge is to be communicated by a competent proceptor to students. But not all and sundry can be students fit to receive this high knowledge. A small proportion of the population of the Ideal State have the necessary competence to take in what is communicated, and they too have to be subjected to a rigorous mental and moral discipline before they become fit to receive the dazzling light of the Idea of the Good. The rest cannot aspire to acquire this knowledge, and have to be content with doing what they are told to do, reposing faith in the wisdom and integrity of the higher class people. The capacity for goodness or the absence of it is with Plato a matter of good or bad fortune. To quote the words of Dr. Martineau, "Though he (Plato) pitches upon the right sort of men to be called good men, what is it that constitutes them good in his eyes?—that by a happy infection or infusion, more of the essence of the Universe has got into them than into others; that the magnetic wires from the fount of real ideas pass the currents of the fair and good with peculiar intensity through them, and evolve within them the responsive and miniature God.....In such a scheme no room is left for guilt as opposed to ignorance or for retribution as different from discipline". (Thus, according to Martineau, Plato and Socrates have not done justice to what he would call the Ethical fact of moral feeling in man and therefore cannot present a satisfactory philosophy of morals. Guilt and retribution connote ideas which imply moral responsibility of the person who must be recognised as an independent and free agent, shaping his own destiny and therefore meriting credit or discredit for the results achieved. But the spirit of the Socratic-Platonic Philosophy is opposed to such an individualism. It is rather animated with the most uncompromising universalism. In the ideal community such as Plato dreamt

of the State is all in all the individual as an individual is nothing. He is a part of the State Machine outside the State system he has no significance. It is only in the light of this universalistic spirit that one can understand and perhaps appreciate Plato's communism—the political economical and social regulations that he prescribes for his ideal State. His division of the whole population into castes according to their functions in the State and his anxiety to entrust the ruling power to only the gifted few after putting them through the most exacting moral and intellectual discipline show his faith in an intellectual aristocracy and his opposition to all democratic notions.

Aristotle differed from Plato in his metaphysical doctrine and gave to Matter in relation to Form, a higher status than Plato would vouchsafe to it and consequently was disposed to recognise the importance of phenomena and study them with a view to their scientific treatment. In Ethics he would study with a scientific eye and arrange systematically the facts of moral life, rather than worry about the metaphysics of morality. He has not the metaphysical insight to understand what Plato means by making the Idea of the Good the Summum Bonum. Yet in spite of all this he does not betray an individualistic tendency. Ethics, he insisted, was a political inquiry and his list of virtues contains some which must appear queer to a man bred up in the individualistic environment of modern Europe.

After the dissolution of the City States of Greece and their passing successively under the sway of the Macedonian and Roman Empires the solidarity of the Hellenic communities was broken and no interest was left which could attract and bind the individuals together into social units. In this situation the individual Greek considered himself an independent unit working for his own individual well being. This state of

things was favourable to the growth of an individualistic spirit which should naturally be reflected in the Philosophies of the post-Aristotelian period. The most important of these Philosophies were Stoicism and Epicureanism. But it was in the case of the latter only that the individualistic tendency manifested itself in an unmistakable manner. The former did not tear itself away from its kinship with Socratic thought. The difference that the removal of the hindering force which the Greek State exercised upon the individual made, in the case of Stoicism, was to develop in it a universalism of a much wider sweep than is found in Platonism. (The Stoic considered himself to be a citizen of the world and held that his Reason was identical with the Reason in Nature. It is interesting to note that the Stoics believed in Destiny.)

(It is in the case of Epicureanism which takes its metaphysical creed from the Atomists that one sees how Individualism affects Ethics. It does not require much thought to see that an individualistic spirit is bound to produce confidence in one's own independence. Consequently, the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will and personal responsibility finds favour with all individualists. The Epicureans were the first philosophical libertarians in the ancient world. On the other hand, it should be equally clear that Universalism is bound to be associated with Determinism. We find this illustrated in the history of Christianity. Christ, who broke away from the ritualistic tyranny of Judaism, held out the hope of salvation to one and all in their individual behalf whatever their position, whether they be rich or poor, strong or weak, provided they surrendered themselves to God and threw themselves on His mercy. His message to mankind was that they were all God's children and that before Him there was no distinction of caste or colour, of age or strength or wealth. Christ stood for religious democracy. Every one was promised the same opportunity

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(It is in the case of Epicureanism which takes its metaphysical creed from the Atomists that one sees how Individualism affects Ethics. It does not require much thought to see that an individualistic spirit is bound to produce confidence in one's own independence. Consequently, the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will and personal responsibility finds favour with all individualists. The Epicureans were the first philosophical libertarians in the ancient world. On the other hand, it should be equally clear that Universalism is bound to be associated with Determinism. We find this illustrated in the history of Christianity. Christ, who broke away from the ritualistic tyranny of Judaism, held out the hope of salvation to one and all in their individual behalf whatever their position, whether they be rich or poor, strong or weak, provided they surrendered themselves to God and threw themselves on His mercy. His message to mankind was that they were all God's children and that before Him there was no distinction of caste or colour, of age or strength or wealth. Christ stood for religious democracy. Every one was promised the same opportunity

of, the State is all in all, the individual as an individual is nothing. He is a part of the State Machine, outside the State system he has no significance: It is only in the light of this universalistic spirit that one can understand and perhaps appreciate Plato's communism,—the political, economical and social regulations that he prescribes for his ideal State. His division of the whole population into castes according to their functions in the State and his anxiety to entrust the ruling power to only the gifted few after putting them through the most exacting moral and intellectual discipline, show his faith in an intellectual aristocracy and his opposition to all democratic notions.

Aristotle differed from Plato in his metaphysical doctrine and gave to Matter, in relation to Form, a higher status than Plato would vouchsafe to it, and consequently was disposed to recognise the importance of phenomena and study them with a view to their scientific treatment. In Ethics he would study with a scientific eye and arrange systematically the facts of moral life, rather than worry about the metaphysics of morality. He has not the metaphysical insight to understand what Plato means by making the Idea of the Good the *Summum Bonum*. Yet in spite of all this he does not betray an individualistic tendency. Ethics, he insisted, was a political inquiry and his list of virtues contains some which must appear queer to a man bred up in the individualistic environment of modern Europe.

After the dissolution of the City States of Greece and their passing successively under the sway of the Macedonian and Roman Empires, the solidarity of the Hellenic communities was broken and an interest was lost which could attract and bind the individuals together into social unities. In this situation the individual Greek considered himself an independent unit working for his own individual well-being. This state of

for salvation, but at the same time ran the risk of damnation if the opportunity available was not improved. Each could make or mar his fortune according to the choice made. Complete freedom of the will was recognised as the most valuable possession of man. Libertarianism was implicit in the new religion and was welcomed as a great relief by the down-trodden suffering and helpless people in the Roman Empire.

But with the growth of the number of its followers the strength of Christianity increased. The Church became an organised and powerful system vying with political Empires in its splendour and dignity. The Ecclesiastical law demanded and received submission from countless subjects, and the Church dignitaries enjoyed influence which was even greater than that of princes. Under such an organisation individualism could not only not thrive but could not be tolerated. Universalistic spirit animated the Catholic Church and the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will was disowned. St Paul's doctrine of salvation through Divine Grace had a fatalistic or determinist complexion. In the hands of St Augustine it received further definiteness and became an essential element in the Catholic creed. Of course, the teaching of Lord Jesus could not altogether be forgotten and Libertarianism continued to be nursed in one school of Catholic Theology, the leading name in which is that of Pelagius. Yet the influence of Augustinian theology was vast and continued for a long time. Hence, according to Dr Martineau the reason why Christianity could not develop a systematic Ethical doctrine, distinct from religious Dogma, was that the Augustinian theology held sway over the Catholic mind and led it to believe that Mankind had, through the transgression of the Divine command by its first representative fallen once and for ever lost all freedom for good and could be reclaimed from sin and saved only by Divine grace. The fatalism of the Catholic Church is quite in keeping with its Universalistic spirit } Its formalities and ritualism

with its hierarchy of priesthood, its distrust of all popular forms of government, its championship of the Divine right of Kings and its love of pageantry and social ranks are all in a line with the anti-individualistic tendencies of its religious creed.

The case is different with Protestantism. That religious movement, as its name implies, was aimed against the domination of the Church over individual Reason. It rebelled against the formalism and autocracy of Rome and stood for the free right of every individual to approach God without the intervention of any priestly agency. The translation of the Testament into the native tongues of Europe and the use of the common language of the masses in prayer are evidence of the democratic spirit which pervaded the Reformed Church. In short, it was the obvious tendency of Protestantism to make the individual independent of the Church official system in his relations to God. This tendency may not have been fully manifest in its early phases and there may be forms of Protestantism in which the Church was nearly as autocratic as under Catholicism. Yet there is no doubt that the inner spirit of Protestantism was antagonistic to sacerdotal autocracy and favourable to individual independence. Such an attitude marks it as an individualistic religion. The sympathy which Protestantism felt for all attempts at popularisation of Governments in Europe is an evidence of its individualistic spirit. It is quite natural that under the aegis of such a religion, religious teachers and writers, as well as philosophers, should believe in and try to prove that man enjoys perfect freedom of the will. It cannot be a rash assertion that Protestantism is a faith congenial to libertarianism. At any rate it could be safely maintained that whenever and wherever Protestantism has been true to its spirit a doctrine of the freedom of the human will has been held obstinately.

In the light of the principle that individualism and libertarianism must go together, while determinism is associated

with universalism we can understand Hobbes being a determinist, and Locke, Hume and Mill libertarians. Thus it is again that Kant and those who thought like him e.g. Green and Martineau, are great champions of the doctrine of human freedom. It is interesting to note that in Europe Protestantism in religion, democracy in politics, and industrialism in the economic sphere of life going together have generally been accompanied by the philosophical teaching that Man is a free agent and therefore responsible for his conduct. No positions and tasks are recognised as hereditary. No caste and privileges are allowed. It is significant that while Ethics as a special branch of study, did not exist in the pre Protestant period of Christianity, it received great impetus with the advent of Protestantism, especially at the hands of those thinkers who believed in the personal freedom of man. So much so that the libertarians have questioned the very possibility of a satisfactory ethical science except with freedom as a necessary postulate. They have decreed that all ethical language in which such terms as Praise and Censure, Remorse, Penitence, Guilt, Punishment, Duty, Continence and a host of similar expressions occur and particularly the word 'Ought' would lose all its significance if Free Will is not accepted as an undoubted fact.

We may now sum up all this discussion in two or three general principles. Thus it may be laid down that 'Ethics becomes an object of special interest and study when religion is not so powerful as to bring under its sway even the social relations of man.' On the contrary, when religion has an absorbing power and all other interests are subordinated to Ethics becomes merged in religion and does not receive a separate treatment. Once more, Ethics as a separate subject of philosophic importance, when though religion wields influence, people take an individualistic view of life. They find that among the Greeks and the Romans whose

was weak in spiritual influence the study of Ethics received the necessary impetus. In the case of Catholic Christianity religion absorbed all human interest and no scope was left for Ethics as distinguished from Religion to thrive. (But with the advent of Protestantism the individualistic view of life, which prevailed, rendered man, as a free moral agent, an object of careful philosophical analysis.) Another conclusion which has been hinted at in the previous remarks may be re-stated now. It is that whenever and wherever a Universalistic view of life has prevailed, man is not credited with Freedom and what is described as moral responsibility is not supposed to lie with him. \

If now it is conceded that here we have a fair hypothesis about the genesis and growth of an Ethical Philosophy among a people, we may perhaps hope to give a satisfactory account of the state of such a philosophy in India.

(It has been said that morality has not been in India an independent subject of inquiry. If the meaning of this charge is that Ethics as the Protestant writers understand the word, viz. a science of Morality which assumes freedom of the Will as its indispensable basis, is unknown, then, according to one of the principles already explained, the Hindu view of life being universalistic a belief in the moral freedom of man is inconsistent with the view and an individualistic type of ethics must be absent in India.)

(Again, if the assertion means that Ethics is not separated from religion in India, that is also as it should be, for according to another principle suggested, Religion in India being all-pervading, Ethical merit and demerit are not different from religious merit and demerit. Hence Ethics as a special science has no scope in Hinduism. \

But there is no dearth of Ethical teaching and Ethical practice in Hindu Society, for difference between good and evil

conduct is recognised, though good and evil are not associated with the responsibility and freedom of man. There is nothing to prevent philosophising about the effects of a given action on the life of a man. Can we not say, for instance, that the effect of wholesome food and proper exercise must be sound health of the body, whereas bad food or over-indulgence of the palate and want of exercise must lead to decline of health? The same may be said about the control and indulgence of passions generally. The kind of Ethics that thus results would be of the determinist type, and Sidgwick is convinced that satisfactory Ethical doctrine can be developed without any reference to free will. It is true that the resulting Ethics will then be a positive science, not normative as it is the fashion to call it.

‘What produces good conduct which brings in its wake happy results or, to put it differently, what is it that leads men to go in for virtue which makes for happiness?’ was a question to which the answer of Socrates and Plato was—Knowledge. The opposite state of things, they asserted, was due to ignorance. The Hindu, or rather the Aryan thinker in India said nearly the same thing. According to him Knowledge—the Sanskrit word being *Jñāna*—is the means, the only means, for the realisation of the real goal of existence. But the Indian thinker was more thorough-going than the Greek. He clearly defined the summum bonum—which according to him was the freedom of the individual soul from all the trammels of finiteness and its recognition of its identity with the Infinite or the Absolute—the technical term to signify this summum bonum is *Mokṣa*. Similarly Knowledge meant with him enlightenment and consequent removal of ignorance or darkness from the soul, which leads it to regard itself as a limited individual entity different from what are, through the same ignorance, treated as other such limited individuals. So long as the light of knowledge does not dispel darkness and improve the vision of the soul, so long the soul takes the false shadows in the cave, that the world is, to be real

and wallows in misery. It is when the vision is turned towards light, through good fortune, that the soul realises the truth, understands its own identity with the Absolute and is freed from all the deceptions of the relational world. The descent of the Soul into the false world and its being involved in all the ramifications of life are the effects of its Karma which is identified with Māyā. (The theory of Karma, briefly stated, is that all the doings of an individual being in the present life are the effects of his former Karma and the effects of the present doings become the storage which flows out as the doings of the next life, and so on *ad infinitum* unless the ever-lengthening chain of Karma snaps, through the sudden darting in of a beam of light which by its heat burns the effects of Karma and frees the soul from the clutches of unrelenting fate.

{ The hypothesis of karma and its sequel, the cycle of births or the worldly incarnations of the Soul, offers an explanation of the differences between individuals so far as their dispositions, endowments, opportunities, etc. are concerned. Of course, the inevitable difficulty viz. how did this unending stream of Karma at all start and why should there be different Karmas for different souls? remains unsolved } But probably the impossibility of its solution is due to the difficulty itself being an absurdity, and there cannot be a rational solution for an irrational difficulty. Of this type is the question—how did the stream of Karma start? The question is exactly like the question—when did the time process make its beginning? “When” itself means, ‘At what time,’ The question therefore is reduced to—At what time did time start? Time cannot be measured or marked by time just as the eye cannot see or the hand cannot hold itself. Karma is often identified with Māyā, and ‘starting,’ i. e. ‘beginning’ is a Māyik idea. An attempt to explain Māyā in Māyik terms is absurd. Hence the reply to the above difficulty is that the difficulty itself is absurd. The answer that is conventionally given is that Karma or Māyā, in common with time, is

beginningless. It is therefore that the existence of karma is recognised as inevitable, without prying further into its secret.

With regard to the second part of the difficulty referred to above, viz. why should there be different karmas for different souls? a preliminary issue may be raised—Why should we worry about differences? Is not the lot of all beings, from the point of view of real bliss, the same, i. e. equally miserable, notwithstanding differences? In evidence of the implication of this question, it may be pointed out as a fact that very few, if at all any, will be prepared to exchange their lot—of course in its entirety, with that of others. If, however, this, the first shot, does not silence the objector, another question may be asked in order to parry the thrust, viz. why should there be different souls at all? The difficulty about the difference of the karmas of the different souls may be shifted backwards and an explanation sought of the difference between the souls themselves. If it is found impossible to answer this question, it may be suggested, as a means of rescue, that the difference whether in the karmas or among the souls themselves is *Māyā* and, therefore, it may be added, that an attempt at explaining the difference is tantamount to an attempt to shew how it came into being. But coming into being is itself *Māyik*, for we cannot talk of the coming into being of what is non-*māyik*, or eternal, and it has been already pointed out that trying to explain what is *Māyik* in terms of *Māyā* is to attempt the impossible. Hence the second difficulty may be disposed of in a manner similar to the first.

And now it may be observed, in accordance with the doctrine, that the rival theory of freedom from the above difficulties. Supposing the present life are not determined by results of his free choice, and that a had

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weak will and that a good and virtuous deed shows a good or strong will and that therefore a bad man must be condemned and punished and a good man honoured and rewarded, may it not be asked, why or how does a bad man happen to be bad or to be weak-willed and a good man strong-willed? The weak and the wicked do not certainly desire to be weak and wicked. They would rather be strong and good. If then the difficulty remains insoluble, the doctrine of freedom can claim no superiority over that of karma.

Hinduism is no doubt fatalistic. The question is whether this is a disqualification. It is true that fatalism is generally considered as a term of abuse. Once it is decided that a doctrine is fatalistic, it is the philosophic fashion to treat it as condemned once and for all. The reason seems to be that it is held to be an axiomatic truth that fatalism kills manhood, for, as is alleged, it paralyses all spirit of self-confidence and induces a feeling of helplessness and renders a man indolent. But let us subject the fatalistic theory of Karma to some cool and dispassionate thought and see whether it deserves the slur that is cast on it.

According to the karma doctrine all that happens to a being and all that the being does are determined by the accumulated karma of the being. This statement itself is the result of some thinking on the part of a thinking being or beings, so that, according to the Karma theory, the thought about the karma is itself the fruit of some former karma, so that it is fated that some beings will have power to think and through thought derive knowledge; further that such beings will know that through knowledge of the nature of karma, they might acquire freedom from its shackles, when it is realised that karma that is done without any selfish desire to enjoy the fruit, would render the karma impotent for further mischief and produce that serene state of intelligence

which enables the soul to receive the light of the supremo knowledge which consists in seeing that the ignorantly conceived individual self is nothing but the Absolute itself.) In this way it may be fated that such a being or beings may attain Moksa—the Summum Bonum. It is difficult to see where, want of self-confidence, helplessness or indolence comes in. Such a man will be inspired by the kind of spirit which, according to the champions of free will, should animate the ideally virtuous man, viz. that of doing duty for duty's sake and not with an eye to the advantages accruing therefrom. On the other hand, a man who is not gifted with the power of such philosophic reflection, will remain blissfully under the delusion that he has in him the freedom to achieve his own welfare. Here again there cannot be any question of his being in any way depressed or diffident or lazy. In no case, therefore, will the Karma doctrine, fatalistic as it is, produce the lethargy which it is feared it may produce.

“But let us assume that the Free Will doctrine is the truer of the two. What is the resulting improvement? It is true that credit for good conduct will be given to the good will of the good man, while the bad man will be awarded discredit. But then if again the former question is asked—why is it that one free man is able to restrain his evil propensities, while another equally free man is not? what is the answer that may be supplied? There is no means of solving the difficulty except by saying that one is fated to be good and another fated to be bad.” Thus from a practical point of view there is no difference between the two views except that the meaning of such words as Virtue, Vice, Merit, Sin, Guilt etc. would be slightly different in the two theories. Guilt or sin, for instance, would imply in one case the idea of responsibility and deserve to be punished retributively whereas, in the other case, the same would be regarded as weakness or defect of the soul, requiring

a curative treatment. Sin in this latter view would not in principle, be different from physical or aesthetic disability—a matter of defective natural endowment. This may be looked upon as scandalous in some quarters. But if freedom cannot be philosophically justified, little store need be put by merely sentimental considerations.

Let us not pursue the question further. (Whether freedom is a fact or a fiction is a metaphysical problem and is not germane to the present discussion, which is simply aimed at finding out the circumstances under which different types of Ethics flourish. (It is, however, noteworthy that in an elaborate work of Ethics, recently contributed to the Library of Philosophy, Hartmann the author—a clear and convincing writer—admits at the end of a voluminous treatment of 'Freedom' that in spite of a strong feeling in favour of freedom, what can be established logically is only that the existence of Freedom is highly probable.)

Whatever may be the metaphysical decision on the point, it is a fact that Hinduism has not accepted the Doctrine of Free Will. Tilak, in his monumental work on the Bhagavadgita, argues in favour of personal freedom, but his argument leaves the reader unconvinced. *Pace* Tilak, Hinduism is a determinist scheme of existence and that is in keeping with the Universalistic view of Life which pervades it. Its social system, of which the division of mankind into four principal castes is an outstanding feature, its recognition of the divine right of Kings, its anti-democratic political creed—all point to a view which is opposed to individualism. Further, it is a religion-ridden system. These two characteristics are, as suggested in the theory put forth in this paper fatal to the development of a separate science of Ethics. Of course, Ethical thought is not absent from Hinduism, and it is possible to carve out therefrom a system of Ethics that can be labelled as Hindu Ethics. This is possible because of the

fact that the Religion of the Hindus is philosophical. It is philosophy turned into religion. Consequently it takes under its charge all the aspects of the life of a human being. So that from birth to death and from sun rise to sun rise, a Hindu is under the watchful eye of his religion. No wonder then that the Ethical philosophy of the Hindus should be a part and parcel of their philosophico-religious system and should not appear as an independent head of philosophic speculation. Ethical conduct is, with the Hindus ancillary to the realisation of the ultimate goal of Existence proclaimed by their religion.

—Moksa

Suggestions for
A New Theory of Emotion.
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

(*Psychology Section*)

BY

Dr. SUHRIT CHANDRA MITRA,

There are noticeable in the modern academic world a keen interest in the study of feelings and emotions and an unusual effort to understand their workings from various standpoints. The holding of the Wittenberg Symposium is an evidence of it. Thirty-four eminent psychologists of international fame have grappled with diverse aspects of this problem and have made their valuable contributions towards its solution. No one would find better materials to start a fresh discussion on the subject than the volume on *Feelings and Emotions*, edited by Carl Murchison and published in 1928 by the Clark University Press. It makes a present to the world of the considered views and mature opinions of the leading psychologists of the day on the question of feelings and emotions. Therefore I need make no apology in accepting this book as representing the current academic position with regard to the question at issue.

When founders or accredited representatives of different schools of psychology are invited to deliver lectures on the same psychological topic, it may easily be conjectured that each will emphasise his own particular viewpoint and discuss, within the limits of the time allowed, such other schools as he seriously considers to be its rivals. The present symposium is no exception and accordingly we find different viewpoints urged with great force and cogent arguments.

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When founders or accredited representatives of different schools of psychology are invited to deliver lectures on the same psychological topic, it may easily be conjectured that each will emphasise his own particular viewpoint and discuss, within the limits of the time allowed, such other schools as he seriously considers to be its rivals. The present symposium is no exception and accordingly we find different viewpoints urged with great force and cogent arguments.

With refreshing candour Bentley asks there whether the subject of emotion is after all still anything more than a mere chapter-heading in the text-books of psychology. In putting the question in that form he has boldly given expression to what many a less vocal worker in the field felt but dared not utter. I wonder if, after the close of the Symposium, Bentley has felt any necessity of changing his views or modifying his attitude. Has he, for example, been able to find that the diversity of opinions has lessened to a certain extent or to satisfy himself that the problems have approached nearer solution?

But whether we are satisfied with the present position of the problem or not, there is one question relating to its past career which interests us. The present conflict may be explained by the fact that the scientific interest in the subject of emotion is of comparatively recent origin and it may be that we have not as yet discovered the proper method or the right technique of studying this particular phenomenon. What I would like to enquire, however, is why emotion did not so long receive that amount of attention from the psychologists, which, by virtue of its importance in the mental life of man, it so richly deserved and why it has suddenly become such a fascinating problem as to call forth even a Symposium on the subject by the most eminent psychologists of the day.

The answers most commonly given are that feelings and emotions are such peculiarly elusive states of the mind that they do not subject themselves so easily to objective study as other mental states do. It is difficult to engender in the laboratory a real virile emotional state in the subject's mind for the purposes of experimental study. For these reasons, though interest was not lacking, results were so few. I maintain, however, that these are only half-truths which, though partially serving to answer the first part of my question, fail completely

to account for the sudden accession of unprecedented interest in the problems of emotion. The answer should be sought elsewhere. To me it seems that the explanation at once becomes easy if we only remember that the renaissance of emotion in psychology has coincided with the discovery of the unconscious by Freud. This coincidence is not an accidental one, as Jastrow has said, but it has more significance and greater consequence than Jastrow would like to admit. It is this one single fact that has been primarily responsible for the impetus given to the study of feelings and emotions. Freud took the lid off the mind and all that lay hidden underneath became revealed. The gates were opened and the prisoners at once escaped. The individual became conscious of the powerful emotions that move him and psychologists were compelled to pay attention to them. In other words, the newly released emotions spread over all and everybody had to take notice of them. At the same time that Freud was reconstructing theoretically the individual man after ridding him of his repressions, the world was practically carrying out the task of reconstructing itself and removing its own repressions. The war ruthlessly broke down all barriers with the consequence that the elemental passions of mankind and their forceful emotions, repressed so long by the process of civilisation, dashed out of the caves in their undisguised nakedness and throbbing with all their unmitigated virility. A surer test and a better experiment no psychological theory had found before. Freud was fortunate, as no theorist ever was, that just as he was beginning to forecast the inevitable consequences of unnatural repressions the world staged a large-scale experiment, unsurpassed before in its magnitude, to put his bold assertions to the test and to prove his fundamental assumptions to be valid.

I have drawn pointed attention to these historical events because it is my earnest desire to emphasise the fact

that emotions in their pure and original forms were not accessible to us so long and therefore a proper perspective for their study was not hitherto obtained. Titchener in his *Text-Book of Psychology* has said that man boasts of being a thinking animal, but how little in reality does the average person think in all his life; he goes on almost always accepting facts uncritically and conforming to traditions unreflectively. Similar remarks, I think, may be made regarding the average person's emotional life. How little real emotion does he feel in all his life! His feelings are mostly a matter of habit and his emotions are regulated by the conventions of society. How is it possible under the modern conditions of life to experience the rich varieties of emotion with all their different nuances and shadings? The emotions that have been studied so long in the laboratories or by professional psychologists are only skeletons or are at best but feeble and considerably attenuated forms of their originals. Psychological research with the help of biology and physiology has done much to point out the external and environmental conditions under the pressure of which the manifestations of emotions have gradually changed their forms. But not until the study of abnormal minds in the neurological clinics and mental hospitals began to make itself felt, did the nature of emotion as such receive the legitimate attention that it deserves and emotion find its proper place in psychological investigations. It was never properly realised before, for example, that what is expressed as undue resentment of A towards B may only be an indication of the strong attachment that the former feels towards the latter. While the forms as also the transformations of the expressions of emotions have been studied with great success by able physiologists, the subtle and manifold sublimations of the emotions themselves have only been very dimly apprehended as yet.

If all that I have said above be true, as I believe they are, the first remark that I would make with regard to the

book *Feelings and Emotions* as a whole is that too little and unduly limited space has been allotted to psychoanalytical findings. The grouping together of psychoanalysis with the pathology of feeling and emotion into a separate part may be justified by the fact that the psychoanalysts have so far dealt mainly with pathological cases; but it should not go unchallenged if it betrays any unwillingness on the part of the organisers of the Symposium to recognise that psychoanalysis has any contribution to make to normal psychology. The psychoanalysts are mostly medical men and naturally it is the diseased minds that often approach them and which they get frequent opportunities of studying. It is not their fault, therefore, that they have not as yet made adequate contribution to the traditional topics of psychology. It is the duty, on the other hand, of the academic psychologists now to try to assimilate the large mass of new information that the former have placed before them and to attempt to incorporate it into the general body of scientific knowledge on psychological matters. The habit of keeping the eyes shut and pretending that there is nothing to be seen is as detrimental to the cause of science as it is useless in the case of ostriches. I do not know, of course, whether any invitation was issued to Freud, Jones, Brill, or other eminent authorities of this school of thought to join the Symposium. All that I can do in this connection is to express, on behalf of a very large body of workers I am sure, a deeply felt regret that a book so valuable in itself in all other respects should be lacking in the most essential article of value.

From the standpoint of descriptive psychology Krueger's treatment of the subject is one of the finest specimens of keen observation, close thinking and logical consistency. His one attempt is to keep as rigidly true in his description to observed phenomena as possible. Though his own article is presented in a rather difficult style, partly due to the limitations of trans-

lation, the essence of his theory has been made clear by the questions and answers that followed the reading of the paper by Dr. Schneider. His theory is based on the fundamental observation which cannot be seriously questioned by anybody, viz., that at any moment our experience is always of a complex totel consisting of parts organised into one whole. Feelings, he says, are the complex qualities of the experienced totality. There is a continuum of qualitative changes in our experience and therefore feelings can pass over steadily from one into another and even change into their qualitative opposites. There is no limit to the kinds of feeling that can be experienced. The Gestalt principle is adopted but it is subsumed under another inclusive principle of *Ganzheit*. His conception of the feeling-like forms of experience reminds us of similar conceptions in our Indian system of thought, viz., *Rasābhāsa*, *Gīdābhāsa*, etc., and the urge towards totality that he assumes is of special value as an explanatory principle.

I must confess, however, that I have some misgivings as to whether I have properly understood Krueger's theory. I feel, for example, that no attempt has been made to bring the manifold varieties of feelings, which according to him we experience, into relation either with the varieties of complex totalities or with the drive towards the *Ganzheit*. Does he imply that feeling is the background of all experience when he speaks of the "*bewusstseinerfüllende Breite*, a spread which fills consciousness completely"? Are feelings the functions of the complex totalities, or is it the feelings that are responsible for the degree and the quality of the organisation that the parts have achieved in the total whole? It is true that there is a continuum of qualitative changes in the experience of a normal man, but there may sometimes be serious disruptions of this continuity, as is evidenced in the cases of double personality or multiple personality. Besides, it seems that Krueger has entirely disregarded the unconscious factors which

are partly responsible for bringing about the apparent phenomenal continuity of the normal man's experience. The rôle of feelings in the socio-cultural development of mankind has been ably depicted, but the part that emotions play in the development of the individual has not, I think, been sufficiently touched upon. I hope my revered teacher will not take any offence if I record here the total impression that I formed after the perusal of his contribution to the Symposium. It seemed to me that he was rather too preoccupied with the totality concept and was more anxious to demonstrate the applicability of the concept to feelings also than to give us an analysis of the feelings themselves. Even his very description of feelings seems to be a deduction from the concept.

Claparède's defence of the peripheral theory of James-Lange is clever, but it misses the point of the objection. Can we, for example, describe in a similar way our perception of 'redness' as the consciousness of a form of nervous impression? Physiologically, we may say that these organic changes accompany the emotions that we experience; but that does not give us any idea as to the quality of the experience as such. All attempts at a purely physiological explanation of emotion are entirely one-sided. No one can be unmindful of the highly interesting and immensely valuable physiological researches that have been conducted by Cannon, Bekhterev and others in connection with emotion. The scientific world is indebted to them for their contributions. But we agree whole-heartedly with Prince when he tells them and the Behaviourists, "God-speed to you. Go as far as you can go; but you are bound to come up against a stone wall somewhere, sometime, and you have finally got to come to conscious experience".

From the functional standpoint, Claparède considers emotion as a regression of conduct and Howard maintains that it is a state of disruption. There are some who emphasise feel-

lation, the essence of his theory has been made clear by the questions and answers that followed the reading of the paper by Dr. Schneider. His theory is based on the fundamental observation which cannot be seriously questioned by anybody, viz., that at any moment our experience is always of a complex total consisting of parts organised into one whole. Feelings, he says, are the complex qualities of the experienced totality. There is a continuum of qualitative changes in our experience and therefore feelings can pass over steadily from one into another and even change into their qualitative opposites. There is no limit to the kinds of feeling that can be experienced. The Gestalt principle is adopted but it is subsumed under another inclusive principle of *Ganzheit*. His conception of the feeling-like forms of experience reminds us of similar conceptions in our Indian system of thought, viz., *Rasābhāsa*, *Ālābhāsa*, etc., and the urge towards totality that he assumes is of special value as an explanatory principle.

I must confess, however, that I have some misgivings as to whether I have properly understood Krueger's theory. I feel, for example, that no attempt has been made to bring the manifold varieties of feelings, which according to him we experience, into relation either with the varieties of complex totalities or with the drive towards the *Ganzheit*. Does he imply that feeling is the background of all experience when he speaks of the "*bewusstseinerfüllende Breite*, a spread which fills consciousness completely"? Are feelings the functions of the complex totalities, or is it the feelings that are responsible for the degree and the quality of the organisation that the parts have achieved in the total whole? It is true that there is a continuum of qualitative changes in the experience of a normal man, but there may sometimes be serious disruptions of this continuity, as is evidenced in the cases of double personality or multiple personality. Besides, it seems that Krueger has entirely disregarded the unconscious factors which

are partly responsible for bringing about the apparent phenomenal continuity of the normal man's experience. The rôle of feelings in the socio-cultural development of mankind has been ably depicted, but the part that emotions play in the development of the individual has not, I think, been sufficiently touched upon. I hope my revered teacher will not take any offence if I record here the total impression that I formed after the perusal of his contribution to the Symposium. It seemed to me that he was rather too preoccupied with the totality concept and was more anxious to demonstrate the applicability of the concept to feelings also than to give us an analysis of the feelings themselves. Even his very description of feelings seems to be a deduction from the concept.

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is an attitude involving a reaction to a situation. Undoubtedly this is verified, as Titchener says, in certain forms of emotion, but there are intermediate cases where this is not attested.

The only difference which we can reasonably assume to exist between feelings and emotions is a difference in complexity. Feelings and emotions are species of the same mental genus; the former may under certain conditions assume the form of the latter and the latter similarly may degenerate into the former.

It is a commonplace in psychological text-books that attention destroys feelings and emotion paralyses thought. Feelings can never be objects of presentation, as Ward has said, and Washburn has discussed the relation between emotion and thought according to her motor theory. But the implication of this very obvious fact of daily observation seems to me to be of more far-reaching consequence than is generally recognised. That emotion can be controlled by thought and that thought can be paralysed by emotion may be put into this form that both of these mental states cannot be simultaneously present in the individual's experience. If we assume that these are but two kinds of transformation of the same limited amount of energy, the fact becomes explainable that one can develop or gain in intensity only at the cost of the other. And that is what, I maintain, commonly happens. Normally none of these forms assumes such intensity, *i. e.*, draws so much energy unto itself, as to leave no supply for the other kind of transformation. But there are extreme cases and it is then that we observe the above mentioned phenomena of thought controlling emotion and emotion paralysing thought. In training our children it had been the fashion so long to emphasise the exclusive culture of that kind of transformation of the mental energy which underlies the intellectual development. The baneful effects of this procedure have been made apparent by modern students of child minds and the danger of neglect-

ings as the characteristic of emotions, but Howard thinks that neither the sensation elements nor the feeling elements are in the focus of consciousness in an emotional state. We shall, however, have occasion later to refer to one idea of his which he expresses in the following sentence: "The affective tones which introspectionists describe—or try to describe—are probably present in all our experience".

Feelings have been distinguished from emotions on various principles. Claparède says "Feelings are useful in our conduct while emotions serve no purpose". Also that feelings and emotions are distinguished not only by their quality and their intensity but also by their depth. "The pain which a pin-prick causes me may be much more intense than the pain which is produced by the news of a shipwreck of a boat full of passengers, but the latter is assuredly a deeper pain". McDougall maintains that in a developed individual the feelings are always complex and never oscillate between mere pleasure and pain. This complexity has been introduced as a result of the development of the individual's cognitive power, as a result of his having learnt, i. e., 'to look before and after and pine for what is not.' These complex feelings however are to be distinguished from the emotions. The former are conditioned by the degrees of success and failure of our striving whereas the true emotional qualities are prior to and independent of success and failure. "The true emotions, on the other hand, must be supposed to be of very much earlier appearance in the evolutionary scale" than the complex feelings. The complex feelings might have developed later and therefore can be distinguished from emotions; but what about the simple feelings? What, according to McDougall, would be the criterion of differentiation between simple feelings or those that he describes as primary, and the emotions?

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ing the emotions has been pointed out in this book by Terry. It is a truism that children are more emotional than the adults, and the savages more so than the civilised. My contention is that both phylogeny and ontogeny illustrate this fundamental fact that feeling or emotion is the primitive mental characteristic out of which and at the expense of which all others have developed. The type of thinking and outlook on life that a man, whether normal, abnormal or super-normal, develops in later life is determined by the way in which this original feeling-nature of his has been treated. Titchener's definition of affection as unclear sensation fits in with the theory that a wise man is he who has transcended the tyrannies of passions and emotions. It need not be assumed, however, that I subscribe to this definition of wisdom; what I am seeking to convey is that the growth of the intellectual powers can only take place at the expense of the emotional equipment.

Consider, for example, perception. That perception is not conditioned by external factors alone is not a novel statement to make. It has been observed that a bush may easily be perceived as a bear under the stress of fear. But there need not be any highly excited state of emotion to transform the object of perception. What happens in an intense form in that exaggerated state of emotion takes place in normal proportions at the ordinary state of feeling—at the state which Krueger would perhaps describe as the feeling-like state. Numerous quantitative experiments have recently been performed both here and abroad on the lifting of weights and all have testified to the great influence that the attitudes play in the perception of weights or in the perception of the difference between weights. By simple tests and easy methods Bose demonstrated the same phenomenon in some other cases of perception¹. Perception being an interpretation of a clue, as Hollingworth

1. *Is Perception an Illusion?* By Dr. G. Bose—*Ind. J. of Psy.*, Vol. I (1926), p. 135ff.

has defined it, must vary with the variation of the interpretation. And nothing is so obvious as that the powers of interpretation possessed by different persons vary according to their age, sex, training, and temperament. In other words, the interpretation differs in accordance with the difference in the original feeling equipment and the way in which it has been modified.

Common observation points out similar differences between man and man as regards other manifestations of intellectual activity, *e. g.*, memory, etc. Differential psychology has attempted precise measurement of these differences and has sought to express them in quantitative terms. But it is psychoanalysis that has demonstrated the rôle of feelings in producing these differences. The psychopathology of everyday life explains particular slips of memory or lapses of language, etc. But the application of this principle to all such cases of a single individual will easily account for the type of memory that the person possesses. In describing cases of affective transfer and affective expansion Titchener came very near recognising this influence of feelings on our thoughts and daily activities, but as he, out of methodological considerations, determined not to transgress the conscious field of experience, he deliberately refrained from taking the final step—to the satisfaction of many, it must be confessed, but at the expense of sacrificing America's leadership in academic psychology.

I have made it sufficiently clear, I hope, that I regard feeling as at once the background and the source of all our experience and as the essence of what we call mind. Consciousness forms only a part of mind, a very small part as is now well-known, and therefore cannot be properly regarded as the essential characteristic of it. That is my first assumption. My second assumption is that this mind is dynamic in nature. Now none of these assumptions is novel. The former is as old

as Plato and the second is current coin in most of the modern psychological schools. The combination of these two yields the concept of 'dynamic feeling' which may be described as a yearning. Plato calls this Eros or Love, and Freud describes it as Libido. The goal of this Eros, according to Plato, is Immortality or Eternal Happiness. For happiness is what all men desire. Of the Libido the goal is the satisfaction of itself by overcoming the conflicts that the Ego has inevitably to meet with by virtue of its living amidst natural and social surroundings. Bose maintains that Wish, taking it in its usual sense, is the primal factor in mental life and actions are prompted by the fact that there is always a repressed wish contradictory to the one in the conscious field.

All these views, however, can be reconciled if a third assumption be made regarding the aim of the Eros or Libido or Wish. Let us assume that mind is at first a vast store of potential energy in a state of perfectly stable equilibrium, quite content and at harmony with itself. The external world enters this mind through the channels of the senses and makes impressions on it. The equilibrium is at once disturbed, and the harmony destroyed. Some of the potential energy is changed into kinetic form and activity is initiated in order to regain the lost equilibrium and the disturbed harmony. I suggest, therefore, that the fundamental yearning of the Ego is for that harmony which it has lost simultaneously with its coming into the world. Pleasant is the primal state of harmony, the disturbances are unpleasant. I would define pleasantness as simply the experience of the harmony and unpleasantness as the contrary experience. A perfectly harmonious state free from all disturbances is the *Ānandam* of our *śāstras*. The world does not cease to act but goes on continuously to inflict itself on the Ego with the result that the original harmony, first disturbed by the act of birth, cannot be fully gained again except at the cost of life itself. It would

seem therefore that there is a yearning in every man even for that blissful state of lifelessness itself. And I take it that that is what Freud describes as the instinct for death. Various are the means adopted by the mind to retain and realise even some sort of temporary harmony amidst the incessant attacks from different quarters. It is the main task of psychology to study these ways and means, surrogates and substitutes, that are employed by the mind for regaining the Paradise that has been lost. Habits develop of meeting, with the least disturbance of harmony, particular stimuli or groups of stimuli in particular ways and that is Perception.

Out of these conflicts of activities arises Reason also. It is a special modification of the uppermost layer of the mind, as it were, attempting to serve the purpose of preventing extreme dislocations of the harmonious arrangements within. It is however one of the highest Rationalisations of Nature, as it pretends to be what it is not and has succeeded for generations in imposing itself on all as the only saviour of mind. It even went so far, some centuries ago, as to claim a divine origin and to insist on its fundamental difference from all other properties of mind, i. e., from all other means by which mind attempts to reach the state of harmony again. But I particularly remember here a relevant passage from Huxley where he says, "We might parry the question whether animals reason by asking whether man reasons, and there would not be wanting plausible grounds for answering the latter question with a negative".¹ Besides, the mode of behaviour of reason itself unmistakably testifies to its fundamental identity with the primal yearning for harmony. Not only has the course of its evolution been promoted by that yearning, but even when it works for itself without reference to any specific demand from outside, all that it seeks is harmony. For what else is Logic

1. Huxley, *Mind in Evolution* (1915), p. 347.

but an effort to establish consistency either with the various premises themselves or with the premises within and the world outside?

Different schools of philosophy, as different intellectual systems, are but different ways of rediscovering lost harmony. Herbart, the great champion of reason, found the task of metaphysics to be freeing the general ideas from the contradictions that they contain. He named his philosophical treatise on education as *The Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe*. Is not the term 'aesthetic' significant? Kant's great mission was to bring back to philosophy that harmony which he had lost by the conflict of the two opposing schools of thought, viz., Rationalism and Empiricism. Hegel's dialectic is the continued attempt to establish a Synthesis between the Thesis and the Antithesis. The view has been expressed that progress always proceeds by way of over-emphasising now one aspect and then another. Without subscribing to the implication of the word 'progress' I readily agree with the view, for that only illustrates my fundamental conception. According to the principle of harmony the disturbed equilibrium caused by the over-emphasis of one aspect must necessarily be sought to be counterbalanced by the subsequent over-emphasis of the previously neglected aspect.

It is unnecessary for me to refer to Aesthetics for the support of my contention. For harmony is universally accepted keynote of all artistic creations and aesthetic appreciation. I shall only refer to Langfeld where he speaks of coming rise to artistic creation. "The conflict is a state of tension, which frequently goes over into an emotion, of discomfort (or unpleasantness, if one agrees that the conflict is the urge towards continued action, of insufficiency, until an adjustment is made. Such is the first artistic production".

when all efforts fail to overcome the threatening situation. When an unexpected event suddenly disturbs the equilibrium we are in a dangerous situation and the consequent loss of harmony is 'Fear'; when an expected danger threatens the equilibrium we are in a state of Anxiety. So the various forms of emotion are but different attempts made to recover or maintain the equilibrium that is lost or threatened.

These are in broad outlines what happens in normal life. The various conditions under which the original yearning for harmony assumes the different transformations, which we describe by the different names of the emotions, have just begun to be more fully studied. Psychoanalysis and abnormal psychology will give us by and by more materials to build up a systematic theory about them. The latter gets plentiful opportunities of studying the exaggerated manifestations of the emotions and their interrelations with each other. As Janet says, "Don't let us forget that the disease only magnifies facts which exist in everybody. Doubtless, veritable melancholia is a disease, but sadness in its most simple form is, after all, identical with melancholia and contains the same fear of action"¹. The former, though now still confined to pathological cases, will one day, I am convinced, be a method of studying normal minds too. I have once before pleaded for the recognition of psychoanalysis in the text-book of psychology as a legitimate method of obtaining normal psychological data². I take this opportunity of once more pleading for the same cause. It does not benefit anybody to remain wilfully ignorant. And when that is done and psychoanalysis is taken more seriously by the psychologists than at present, psychology will not be the dry and dreary subject, divorced from life, as it now is, and the subject of

1. *Feelings and Emotions* p. 309.

2. Mitra, *Psychology and Psycho-analysis*, *Ind. J. of Psy.*, Vol. V, July-October, p. 161ff.

emotion will no more be a mere chapter heading in its textbooks.

Let me present here once more in very general outlines the tentative theory relating to the emotional life of man that I have attempted to propound above. It might also be described as a theory of the mental life as a whole, because my very first assumption is that feeling constitutes the essence of mind. Every mind is a store of energy the nature of which is not at present known. Minds differ from one another in their potentialities as, to give a physical analogy, the differences in shape of the contained water are conditioned by the differences in the configurations of the containers. The original fundamental feeling of mind is the feeling of harmony. Pleasantness is the experience of this harmony. This harmony is first disturbed by the act of birth; simultaneously with that act the external world begins to thrust itself on the mind. Unpleasantness is the experience of this disturbed harmony and therefore is later in its genesis than pleasantness. This is in agreement with the view of Bose. Says he, "I would urge that originally all wishes are pleasurable and it is only when they are in conflict that unpleasantness arises".¹ Mind yearns for the lost harmony and action ensues to bring it back. Actions produce changes in the external world and these again have their reverberations in the mind. And so the conflict continues. Complexities develop in the procedure by which the external world acts on the mind and complications arise in the modes in which the mind seeks to defend itself against the violation of its harmony or to recover the lost equilibrium. Thinking develops as a mode of defence and of reaction. As all things made of clay bear the characteristics of clay so thinking reveals its inner nature in its efforts after consistency and harmony. The yearning to go back to the original state of harmony is the

1. Bose—*Concept of Repression* (1921), p. 55.

Death Instinct and that to maintain it for all times is the Sex Instinct. Says Plato, "Having none of the divine unchangeableness it (Eros) feels the necessity of sustaining itself by continual self-propagation. This propagative impulse is Love.So Love is, generally speaking, the endeavour..... to fill itself with what is eternal and imperishable, to generate something enduring"¹.

Not only thinking but other methods are also resorted to. Suppression and Repression, Introjection and Projection are some of the means utilised by the mind for gaining its end. These have been elaborately studied by the psychoanalysts. When a certain degree of balance is somehow maintained we have a normal mind. When the methods adopted fail in their object we have pathological cases and dissociated minds.

This view, I venture to hope, reconciles many a conflict both among the academic psychologists and among the psychoanalysts. Thus the fundamental yearning may be identified with the 'w' factor of Spearman and others of his school. This yearning however is not felt by us consciously as such. It remains therefore as the unconscious drive. Hence the necessity and importance of studying the unconscious remain. That feeling is the background of all our experience and colours them all is perhaps the view of Krueger too, as also of Dunlap who however insists only on the physiological aspects of emotion. Howard also mentions this in the quotation already cited. That it is best to consider emotion as a form of energy has been said by Prince. That there is a rich variety of feelings is not denied but this theory accords a special importance above all to pleasantness and unpleasantness. There is no difficulty in recognising Excitement as an undifferentiated emotion for which Stratton has pleaded. The theory is not opposed to physiological methods in psychological studies but is not

1. Zeller—*Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. Trans (1888), p. 193.

convinced about the sufficiency and the adequacy of such procedure. Along with the Gestaltists the totality of experience is admitted but analysis is not necessarily denied. A meaning is found for the phrase 'unbalanced mind' in connection with abnormality. Besides, Freud's Libido, Jung's Compensation, Alder's Inferiority Complex and Bosc's Opposite Wish all may find a place here without needing the slightest modifications. This I consider to be one of the special merits of the theory.

SYMPOSIUM

The Possibility of a New Morality.—I

By

J. MACKENZIE, M.A.

(*Bombay University*)

It is a remarkable fact that up to quite recent times very little consideration was given to the possibility of a morality which should differ essentially from that which was currently followed, or rather which men professed to recognise some obligation to follow. I must not state this fact too categorically, for as a sweeping generalisation it may be challenged. The history of the human race there has been great variety of behaviour, there have been varieties of values, and there have been differences in the values of particular virtues and in the order held of the relative places of these values. In spite of all these I think we may say that by the great measure of agreement amongst those who have thought on the subject of the moral life.

It is not but he struck by the way in which this is reflected in the writings of European thinkers. It is implied in the thought of the Intuitionists. However individualistic their thought may sometimes seem in form, there is none of them, among those at least who are regarded as serious thinkers, who finds in his intuitions material for all to private morality. In Butler, for example, this is clear. Recognition is not a private possession which may lead one man to a different action, another in that. It is a principle which is to be found in every man, in whom it is an expression of the

"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a *higher and more effectual sentence*, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own."

Sermon II

«The same thing comes out in Kant, when, for example, he declares an erring conscience to be a chimera, or even more clearly in his exposition of the law of reason.» One might expect something more startling from the attempt to derive morality from the bare form of reason than the very familiar duties which he actually discovers. In neither Kant nor Butler is there any radical criticism of current moral ideas. What they try to show is the source from which these ideas as properly understood have been drawn.

«John Stuart Mill is equally sure that current moral ideas owe their origin to the principle of utility. He pours scorn on the objection to utilitarianism that there is not time previous to action for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness. He says there has been ample time namely the whole past duration of the human species, during which men have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions. Like the sailor who goes to sea with the Nautical Almanack already calculated, all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their

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breakers than with political revolutionaries. They have refused in this or that detail to live what is understood as the moral life, but they have not often claimed that in so doing they were practising a higher morality. And up to recent times there has not been much evidence of serious attempts at a radical reconstruction of morality. The first important revolt in modern times was that of Nietzsche, who set out to transvalue and invert current values. He characterised the current morality of Europe as "herding-animal morality" and described the virtues of the "gregarious European man" such as public-spirit, kindness, deference, industry, temperance, modesty, indulgence, sympathy, as qualities which made him useful to the herd. It is a slave-morality, suitable for the mass of men, but not suitable for the great men in the production of whom the historical process is fulfilled.

"The essential thing in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the significance and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, *for its sake*, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is *not* allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence."

Beyond Good and evil ; P. 225.

He stands above the morality of the herd. Nietzsche makes it clear that he does not propose to restore the "blond beast" or the "robber-man". His "Vornehmer Mensch" has also a "Vornehmer Moral". He stands above the common

minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong. There is room for indefinite improvement of the corollaries from the principle of utility, but it is one thing to say that the rules of morality are improvable and another to say that we have no rules of value at all.

T. H. Green approaching the matter from a different angle, arrives at a very similar conclusion. He finds himself in agreement with Plato and Aristotle in their understanding of the good as goodness, and he says:—

"In the development of that reflective morality which our own consciences inherit, both the fundamental principle and the mode of its articulation have retained the form which they first took in the minds of the Greek philosophers When we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which, however otherwise modified, the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. It is the will to know what is true to make what is beautiful; to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (*i.e.*, to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the state, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, and to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to but what is due."

We are all familiar with the way in which Green illustrates by examination of the virtues of fortitude and temperance how our understanding of goodness has grown in fulness and determinateness.

There have always been rebels against the established morality, but the rebels, if one may develop the political analogy, have been comparable rather with criminal law-

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herd, strong and self-sufficient but at the same time self-disciplined, and imposing discipline on others.

"Every aristocratic morality is intolerant in the education of youth, in the control of women, in the marriage customs, in the relations of old and young, in the penal laws, it counts intolerance itself among the virtues, under the name of Justice."

Beyond Good and evil ; P. 235.

Among the excellences of character which belong to him are pride, venturesomeness, bravery, self assurance, the will to responsibility, the will to self mastery.

It may be said that we have here no new morality but a very old morality—a morality which would find a large measure of approval among the aristocratically minded of almost all ages. This is no doubt partly true, but there are two things which are worthy of note. *Firstly*, a considerable part of the new morality of Nietzsche represents undoubtedly a return to an older point of view; it is the old conception of the relation of the ruler to the ruled, though put in a more extreme form than it was usually put by the supporters of absolute monarchy or aristocracy. (It may be remarked in passing that in this respect it resembles a good deal which is described as new in morals.) But whatever amount of reversion there may be to older ways of thought and practice, I think Nietzsche goes beyond what has been laid down in any serious justification of caste or class in his assertion that the lower classes exist only as a scaffolding for the higher, and this is a conception which belongs to the essence of his teaching. *Secondly*, there is this other significant fact, that the gentler virtues which involve love and self sacrifice—the virtues which have been generally supposed to be the finest flowers to be developed in the evolution of the moral life—that these virtues are despised and rejected in favour of qualities of aggressiveness and

self-assertiveness. It is one thing to follow the lower and more primitive when there is nothing else to follow, it is another thing to follow it in preference to the more highly developed. And in this Nietzsche's ethic may be regarded as new.

I have mentioned Nietzsche's ethic not as one which is specially influential at the present time, though I admit that it is difficult to gauge the extent of his influence. I have been interested in him as the man who in recent times first applied radical criticism to current morality. Since his time, and more particularly within the last fifteen years or so, there has been a great deal of radical criticism, some of it almost entirely destructive, some of it accompanied by constructive ideas. We cannot ignore the large place which this criticism occupies in the current thought and practice of the day and not least the fiction of the day. We are familiar with the saying that metaphysics is the giving of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct. We might say with as much truth that ethics is the giving of bad reasons for what we practise by instinct. There is at least enough truth in the saying to prevent us from ignoring ethical tendencies that are not rooted in profound systematic thinking.

The most striking feature of present-day life is probably the revolt from authority. This is not in itself a new thing, but what I think is significant at the present time is the widespread questioning of authority in almost all of its spheres—religious, political, and social, as well as moral. This is on the negative side. On the positive side there is the demand for freedom—freedom for self-expression, it is often put. The Hegelians made familiar to us a conception of freedom, for the presentation of which they made large use of New Testament terminology. There is a bondage which is the

herd, strong and self-sufficient but at the same time self-disciplined, and imposing discipline on others.

"Every aristocratic morality is intolerant in the education of youth, in the control of women, in the marriage customs, in the relations of old and young, in the penal laws, it counts intolerance itself among the virtues, under the name of Justice."

Beyond Good and evil ; P. 235.

Among the excellences of character which belong to him are pride, venturesomeness, bravery, self-assurance, the will to responsibility, the will to self-mastery.

It may be said that we have here no new morality but a very old morality—a morality which would find a large measure of approval among the aristocratically minded of almost all ages. This is no doubt partly true, but there are two things which are worthy of note. Firstly, a considerable part of the new morality of Nietzsche represents undoubtedly a return to an older point of view; it is the old conception of the relation of the ruler to the ruled, though put in a more extreme form than it was usually put by the supporters of absolute monarchy or aristocracy. (It may be remarked in passing that in this respect it resembles a good deal which is described as now in morals.) But whatever amount of reversion there may be to older ways of thought and practice, I think Nietzsche goes beyond what has been laid down in any serious justification of caste or class in his assertion that the lower classes exist only as a scaffolding for the higher, and this is a conception which belongs to the essence of his teaching. Secondly, there is this other significant fact, that the gentler virtues which involve love and self-sacrifice—the virtues which have been generally supposed to be the finest flowers to be developed in the evolution of the moral life—that these virtues are despised and rejected in favour of qualities of aggressiveness and

of the day are justified. We cannot call a revolt against established morality or a demand for free expression by the name of a new morality, for morality means more than this—it means *mores*. Accordingly, if this were all, there would be no occasion for this discussion. But there are proposals of a more systematic and constructive kind for what does merit the name of a new morality. The term has been specially associated with the name of Lord Russell, (better known as Mr. Bertrand Russell), but he is only the most outstanding of a considerable group of thinkers. They are concerned more especially with sexual ethics, but by no means to the exclusion of other departments of human conduct. Lord Russell himself has said that “the received moral code, in so far as it is taught in education and embodied in public opinion or the criminal law, should be carefully examined in each generation, to see whether it still serves to achieve desirable ends, and, if not, in what respects it needs to be amended.”

I do not propose to enter into any detailed discussion of sexual ethics in the light of these ideas. But there are one or two things to which I think I may properly draw attention. In the first place it is difficult to deny the great ethical importance of the family as an institution. The fact that, there are unhappy families and families that are ethically ineffective or worse need not be denied. But on the other hand we shall probably agree that the family has not only served as the most valuable of all spheres for the ethical training of the young, but that it has also been the sphere in which much that is finest in the moral life has found its expression.) Proposals for making the family less permanent, or for impairing its unity either by lightening the obligations which the members owe to each other or by licensing promiscuous sexual relations,—proposals such as these must mean very considerable moral loss, unless it be shown that there are compensating advantages. The advantages which are alleged

condition of freedom, a death which is the condition of life. The modern spirit in its more extreme expressions will have none of this, but seeks free expression for the free spirit. Established institutions are irksome and the recognised virtues are stodgy. They carry no evidence either within themselves or without why they should have the right to compel our conformity to them, and we may with a good conscience ignore them if we feel that they hamper our free life. I have stated this briefly and dogmatically as a tendency in our modern life, but it would not be difficult to demonstrate it from much of the literature of the day.

It is with reference to this very widespread tendency and not any systematic formulation of new moral ideas that some of the most vigorous criticisms of the "new morality" have been made. Here is one that has met my eye as I have been preparing this paper, a quotation from a new book by Professor Jose Ortega Y Gasset:

"Do not believe a word you hear from the young when they talk about the "new morality". I absolutely deny that there exists to-day in any corner of the Continent a group inspired by a new ethos which shows signs of being a moral code. When people talk of the "new morality" they are merely committing a new immorality and looking for a way of introducing contraband goods. Hence it would be a piece of ingenuousness to accuse the man of to-day of his lack of moral code. The accusation would leave him cold, or, rather would flatter him. Immoralism has become a commonplace, and anybody and every body boasts of practising it".

If it be true, as this writer asserts, that there is no group inspired by a new ethos which shows signs of being a moral code, then the strictures which he passes on the "immoralism"

of the day are justified. We cannot call a revolt against established morality or a demand for free expression by the name of a new morality, for morality means more than this—it means *meres*. Accordingly, if this were all, there would be no occasion for this discussion. But there are proposals of a more systematic and constructive kind for what does merit the name of a new morality. The term has been specially associated with the name of Lord Russell, (better known as Mr. Bertrand Russell), but he is only the most outstanding of a considerable group of thinkers. They are concerned more especially with sexual ethics, but by no means to the exclusion of other departments of human conduct. Lord Russell himself has said that “the received moral code, in so far as it is taught in education and embodied in public opinion or the criminal law, should be carefully examined in each generation, to see whether it still serves to achieve desirable ends, and, if not, in what respects it needs to be amended.”

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are, I believe, greater freedom for the individual for self-expression and deliverance from the narrowness and selfishness which the family embodies. In regard to this experience may help us to form a judgment, but for the present my impression is that the experience which is available is not particularly convincing. Further there has to be taken into account the fact that the weakening of family bonds means that increasing responsibility must fall on other bodies for the care of the young, and it is rather surprising that some of the apostles of freedom should look to the state as the institution to which the burden should be transferred. I shall return to this presently when I come on to look briefly at another present-day tendency.

There is another aspect to the matter, and with regard to it I shall now say a few words. Some at least of those who stand for a reformed sexual morality are concerned less with the institutional side of morality than with its personal side. I think of a writer such as Mr. Joad, who thinks that with the discovery of means of birth-control the bottom has gone out of sexual morality, and who in regard to this department of conduct seems to teach that pleasure is the guide. This point of view seems to me to be extremely unsatisfactory. There is no sphere of human activity in which there is more need for the virtue which the Greeks called *sophrosune*—self-control or temperance. And I believe I am right in asserting that experience shows that on any view of the moral end—whether it be pleasure or self-realisation or reason—this virtue is necessary for its attainment. I shall not develop this point, but I believe it to be of great importance.

The term "The New Morality" has by some writers been appropriated to these revolutionary ideas regarding family relationships and sexual morality generally, and this whole

question has been discussed, with special reference to the views of Lord Russell in an interesting book by Mr. Newsom, Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge. But we are concerned here with these views not as setting forth *the* new morality, but as illustrating in one particular way the wider question which we have set ourselves of the possibility of *a* new morality. We have another important illustration on a larger scale and in more thorough-going style in the actual morality of the Soviet Republic.

Many questions force themselves upon us when we give our attention even in the most cursory way to the principles of Bolshevism. There is for example the whole materialistic view of history which serves as a background for all Bolshevik thinking. There is again the explicit doctrine of the nature of morality which appears against this background. Here, for example, are the words of Lenin :—

"In our opinion morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of the class war ; everything is moral which is necessary for the annihilation of the old exploiting social order and for the uniting of the proletariat. Our morality thus consists solely in close discipline and in conscious war against the exploiters. We do not believe in eternal principles of morality, and we will expose this deception. Communist morality is identical with the fight for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

There is again the actual content of the moral life as so conceived, and in regard to this certain things stand out. What seems to me to be most important in this is not the emphasis which the Bolshevik lays upon a more satisfactory distribution of material goods among the people, for the question of distribution is exercising the minds of all socialists and of many who are not socialists. It is the complete

spheres of the operation of the mating and the parental instincts can be separated, so far at least as whole communities of human beings are concerned. This is to take the case at its simplest. In the developed human family we are carried far beyond the mere primary instincts into a region in which many of men's highest purposes find their fulfilment and their finest emotions are evoked.

Again, the state is unfitted for another reason to take the place of the family. The very unwieldiness of the state disqualifies it for meeting the social needs of men. Apart altogether from the question of mating and parenthood, there must be social units of limited size, in which the members are bound together by ties of affections and a purpose of mutual helpfulness. Associations like clubs and societies only go a little way towards meeting this need. There may be occasional people who find complete social satisfaction without family life, but these people must be rare and unusual.

Let me, lastly, say a few words regarding the Soviet attitude to property. The case here is a little confused by the fact that there is to-day very general recognition of the desirability of putting limits and restrictions on the possession of property. This recognition is largely the outcome of the modern phenomenon of the accumulation of immense wealth, with the power which this involves over the destinies of masses of their fellow men, in the hands of individuals. The Bolsheviks aimed at a practically complete nationalisation of property, but they speedily found themselves faced with difficulties, particularly in regard to land and agricultural produce. They have effectually demolished capitalism; the question is whether they have in so doing demolished something more, which is essential to the moral life. In an interesting article on "The Ethics of Communism" in the *Journal of*

Philosophical Studies for April 1928, Professor Laird discusses the ethical significance of property. He remarks :—

"The old individualist argument that private property is the necessary incentive to industry seems to me a huge *petitio principii*. Among the wealthy by which private property is notoriously an incentive to idleness."

No one will deny this. But there is a kind of private property which has nothing to do with bloated wealth—with the exploitation of others or the disintegration of the character of the possessor. There is that kind and that degree of property which is the natural extension of a man's personality—the instruments by means of which he may express himself. A man's body and mind are his own, and cannot in any real sense of the term be communalised. Neither can his clothes or his home—at any rate with profit to himself and to the community. The skilled craftsman cannot do his best work with community tools nor the artist with community implements. One might extend the list. but the principle is clear.

In regard to both the family and property anyone can see how they may, and in certain circumstances do, stand in the way of "the brotherly union of all men." Any association of men may do so, and any right which men may claim may do so. But attempts at the abolition of either the family or property in the interests of better human relationships seem to me to be certain to defeat their own end. The affections, of the family may be "the germ of all public affections", and they are so in the normal family. Property in all respectable communities is used on the whole so as to benefit and not to injure the other members of the community. We can no doubt find many instances to the contrary, but I cannot believe that the remedy for this is the abolition of

property and the family and the bringing of all men into direct dependence on the state

I have dealt briefly and inadequately with these ways in which we see the attempt being made to break not with traditional morality in the strict sense—for we are continually breaking with parts of it—but with what seems to be in the true line of evolution in morality. If morality be a living spiritual thing and not merely a set of customs which have won respect by their age, then it must be capable of adjusting itself to new conditions. But I do not believe that any development will lead to the supersession of the virtues which have been recognised since the days of the early Greeks. There will doubtless be changes in emphasis, and there will be, as there has been, a deeper understanding of all that is involved in them. But it is hard to think of any circumstances that will render them obsolete. As for institutions there are great possibilities of change. But I have given some reasons for believing that the institution of the family has a necessary place in human society

SYMPOSIUM

On the Possibility of a New Ethic—II.

By

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The general position of Principal Mackenzie seems to me to be one of unquestioning acceptance of the traditional and orthodox ideas and ideals in moral life. He indeed makes a timid admission that it is possible for considerable changes to be made in regard to both moral institutions and virtues, he is, however, not prepared to entertain the view that such changes will have anything to do with the substantial alteration and revaluation of those accepted ideas of old, and that we are in sight of anything like a moral reconstruction or evolution, far less of a moral revolution.

In formulating this position of his that a radically New Ethic is as yet dubious and even impossible, he has taken no little pains to establish the immutability of the *abstract moral ideals and principles*, in spite of the influx of concrete moral experiences of the present-day human life of growing complexity which have tended largely to undermine those accepted moral abstractions and to replace them by those that take human life and its activities and relations in a more comprehensive and concrete setting. He has referred to the teachings of Kant and Mill who in their respective ways have generally opined that the current moral conceptions are on the whole valid. He has particularly leaned upon Green as his mainstay for the support of his orthodoxy in morals. For Green is a great admirer of the old Greek ideals and thinks that we have inherited from the Greek thinkers both the principles of morality as well as their general articulation and that the

moral and social progress of the present day cannot mean anything more than the mere explication or unfoldment of what was lying implicit or enfolded in the Greek ideals, which are therefore eternal and immutable. Green has even gone the length of maintaining that Socrates and his followers who have given us the theory of duties and virtues were not the inventors of it, but were only the elaborators of the principles of conduct which are but the self-explications of the will to be good.

But curiously enough Bishop Butler, whom the Principal has laid under contribution for the support of his view, though belonging apparently to the old school is not without his suggestions for the concrete character of moral life. There are according to him two distinct currents of thought, one in a line with the old abstract Ethics which simply concerns itself with the explication of certain *a priori* moral ideals out of touch with the particularities of the concrete moral situations in human life, the other which takes cognisance of the particular nature of man in its actual relations and interrelations in their concrete setting, and Butler seems to be inclined to think, and rightly, that the ideal can have any significance only in so far it is determined by the actual. "There are two ways" says Butler, "in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things the other from a matter of fact, namely what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution, from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is which is correspondent to this whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature of things, in the latter, that it is a violation of the law upon our own nature." And Butler gives the most direct formal proof, and in the latter method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature of things, in the latter, that it is a violation of the law upon our own nature. And Butler gives the most direct formal proof, and in the latter method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature of things, in the latter, that it is a violation of the law upon our own nature.

liable to cavil or dispute, the latter is in a peculiar manner adapted to satisfy a fair mind; and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life” And it is interesting to note that in Butler we have the first formulation of that kind of Ethics which can really justify and encourage proper attitude to human life and conduct and can explain *real* progress in ethical thought and practice.

Principal Mackenzie has referred, by way of criticism, to the attempts of the opposite school who have expressed disapproval of the old ideals, only with a view to strengthening negatively his own fundamental position that except certain incidental changes in the details of our moral life, it is not possible to think of a decidedly new era of morals that may be said to have dawned in recent years. He has begun his inquisition from Nietzsche, the most violent of reactionaries against traditional morality who has with his ideals of Power and Beauty gone beyond good and evil, beyond right and wrong, and has spurned the so-called ‘Slave morality’ of the masses, by holstering up the Superman, of whom a Beethoven or a Bismark or a Wagner is a type. Referring to the romantic and Ibsenian tendencies in modern literature, which show signs of revolt against the old conventions of sex and family life, the Principal has disposed of them as the outcome of a vaguely conceived idea of increased personal freedom, and has subscribed to the view of some of the orthodox modern literature who have pronounced this new movement, “immorality”. He has passed over Bertrand Russell as more critical than constructive in his pronouncements before reconstructions of political, moral and social order; formal however, have opened up really new paths in the actual since the great world-war. He has looked at the Experimental Communist State with its inspiration beneath the Formal the Church, but the net result, where, has amounted to a

Communism, without eliciting from him any candid acknowledgement of those elements in it that might really contribute to the reconstruction of a programme of life needed for the changed outlook of the present day.

After this preliminary remarks on the general standpoint of Principal Mackenzie, I would like to point out that my thesis is one of *Moral Evolution* or *Moral Reconstruction* which he apparently denies. We may not indeed be on the eve of a moral revolution in the sense in which Nietzsche took it, but it would not be going too far to acknowledge that there have already been at work efforts at reconstructing and re-interpreting moral ideals and principles in the light of new and varied moral experiences especially after the great war. Now these new and varied experiences have been of different ranges and dimensions, not only personal or individual and social, but also national and international and even cosmopolitan. Then again not only the inroads of these new and varied experiences themselves, but also the immense development in the Psychological Method, which again has drawn largely upon the method of physical science, have jointly contributed to the re-orientation of life and experience as I would understand it. When I thus uphold moral reconstruction I equate life with experience and take these terms in their widest connotation. By life I mean not simply the life of the individual but that of the whole human kind as one organic whole, not simply the ideals and aspirations, experiences and practices of the individual, but rather those of the whole human race in their relations and interrelations. By experience again I would mean not simply that cross-section of the mental life to which the traditional moralist is accustomed to reduce it, with a view to establishing the transcendental character of the moral ideals as though completely unaffected by moral experiences, just as in the sphere of knowledge too the

rationalist is apt to give unnatural primacy and ultimacy to purely logical thought as if transcending all experience. What I would mean by experience is the whole range of experiences as they are humanly lived, so that the ideals, moral as well as intellectual and aesthetic, are not pure abstractions but are concrete universals growing out of and determined by real and throbbing experiences. It would follow then that moral ideals and principles are subject to change and evolution, reinterpretation and reconstruction in the light of new and changing circumstances of the concrete moral and social life.

A historico-psychological analysis of the concepts of virtue and duty in relation to the norms would further justify the position I have been convinced to accept. The concepts of virtue arise out of the facts of moral life in reference to motives, and the concepts of duty in reference to ends. It is thus evident that these two classes of concepts are dependent on the varieties of moral practices furnished by concrete life for the formation of ideas about motives and ends of conduct. And it is worth while to remember that the concepts of virtue are not wholly without relation to an end, nor are those of duty unrelated to the motives of conduct.¹ And when we come to consider the nature and origin of norms we are told by the older school of moralist that the ethical norms are those fundamental principles which are 'eternal verities' and from which the concepts of duty are deduced and which are therefore prior to all such concepts, just in the same way as the logical laws of thought are the eternal truths and had been in use thousands of years before Aristotle propounded them. But the purely formal character of such norms involving conflicts with the actual moral situations can be exposed as easily as the Experimental Logic of to-day is cutting the ground from beneath the Formal

1. Wundt's *Principle of Morality*, Ch. IV.

Logic of Aristotle which so ill applies to reality and life. Even the imperative character of the ethical norms is derived not so much from their being formal *a priori* and abstract ideals which transcend all real concrete life, as from the fact that they are the concrete products of the combined experiences of many ages and cultures arrived at as so many tested hypotheses, so far as they are based on the present state of our experience of moral life, but not excluding the possibility of better and newer ones. The facts and values are thus no water-tight compartments, but are such that the former can be interpreted into the latter, that facts are implicit values and that values are facts re-interpreted in the light of experiences of mankind in their varied circumstances. As a very brilliant writer has observed: "If we would understand the nature of Beauty, Goodness and Truth, we must turn our attention to what has been offered and accepted, as beautiful, good and true. The acceptance may have been after a long struggle and much heroic battling, particularly in the field of conduct. But what in the last analysis is the process involved but experiment,—an experiment carried out in the laboratory of the universe, with its crucible of endless space and time; its material, whole peoples and civilizations."

My proposition therefore is to take the moral life of man as a concrete reality—not as a pure, immutable and undifferentiated unity of moral ideals and principles wholly undetermined by the multiplicity of the concrete moral experiences as the ancient Greek ideals and the great momentum of their tradition have even to this day sophisticated most minds; nor again as a scattered and disintegrating plurality of mere chaotic moral experiences without any ideals and principles, without norms, values and standards whereby to organise and reinterpret these experiences and to reevaluate its old values; but rather I take it as a concrete reality, evolving its ideals and values, its standards and principles out of its own experiences,

revising and reformulating them as the needs of time and circumstances of progressive culture and civilization would demand such reconstruction and reformulation. This attitude to moral life has thus taught us to look upon Ethics as a heuristic science, appreciating and absorbing with candour and open-mindedness those fresh and obtruding data which the complex moral life of recent years has been thrusting upon contemporary minds. (One of its most important achievements in this direction is its emphasis on the Group-mind as distinct from the individual. The old traditional systems of Ethics were based on individualistic psychology, but the psychological outlook has in recent years been greatly widened in view of the increasing social and political interests, and the post-war German ethical thought is the natural expression of that necessary change in the social and political life of man. We have now to think of Ethics and Politics not as mere contrasts, but rather have to ethicise Politics, that is, to evolve such a positive relation between Ethics and Politics as would enable us to place Politics on the bed-rock of Ethics¹. We have now to think, and rightly, that not only an individual, but in a sense more truly, a nation is a mental and moral organism. The goal of civilization will thus be approximated by the degree of success in the realisation of a higher level of international morality². And it is needless to add that international morality can be established only on the broad basis of a sound democracy. Modern writers like McDougall and others have been in recent times emphasising the need of such an international Ethics which is indeed a new development in the present day life of man. And in his endeavour to affiliate Politics with Ethics McDougall has so great an authority as that of

1. Cf. *Philosophy To-Day: The Development of Ethical Problems*.

2. McDougall's: *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*
Preface p. XI.

Plato whose Republic is the living recognition of the need of such affiliation, and even quite in recent times Edmund Burke explicitly declared that the 'principles of true politics are but those of morals enlarged'. Indeed McDougall has gone a great way towards the recognition of a wider moral life in so far he has striven to impress upon us the need of a concrete and dynamic view of moral life in the place of old statical one which was either abstractly universal or individual, and has shown in his own way how international Ethics is the need of the hour. But we would like to point out at this stage that his view is not sufficiently liberal and has the tinge of narrowness in that he is always anxious to protect his internationalism with national Christian Ethics which, he thinks, would prevent, the otherwise inevitable degeneration of the race by miscegenation. His spirit of ethical reconstruction has yielded to biological and eugenic demands and is pervaded by what we commonly call superiority complex. We shall indicate in the sequel the line of development which, I think would meet the real demands of the wider moral life which has recently grown.

Then if I am asked as to the method of the concrete Ethics or the Ethics of Reconstruction I have advocated, I would unhesitatingly reply that it is the *Experimental Method*. For reconstruction can have meaning only in reference to experiment and trial. Just as the method of philosophy in recent years has outgrown the purely *a priori* elaboration of certain intellectual concepts, but has liberalised itself enough to embrace all that concerns man and his life in the world, instead of clinging like a timid spinster to the old-fashioned problems and ideas and of leaving the direct pre occupation with contemporary difficulties to literature and politics, even so Ethics which aspires to explain the conduct and character of human life personal and communal, should no longer

indulge in the barren metaphysical abstractions, but rather begin from the very beginning by seeking out and sifting the particulars of moral and social experience, and then rise into norms and values as so many *hypotheses* to be retained or rejected and replaced by fresh norms and values arising out of and explaining the new complexities of life. We must meet each problem with a specific hypothesis and no universal theory, theories are tentacles, while fruitful progressive life must be lived through trial and error. I do not know how to make myself more clear on this than by using the words of Prof. Dewey: "The Experimental attitude..... substitutes detailed analysis for wholesale assertions, specific enquiries for temperamental convictions, small facts for opinions whose size is in precise ratio to their vagueness. It is within the social sciences, in morals, in politics and education, that thinking still goes on by large antitheses, by theoretical oppositions of order and freedom, individualism and socialism, culture and utility, spontaneity and discipline, actuality and tradition. But with the advance of the experimental method the question has ceased to be which one of the two rival claimants has a right to the field. It has become a question of clearing up a confused subject—matter by attacking bit by bit."¹

Now having outlined my standpoint and my method of concrete Ethics which I advocate, I would now enter upon an estimate of Principal Mackenzie's observations on certain so-called departure, from the old stereotyped moral conventions specially those connected with sex and family life. But at the very outset we would do well to realise that the set of conventions which, for a particular age in the history of human society, usurps its moral universe should not claim more than what they deserve as conventions. And it is also worth while to remember that not only in the sphere of

1. *New Republic*. Feb. 3. 1917.

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Then if I am asked as to the method of the concrete Ethics, or the Ethics of Reconstruction I have advocated, I would unhesitatingly reply that it is the *Experimental Method*. For reconstruction can have meaning only in reference to experiment and trial. Just as the method of philosophy in recent years has outgrown the purely *a priori* elaboration of certain intellectual concepts, but has liberalised itself enough to embrace all that concerns man and his life in the world, instead of clinging like a timid spinster to the old-fashioned problems and ideas and of leaving the 'direct pre-occupation with contemporary difficulties to literature and politics', even so Ethics which aspires to explain the conduct and character of human life, personal and communal, should no longer

indulge in the barren metaphysical abstractions, but rather begin from the very beginning by seeking out and sifting the particulars of moral and social experience, and then rise into norms and values as so many *hypotheses* to be retained or rejected and replaced by fresh norms and values arising out of and explaining the new complexities of life. We must meet each problem with a specific hypothesis and no universal theory, theories are tentacles, while fruitful progressive life must be lived through trial and error. I do not know how to make myself more clear on this than by using the words of Prof. Dewey: "The Experimental attitude..... substitutes detailed analysis for wholesale assertions, specific enquiries for temperamental convictions, small facts for opinions whose size is in precise ratio to their vagueness. It is within the social sciences, in morals, in politics and education, that thinking still goes on by large antitheses, by theoretical oppositions of order and freedom, individualism and socialism, culture and utility, spontaneity and discipline, actuality and tradition. But with the advance of the experimental method the question has ceased to be which one of the two rival claimants has a right to the field. It has become a question of clearing up a confused subject—matter by attacking bit by bit."¹

Now having outlined my standpoint and my method of concrete Ethics which I advocate, I would now enter upon an estimate of Principal Mackenzie's observations on certain so-called departure, from the old stereotyped moral conventions specially those connected with sex and family life. But at the very outset we would do well to realise that the set of conventions which, for a particular age in the history of human society, usurps its moral universe should not claim more than what they deserve as conventions. And it is also worth while to remember that not only in the sphere of

1. *New Republic*. Feb. 3. 1917.

morals, but also in those of noetics and aesthetics, conventions play a great part. In fact life is, in its major part a matter of conventions. But conventions command adherence to them, not because they replace ideals but because they satisfy the demands of the society under certain conditions which are also subject to alteration. Since moral evolution is a fact conventions also are subject to change and evolution. But at the same time caution and circumspection in the highest degree are necessary for the proper interpretation of new phenomena and appraisement of their significance and value in the changed circumstances of our life. Rashness in this is as bad in its effect as conservatism. From the wider standpoint of Life and Experience and of moral evolution and reconstruction which follow as necessary corollaries from such a standpoint, the new perspectives in social life and sex relationships which the last great war and the post-war conditions have opened up, should be regarded as necessary elements and should be given the chance of tentative hypotheses which await acceptance or rejection after sufficient sifting of materials. The individualistic tendency which had been seething so long in the sphere of politics and religion, has but its natural outlet in sex relations and family life. And the recent famous "Women Movement" is the natural and necessary development of the changes that are breaking forth on all the walks of present day life, and advances the opinion that it is our women folk that can really purify and elevate human civilization by the use of their power and influence. Every new movement has of course its aberrations for which due allowance must be made. We must not be surprised when we find Lady Trance Balfour observing at the National Council of Women at York (Oct 16th 1928) "None of us can move anywhere without finding that men are trembling before coming events." A. M. Ludovici voices forth the same idea in her *Woman: A vindication, Man: An Indict-*

ment. Storm Jameson, Mrs. Bertrand Russell, Oskar Schmitz and a host of them subscribe to this view. These movements are not to be overlooked as mere surface streams having nothing to do with the deeper undercurrent of social life, but deserve to be viewed in their proper perspective in order that they might yield the necessary elements in the evolution of human morals. But on the other hand commit yourself to the old conservative ideals and you shut out all such new phases and new developments as the flimsy freaks of a few frenzied fops.

When he comes to consider the spirit of revolt against old morality as manifest in the present-day fiction, the learned Principal seems to forget the value of the contribution of Literature to the moral progress of man. Literature is the spontaneous self-revelation of man in the simple unconventional and communicable form, and its revelations are often so comely and intimate, that it is not really surprising that they should have dissipated many of our cherished and comforting illusions. Human nature is far more complex than what the sermons and formulas of the moralist can comprehend. The moralist 'account of conscience pales before the passionate analyses of a Dostoevski, his remarks on natural affection need to be qualified in face of *The Way of all Flesh* or *Father and Son*.' Literature is certainly more than mere description and analysis. "It is not only that the literary method of a Marcel Proust is as worthy of the name 'Psychometry', as the painfully compiled statistics of Galton;" but "the very experiment forbidden to the eugenicist is the natural sphere of literature. The work of Moliere is strictly comparable to the laboratory activities of the experimental chemist." Bernard Shaw and D. H. Lawrence deserve the special credit of having shown the perfect naivete of the instinct of love. While Shaw in his *'Apple Cart'* describes the 'strangely innocent relations' between Magnus and Orinthia, Lawrence

wants love to be etrougly animal, though not bestial and seeks to bring back the primal energy of Eden. Huxley strips off hypocrisy and cant of false moralists. We have indeed on the one side tho liberalism of Bertrand Russell, and on the other, the extremo conservatism of Dean Inge. But the *via media* is struck by Walter Lappmann in his "*Preface to Morals*" where he quotes from the Analecte of Confucius : "I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right." So that self-discipline is not at a discount. These hard and realistic revelations which the contemporary literaturo makes to the inquiring mind are too significant for the Ethics of Reconstruction to be given the go-by, hut rather demand as much of its attention as any other phases of eocial and political life of the present day, for their proper adjustment in the economy of human existence. —

The problem of divorce has been one of the burning problems of the family life of the West and any attempt at moral reconstruction must have its say on the problem bowever difficult of eolution it may be. The dissolution of marriage becomes the legalised instrument for separation between the husband and the wife, where marriage has no solemnity and eacredness of the *dharma* which *holds* together mau and wife into the unity and integrity of the family life, hut where it has for its eole aim the promotion of pleasure and self-interest of the individual. Divorce which has been advocated by a majority of western thinkers and on easy ordinary conditions, has been restricted in its application by some and has been denounced altogether only by a few. Now divorce to my mind appears condemnable under any circumstances, either when the parties concerned are of opposite habits and temperaments or are guilty of sexual delinquencies. The banes of the system of divorce, amongst others, are that it disintegrates the family which is the unit of society, that it gives unbounded licence to the sexual life

of man and lastly it produces the most deplorable effect on the children of the marriage. The root of the trouble is to be traced to the fundamental misconception of the purpose or ideal of marriage and the remedy lies in the proper interpretation of that ideal. When it is recognised that the institution of marriage is for the purpose of helping the spiritual growth of two individual souls, it ceases to be the union of flesh with flesh, the delays and obstacles fail to make the partners impatient, mistrust and misunderstanding cease to vitiate their minds. Children are a great aid to the development of the higher life—they are the embodiment of the purest conjugal love which receives its perennial flow from them. On the other hand for the healthy development of the inner potentialities of the children's minds the much talked of state-nurseries in the western countries are but poor substitutes for parental home where alone the children can freely breathe the genial atmosphere of benign love and superintending care. It appears to me that the problem of divorce which is the most threatening of all that the western family life has to face can be successfully tackled only by the changed outlook I have outlined above and Hindu conception of married life may contribute largely to that solution.

I have already indicated that the general tendency of recent ethical theory is to break down the rigid barriers between the ethical good and other goods co-ordinated with it, and to subordinate all goods under the moral good which includes the whole of life. I have also indicated that this moralistic interpretation of politics necessarily involves a democratic broadening of its basis which alone can render real help to the growth of virtues and institutions of the ethico-social life of man. The old absolutist theory of the state has been forced, by the changed outlook of life, to abdicate in favour of the individualist and democratic theories, as it has proved fundamentally opposed to the individual freedom. Every

individual, every member of a society has a right to the attainment of the fullest stature he is capable of, in his business, art, religion and government, in his social and moral institutions. "Democracy," says Dewey, "has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning it is found in resolving that the supreme test of political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-round growth of every member of the society." With all its shortcomings democracy is in keeping with the experimental attitude which we have accepted as the proper attitude for reconstruction in science and philosophy; for instead of proceeding by any preformed standard whereby to guide and measure the growth, possibilities and self-realisation of the individuals, it makes growth itself the end, because it is impossible to know beforehand the exact ideal into which the human life is to grow. Democracy is nothing less than the persistent will to liberate experimentally the actual activities of each and every individual. Democratic ideal implies a reorganization of Education as an institution; for it throws open, before every individual, self-governance in an empirical sense in which every individual is given the opportunity in every act to be guided by a knowledge of the consequences or significance of his own act. Instead of merely preparing the individual for a future adult life as a means to some other end, it enables the child to acquire the habits of intelligence by following out the bearings of his present interests and activities and to make him conscious of himself as an end in himself. This reorganised education will have a very important bearing on the relation of virtue to knowledge. It is more than true that no theoretical description of facts, but an active creation of and participation in them only can produce a norm worth living up to, just as a mere description of the housing conditions cannot improve them but only a direct acquaintance with those conditions by actually living under them, with powers of judgment and discrimination

kept wide awake. Democracy has succeeded in most countries not because it is a theory of Socio-political life settled once for all, but because it is an ideal yet to be realised, a hypothesis yet to be verified and modified with the modifications in the life of the community. The democratic aim of equalisation can never be fully realised, men will never be born with equal physical and mental powers. The claim of democracy to our acceptance as a working hypothesis consists not so much in this levelling down process, as in throwing open to community an equal opportunity to its members. The aristocracy of intellect and power is an inevitable fact, but for the moral and political uplift of mankind as a whole, what is most urgently needed is the *democracy of aristocrats*--a liberalisation of the aims and ideals, the ambitions and aspirations, of those that are gifted with superior physique, richer intellect and immenser wealth and better opportunities to utilise them.

But this liberalising tendency, if it has to attain its widest expansion, cannot be satisfied with anything short of commonwealth of nations. Democracy practised in every nationality would only pave the way to that highest achievement of human existence. Such world-federation might sound like a Utopia, but the experimentalist either in science, or in politics or in Ethics is after all a visionary and need not fight shy of the uncertainties and of the adventures which he has to encounter. In that federation of the human kind the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, the nationalism of the nineteenth, and even the internationalism of the present day will have their respective ideals transmuted into something which would include and transcend them all. Under the auspices of such a political ideal every branch of the human family would find freedom, enjoy security and attain self-realisation in the wider life of humanity. And the ethical basis of that ideal lies deeper in man's cultivation of love and

respect for man. Internationalism is a sham so long as there is the national pride and prejudice allowed to preponderate; no amount of external adjustment can effect an international harmony. Untouchability, political and social, would be banished from the face of the globe, colour-bar would cease to be the vanishing point and disarmament question and Kellogg Pact would be back numbers, the moment man will have ceased to suspect man, but begun to love him as his brother and respect him as his divinity, and '*homo homini deus*' and not '*homo homini lupus*' would be the guiding principle of his life.

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terms, it helps to make ethics concrete and practical. How fruitful the employment of such a method in the field of philosophy, logic and ethics can be is to some extent exemplified in some of the recent works of John Dewey. But there is a tendency as it is evident in Mr. Bhattacharya's paper to lay an exclusive emphasis on the experimental method. Such a tendency is detrimental to the elaboration and refinement of ethical conceptions and there is need for one to guard oneself against it.

Coming to the view-point and opinions adopted by Prof. Mackenzie towards the newer ventures at moral theory and practice, I find myself at variance with him not only in respect of his general attitude but also in respect of the particular opinions regarding the new moralists even though I do not accept their solutions of current problems without considerable modifications and reservations. I. His general attitude is that there should be nothing new in ethics except by way of the readjustment of established ethical rules to new situations and that the attempts at constructing new theories or newer schemes of evaluation are neither possible nor desirable. II. His particular conclusions are: (a) that Nietzsche's ethic is a defence of selfishness, immorality, barbarism, (b) that the advocates of the new morality in sexual matters aim at promiscuity in sexual relations and the destruction of family life, and (c) that the Bolshevik theory and practice cut at the root of family life and property rights of individuals.

I. The General Attitude of Prof. Mackenzie

It must be admitted that there is nothing like the absolutely new either in morality or in other forms of life. I don't think that any sensible person would be so rash as to think that he is setting out to give the world something that is totally unlike or unrelated to everything in the past. Some of us, as youths set out to do things very romantic, fresh and

fullsome, things far different from anything that our parents did. But before we have lived the life of husbands, parents and teachers for a short time, we shall have realised that what we have achieved is not anything so new or startling as we expected to achieve. But can we say therefore with Prof. Mackenzie that the moral life that we have constructed is nothing but a new adjustment of old ideals. Are the changed relationships that we have established between man and man, man and woman, nothing but merely changes in the mechanism of life? Have not the changed relationships meant also changes in our attitudes and ideals? Have not our attitudes and ideals widened or deepened? Is it true to say as Prof. Mackenzie says that the new morality that we are thinking of is a mere adjustment of established principles to the changing environment? Do not changes in the objects of contemplation imply at the same time changes in the subjects that contemplate? It is only possible for a theologian to say that the principles of morality are set down once for all by this or that revealed text and that our main concern as moralists lies merely in applying them to new situations in life. But such a view is impossible for a moralist who takes a historical, humanist and above all rational view of morality. The history of morals has shown to us that morality through the ages, has changed not only in content but also in form, not only in practice but also in theory. Sometimes, theory has changed in the light of practice, at other times, practice has changed in the light of theory. But in whichever order the one may have influenced the other, the two have been inseparably related to each other; each has been in and through the other. We can not have any change in the body of ethical practice, unless there is a change in the spirit of moral inquiry. Christianity, Democracy and Nationalism were the forces that inspired moral inquiry in the past. To-day Industrialism, Internationalism, Feminism and Pacifism

have taken their place. They call for a more liberal and rational outlook than the one called for by Christianity and Nationalism.

II. (a) Coming down to the particular opinions which he holds regarding the newer ventures at moral theory and practice, the conclusion that Nietzsche's ethics is a defence of selfishness, immorality and barbarism strikes us as profoundly untrue. I wonder how he arrived at so false a conclusion. There are some penny-a-liners who has set current such a view about Nietzsche's ethics. But I am sure that Prof Mackenzie has not taken his view from such sources. From whatever source he may have derived his ideas about Nietzsche, it will be plain from what follows that it is a gross caricature of Nietzsche's ethics. In order to clear up the colossal ignorance and misunderstanding about Nietzsche's ethics one needs to attempt an elaborate exposition of it, but the scope of this paper does not admit of any such elaborate exposition. For such an exposition, one should go to Salter's Book—*Nietzsche The Thinker*, which is admitted on all hands as the best book on Nietzsche's philosophy. I shall here confine myself to such portions of it as have a close bearing on the points raised by Dr. Mackenzie.

1. *Nietzsche's Ethics not a defence of selfishness in any gross sense but a defence of selfishness of a profoundly altruistic character.*

For Nietzsche, the roots of altruism lie deep in man; more than any other animal man is originally altruistic.¹ Two factors co-operate to produce this original attribute of man. On the one hand, social existence requires it and on the other, individuals themselves find compensation for a sense of their unimportance in serving others—mothers their children, slaves their master, the soldier his commander, even the

1. *Will to power*. See p. 771.

prince his people.² Pleasure in the group to which one belongs is really older than pleasure in oneself, and the self, loveless ego that seeks its own advantage is not the origin of the group but its destruction.³ But altruism taken as a universal maxim leads to an *impasse*. Only when a limit is set to it, it becomes really possible.⁴ Altruism becomes possible only when it implies some egoism, not as its contrary, but as its complement and condition. If there should be service, there must be those who are willing to be served. The selfishness of the group is the necessary condition for the expression of altruism in individuals. Selfishness becomes indispensable for altruism for another reason. The man who would serve others must strengthen himself first. Nietzsche says: "Love your neighbour as yourself, but first be such as to love yourself." If you make altruism absolute, it leads to the degeneration of the human self. If all should find the significance of their lives in serving others, it would show that none found value in themselves, had no real self (none worth while) and humanity would be on the downward grade.⁵ A weakened, thin, obliterated, self-denying person is useful for no good thing. Selfishness of this type has no value for either heaven or earth.⁶ Lest his doctrine of selfishness should be misunderstood, Nietzsche distinguishes between two kinds of selfishness—a sacred one that forces us to serve what is highest in us and another, the egoism of the cat that wants only its life.⁷ Some only want to receive and gather others in the weak, the needy, the sickly in body and mind, when such people say 'all for myself' they are

2. *Ibid.* See p. 785, 964.

3. *Zarathustra. II.* xv.

4. *Joyful Science.* See p. 21.

5. *Zarathustra. III.* v 3.

6. *Twilight of the Idols.* ix, p. 35.

7. *Dawn of Day.* See p. 345.

8. *Zarathustra I.* xxii, See p. 2.

a horror to Nietzsche. But there are others who get and accumulate only to give out again in love, their selfishness even if it is insatiable in gathering to itself, is sound and holy.⁹ It is the latter kind of selfishness which is creative not possessive that Nietzsche advocates.

2 *The immorality of Nietzsche—the morality of superior man—the morality of a higher altitude of life*

The morality of Nietzsche is a morality of rank life—the Hindu morality of varna and asrama. But it is different from the morality of rank as maintained by the mediaeval Hindu moralists in so far it does not—maintain unbreakable lines of social cleavage. According to Nietzsche, there are three classes of men.¹⁰ In the first class are men who are the most spiritual, the strongest and the supreme ruling class. They do not rule as princes do by physical force, they rule by the weight of their ideas by the relative perfection of their personality. The second class of men are their instruments for governing. They are the warders of justice, the guardians of order and security, the higher ranks of soldiers, above all the king as the highest formula of soldier judge, maintainer of the law. The third class engage in manual labour, in business, in agriculture in science (as distinguished from philosophy) in the ordinary forms of art, in short any kind of more or less mechanical work. Nietzsche does not really look down upon the lower classes as some of his extravagant and unguarded expressions indicate, they have a right of entry into the higher class and the qualification for such an entry is not a property qualification, but a personality qualification. Even as they are the lower classes have, in Nietzsche's eyes an important and indispensable place in

9 *Zarathustra I* xxii

10 In his earlier writings he spoke of four classes on the analogy of the Hindu philosophers but in his later writings he combined the agriculturist and commercial classes into one class.

the social structure¹¹. All three classes are organically related, each being necessary to the other and to the whole.

In order to distinguish the morality of the highest class from that of the lower classes, i. e. morality in the ordinary sense, he calls the latter by the misleading name "immorality". Nietzsche does not deprecate morality as ordinarily known, though he grows wild with it when it is set up for the highest morality. Nietzsche affirms as strongly as do moralists like Dr. Mackenzie that morality in the ordinary sense is necessary both for individual and social well-being. He goes further and maintains that it is necessary as the basis of "immorality".¹² We will be, he says "heirs of all morality that has gone before and not start *de novo*"¹³. If he speaks of the overcoming of morality by immorality, it is only a self-overcoming. "Why do I seek free thinking?" he asks and answers: "As the last consequence of previous morality—justice, courage, honesty, loving disposition to all." The demand for a critique of morality is a form of morality, the most sublimated kind of it¹⁴. The immorality that he embraces is thus the fulfilment of morality.

The need for this immorality arises for him from the inner contradictions and disharmony of the present moral life of Europe. "Immorality" is a solution to cure the ills of European moral life. It aims at making an ideal, a goal, a principle of organisation that is proof of man's creative power. The instinct for something perfect, or as perfect as the conditions of existence will allow is, the bottom instinct, the ruling impulse of Nietzsche. His aim is cosmical; he thinks of the world as pressing to a higher realization of its potencies through us. Says Nietzsche "we are buds on one tree.

11. *Will to Power*. See p. 764.

12. *Werke*. xii, 411. vii, 486, 35. *Will to Power*. 764.

13. *Werke* xiii, 125, 282.

14. *Werke*. xii, 124, 281. *Will to Power*. 399, 400.

What do we know of what can come out of us in the interests of the tree! '5 His ideal is a new species of man, a new human personality, a new type of sainthood! '6

3 *His will to power not a proclamation of barbarism, behind and underlying it are tenderness and love*

The power which Nietzsche wills is not the brute power of physical nature—the power of free non ethical forces uncontrolled by the intellect. He dislikes the power of blind nature for it is wasteful indifferent and uncertain without purpose or consideration, pity or justice, at once fearful and desertlike. The power he worships is the power that blends with reason, the power that serves something higher. The power of the tyrant, no less than the power of the masses in modern democratic society are odious to him. Of the German Imperialism he is profoundly contemptuous. He exclaims 'Power is tiresome. Witness the Empire!' His will to power is really will to higher values like beauty, truth, goodness and above all of love. His tenderness and love are more tender than even the tenderness and love of Christianity. Look at the following passage. 'If you have an enemy, do not return his evil with good—that will humiliate him, if he curses you curse a little back, if he does you a great wrong do him a few small ones—dreadful to behold is one under the weight of wrong that he has done alone, more humane is a little revengo than absolutely no revenge.' Compare the above with the words of the apostle for returning the evil of an enemy. 'By thy good, do doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head. Is truer or more christian in spirit for himself

All this is overlooked by persons like Prof. Mackenzie when they conclude that Nietzsche proclaims an indiscriminate "gospel of might" of the "wild beast" type. They only fasten upon the stray extravagant and irritated utterances which came out of the bitterness of heart of a man who found no sympathy or echo for his ideas. There is also another reason for the general misunderstanding of Nietzsche by the European. Nietzsche's ideas are altogether foreign to the European mind which is generally engrossed with a religion of the superstitious kind or in values that are merely utilitarian. But to the Indians Nietzsche is no foreigner. They find that Nietzsche is speaking in the idiom and the accent of their own philosopher-saints. He has done a great service to Europe in laying emphasis on the life of Sanyāsa of which Europe is greatly in need. Europe will soon recognise him as the first European philosopher, who revealed to it a new life and a new morality.

(b) Dr. Mackenzie's conclusion about the new moralists like Bertrand Russell and C. E. M. Joad that they advocate sexual promiscuity and the abolition of family life is equally untrue. That even the more extreme of the two—Joad does not advocate the relaxation of the marriage-laws for the sake of sexual promiscuity or the abolition of the institution of marriage will be evident from the following extracts. "What then is likely to happen?"

"Certainly not a relapse into complete promiscuity. The belief that people are fundamentally licentious, and that a partial removal of the barriers with which society has hedged about the business of reproduction, will precipitate the population into a welter of unbridled license, pleasantly shocking though it is to the minds of respectable people, has absolutely no foundation in fact"¹⁹

19. C. E. M. Joad: *The future of Morals*, p. 63.

'Within reason, continence and constancy are natural to human beings. It is only the intolerable strain to which our absurd social arrangements have subjected them that has caused us to regard ourselves as being by nature unfaithful and incontinent. There is no ground for the belief that the average man or woman who allow themselves to be guided by their own impulses must needs be scoundrels. For among their impulses must be numbered self respect, moderation and a sense of what is right and fitting.'

'If this means, as it probably does, that unhappy families have broken up and that husbands and wives who disliked each other have availed themselves of the opportunity to make a fresh start we need not regret the change. Nobody would contend that society is the gainer by condemning the unhappily married to a lifetime of domestic misery, and it is difficult to see why the commonsense of the community which considers the wishes of the parties concerned a sufficient ground for consummating their marriage does not regard the wishes of the same parties as a sufficient reason for terminating it.'

"On the other hand it is unlikely that those who are happily married will rush to the Register with the object of making themselves miserable by separating, simply because reasonable divorce laws give them the opportunity to do so."²⁰

In so far as the changes which the new reformers propose have only in view the remedying of the manifest evils of social life, the providing for decent ways of retreat in cases of failure in matrimonial relations there is no need to find fault with them. But when they forget as Joad and Russell tend to forget—that the remedies are only remedies and go on to institute them as ideals, we must protest severely. We must point out that they only point out the escape from the bad life but that they do not point out the life of sex.

If it is mere love as a passion and nothing else that they aim at, it is sure to leave the love e soon with a sense of emptiness and nothingness and the only thing for them to do would be to break off and begin again and repeat this till the end of their lives. Love becomes enduring when it is not an end in itself but a condition for the realisation by the lovers of something valuable. As Walter Lippmann says "It is this understanding that love cannot successfully be isolated from the business of living which is the enduring wisdom of the institution of marriage. Let the law be what it may be as to what constitutes a marriage contract and how and when it may be dissolved. Let public opinion be as tolerant as it can be toward any and every kind of irregular and experimental relationship. When all the criticisms have been made, when all supernatural sanctions have been discarded, all subjective inhibitions erased, all compulsions abolished, the convention of marriage still remains to be considered as an interpretation of human experience. It is by the test of how genuinely it interprets human experience that the convention of marriage will ultimately be judged."

"The wisdom of marriage rests upon an extremely unsentimental view of lovers and their passionsThe convention of marriage rests on an interpretation of human nature which does not confuse the subjective feeling of the lovers that their passion is unique, with the brutal but objective fact that, had they never met, each of them would in all probability have found a lover who was just as unique. 'Love' says Santayana 'is indeed much less exacting than it thinks itself. Nine-tenths of its cause are in the lover, for one-tenth that may be in the object.' It is the overlooking of this brute fact that is responsible for the unhappinesses of many romantic lovers. "The deep fallacy of the conception", as Lippmann says "is in the failure to realize that compatibility is a process and not an accident, that it depends upon the maturing of

instinctive desire by adaptation to the whole nature of the other person and to his common concerns of the pair of lovers... It is what the lover does about that nine-tenths which is decisive for his happiness. It is the claim, therefore, of those who uphold the ideal of marriage as a full partnership, and reject the ideal which would separate love as an art from parenthood as a vocation, that in the home made by a couple who propose to see it through, there are provided the essential conditions under which the passions of men and woman are most likely to become mature, and therefore harmonious and disinterested It is the hidden issues between lovers, more than anywhere else, that modern men and women are compelled, by personal anguish rather than by laws and preachments or even by persuasions of abstract philosophy, to transcend naive desire and to reach out towards a mature and disinterested partnership with their world"¹

This is the attitude, if not of all, but at least of some new moralists towards sex relations. It is such an attitude that should be taken as the attitude of new morality for purposes of evaluation and criticism. Of course, there are persons who take a less exalted and less positive view of the matter, but such men have always existed and they do not go to make a new age.

(c) Prof. Mackenzie's criticism of Bolshevism is in many respects truer than his criticism of the other modern moral movements. Bolshevism tends to the destruction of family and places very heavy restrictions on the freedom of individuals. It is not by any means a solution of the socio-economic problems of modern society, but it is here staring us in the face and for morality

In conclusion, it seems to me, that Prof. Mackenzie takes too formal and external a view of the modern problems of morality and is therefore precluded from adopting a sympathetic and humanistic attitude towards the new attempts at solving them. If such an attitude were to be adopted universally, moralists will be looked upon as Dean Inge says, "as persons who are under the illusion that they are attracted by God but who are really repelled by men."

instinctive desire by adaptation to the whole nature of the other person and to his common concerns of the pair of lovers. It is what the lover does about that nine tenths which is decisive for his happiness. It is the claim, therefore, of those who uphold the ideal of marriage as a full partnership and reject the ideal which would separate love as an art from parenthood as a vocation that in the home made by a couple who propose to see it through there are provided the essential conditions under which the passions of men and woman are most likely to become mature and therefore harmonious and disinterested. It is the hidden issues between lovers more than anywhere else, that modern men and women are compelled, by personal anguish rather than by laws and preachments or even by persuasions of abstract philosophy to transcend naive desire and to reach out towards a mature and disinterested partnership with their world.²¹

This is the attitude if not of all but at least of some new moralists towards sex relations. It is such an attitude that should be taken as the attitude of new morality for purposes of evaluation and criticism. Of course there are persons who take a less exalted and less positive view of the matter but such men have always existed and they do not go to make a new age.

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Contents.

	PAGE
—The One and the Many • G. R. Malkani ...	11
—Knowledge and its Object • Ravihary Das ...	12
—The Universal and the Particular • T. R. V. Murti ...	130
—The Epistemological Corollary to the Western psychology of Perception: D. M. Datta ...	137
—The Soul of Knowledge • P. Narasimham. ...	144
—The Individual in Kant's Philosophy • Humayun Z. A. Kabir. ...	155
—The Cardinal Principle of Idealism • Hanumantha Rao ...	169
—The Empirical Tradition in Bradley's Logic: R. N. Kaul, ...	177

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY.

The One and the Many.

By

G. R. MALKANI.

(Logic and Metaphysics Section)

The problem of the one and the many may be said to be the central problem of metaphysics. It is not possible here to enter into a detailed consideration of it. I shall therefore simply state the problem in its most general form as it presents itself to thought, and indicate the lines on which I believe a solution of it is possible.

We know the "many" of experience. We do not know the one. Still the many are not given to us merely as many. They imply in different ways and in different degrees some kind of unity. The problem presents itself to thought, how are the two reconcilable? (For there appears to be a contradiction in saying that both the one and the many are real.) That which is many cannot really be one, and that which is one cannot really be many. We must either be able to reconcile the two concepts with each other, or in the alternative decide to reject either the one or the many as unreal.

It is at once evident that on the plane of pure thought, the one and the many cannot be reconciled. What is one cannot also be many, unless either the one or the many is illusory. In the same way, the one cannot become the many without losing its one-ness, and the many cannot

become one without ceasing to be many. It might be thought that this clear-cut division and so the contradiction arising from it exists only in abstract thought. In the realm of actual facts with which our experience is chiefly concerned, this contradiction is absent. The real is neither pure identity nor pure difference. It is identity in difference and difference is identity; it is a differentiated unity. Further, this conception cannot be said to be irrational. For pure identity is unthinkable. Space, time, substance and quality, relations, etc. are all principles of the manifold. What does not conform to these principles can never be known, and can never be posited. If the real *one* is nevertheless known, it would at least be an object to a subject and thus stand in this relation at least. Pure identity then is impossible to find in the realm of being with which alone our experience is concerned. Pure identity is pure nothing.

Similarly, pure difference too cannot be. For elements which are absolutely discrete and are in no way related cannot even be different. Difference is a relation; and every relation is only possible within a unified whole. Thus the only alternative left is to suppose that both unity and multiplicity are real. The real is a differentiated unity.

What however are we to understand by this last notion? Is it intelligible? Attempts are made to render it intelligible by an appeal to certain facts of experience. We are supposed, for example, to have an idea of one substance which has many qualities. It is a unity in difference. Again a physical organism and a work of art are clearly unities that cannot do without real difference. Every organic unity is a unity of parts that are what they are only as they are related in the whole. They both contribute to the whole and derive their sustenance from it. There is real unity in difference.

The instances here given do not in our opinion render the above notion at all intelligible. They only restate our

problem, and do not solve it. The so called unity of substance requires to be elucidated. It is more of a postulate than a fact known. We can legitimately ask, what is the substance over and above the qualities? It is no answer to this question to say that although the substance is nothing apart from the qualities, it can be something together with the qualities. For what is this "it"? Again, a physical organism is no doubt a whole of interacting parts which hold together for certain purposes. But the existence of none of its parts is entirely dependent upon other parts or upon the whole. A part could not contribute anything to the whole if it were thus dependent. In order to contribute, it must have an individuality of its own not capable of being annulled in the whole, or in any higher unity. So far then it must stand outside this unity. We know as a matter of fact that any part of an organism can leave the organism and still be something. It may undergo a great change but it will not be nothing; and so far as this is so, it will remain alien to the unity; it is an outsider that mixes only for a purpose, and not because of its very being. Indeed in the whole which is the universe, no part can leave the whole. But the essential nature of the relation will remain materially the same. The part cannot be the whole. But if it is not the whole, how is it related to the whole? Evidently the whole is made out of the contributions of the parts and has no being of its own apart from the latter; it has no real being at all. The parts are the real thing. It is this thought which inspires the proposition that the truly real must be indivisible; for if it is divisible, its substantiality is not truly in it but in its parts, and we should have to look for our reality in some ultimate indivisible parts and in nothing else.

The above analysis is also true in the case of products of art. Each note in a melody and each tint in a picture is something in itself. Their unity with other parts in the

whole is only partial, teleological, and not essential. The primary problem of metaphysics is the problem of being, and only secondarily the problem of ends, for ends cannot subsist by themselves. We can always ask, ends for whom? Why any ends at all? Is there real dualism in being making ends possible? The above-mentioned unities are all teleological unities, not essential unities or unities of being.

The problem of the understanding is not solved. Reality cannot be both one and many. But it might now be said that the many can be many and yet one in the sense that they have a partial unity. This however does not carry us any further; for, in the part in which they are one the difference is annihilated, while in the remaining parts the difference is unbridged. In other words, that in which the many are one they are not many, but that in which they are many they are not at all one. Where is any difference-in-unity?

There is however one more argument that might be advanced here. It would be said that, we have argued as though the parts have the primary reality, and the whole only a derivative reality. But this is not true. The position ought to be reversed. The whole alone is primary. The parts are real only as parts of the whole; they have no being outside this whole. Thus there can be real unity; and yet this unity is not simple or indivisible. It is truly a differentiated unity.

Now it is indeed true that there is a sense in which the whole is more real than its parts. The parts taken by themselves are comparatively more limited in being and incomplete. The whole completes them. It both includes and transcends them. We might even say that the whole endows them with parthood, for without the whole, parts would not be parts at all. But clearly this is not the whole truth. For although we can never get a part except as

part of a whole, it is equally true that the parthood of a part is derived not only from its membership in the whole, but primarily from its own being or essential independence. The relation of the part to the whole cannot constitute the whole being of the part. If it did, the part would be nothing in itself, and it could not therefore sustain any relation to the whole or to the other parts of the whole. This argument can be extended to all the parts of the whole. It thus becomes clear that the being of the parts cannot be conceived as wholly subordinate to the being of the whole. They must be conceded a certain being-in-themselves. But so far as this is true, the unity is external to them; it is superficial.

This becomes still more evident when we try to understand the being of the whole. The whole would not be constituted a whole unless the parts were self-constituted or had reality in themselves. If we suppose that the whole has an individuality of its own or a being apart from the being of its parts, then to that extent it is not divisible in parts at all; it is simple, unique and indivisible, it is not a whole. But if it has no such individuality, then it is what it is because of the parts constituting it. Can we really argue that the parts are in themselves nothing, and that they derive what reality they have from such a whole? It is because the whole is not a real unity, i. e. it does not annul the parthood of the parts, that we are obliged to regard such a whole as possessing only a secondary and therefore derivative reality. A true unity has no parts.

This disposes of the contention that the ultimate unity must embrace differences. Differences cannot cease to be those differences because they are embraced in some kind of unity. It is asked, what content can the Absolute have except the content of the appearances? Take away all the appearances and the Absolute is reduced to nothing. In our

opinion, this is only a confession of the emptiness of the Absolute. For if the content of the appearances is all the content which the Absolute has, then wherein lies the claim of the latter to greater reality? Should we not rather go farther and say that the substance of the appearances which the Absolute has borrowed is the only true ultimate substance? The notions of harmony and of systematisation are superimposed upon being and are subordinate to it. They do not affect the being-hood of being. They do not even affect its intelligibility, if, as we shall show, there is only one true being and that being is intelligent; the dualism of matter and form giving rise to all the conflicts and contradictions in thought has no place there.

It might now be urged that the last remaining alternative, namely that the one alone is real, is also not tenable; the conception of the one involves the conception of the many. In pure non-difference, there will be nothing to make the any boundary, any limit, any distinction to being. We then significantly call such being one? When anything one, we separate it out from a manifold and it into a unit in itself. Thus, the unlin the undifferentiated, if it d be one in

non-repeatable. Such a real manifold would be alien to the idea of number. This idea implies a unit, throughout self-same, by the self-addition of which other numbers are reached. But a universe in which nothing was repeatable, and nothing could be got twice over—in other words, in which everything was unique,—would not be amenable to a numerical treatment. How can we get anything that is *one*, since we can nowhere proceed from a given something to a second? Still we may admit that where a distinction can be made, the idea of number can also be applied. We can thus give meaning to *one*. But at the same time, this only shows the limitation of the conception of the one in ordinary use. It does not show that the unlimited and the undifferentiated cannot be. That is the only *real one*, if one we may call it; for it is one without a second.

Whether such an undifferenced unity exists or not is a question that can be asked. But one thing that is certain is that if anything exists it must be such a unity, for the notion of this unity involves no self-contradiction, while there is self-contradiction in the notion of the pure many or the notion of the one-in-many. The one in our sense then alone is a possible existent.

We shall now proceed to give some further indication of this non-dual being. It is evident that what can be objectified can only have a limited being; it will be *this something* and *not that something*. It will exclude, and also be excluded. In itself, it will be divisible, and it will stand in relations without which it can be nothing. The ultimate unitary being cannot therefore be objective in character. Can we find this being in the subject? But our idea of the subject is of something that is related to the object, the subject is therefore itself known; it cannot be said to be wholly unobjective. Can we suppose that the true being is the unity of both subject and object? But that unity is nowhere realised, and by the

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We admit that the conception of the one, as it is used in mathematics and in ordinary speech, is the conception of what is limited or what is only one among many. Its specific sense is that of a unit that can be repeated in almost identical form and measure. But in this specific sense it is certainly not true of reality. If we looked at the being of things as such, we should find it throughout continuous; there is no hiatus, no discontinuity, no real separation anywhere to serve as a basis for enumeration. If, on the other hand, we concentrated attention on real differences, then each different element would be simply itself, unique and

non-repeatable. Such a real manifold would be alien to the idea of number. This idea implies a unit, throughout self-same, by the self-addition of which other numbers are reached. But a universe in which nothing was repeatable, and nothing could be got twice over—in other words, in which everything was unique,—would not be amenable to a numerical treatment. How can we get anything that is *one*, since we can nowhere proceed from a given something to a second? Still we may admit that where a distinction can be made, the idea of number can also be applied. We can thus give meaning to *one*. But at the same time, this only shows the limitation of the conception of the *one* in ordinary use. It does not show that the unlimited and the undifferentiated cannot be. That is the only *real one*, if *one* we may call it; for it is *one* without a second.

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1. We are not at present interested either to deny or to affirm that there is such a thing as pure knowledge in which nothing is known. But surely there are cases of knowledge in which objects are known. In fact our ordinary notion of knowledge requires that there should be an object if there is to be any knowledge. We do not however mean to insist here that knowledge must always have an object. We want simply to know whether and how knowledge is related to its object when there is an object given to it.

2. Since we have chosen to consider only the cases of knowledge in which objects are given, we cannot here entertain the hypothesis that there are no objects at all. To think that there are objects and objects are known may be an error, but we are concerned here with the analysis of this erroneous position, taking it to be true.

3. If knowledge were absolutely and literally identical with its object, there would be no sense in discussing the relation between them. But it seems impossible to identify knowledge with its object. When I know a book, I cannot say that my knowledge of the book is the book. If my knowledge were identical with the book, the material characteristics of the book would be the characteristics of my knowledge, which is certainly not the case. My knowledge is not heavy or thick as the book is. Moreover I know a book and I also know a table. If knowledge were identical with its object, the table would be identical with my knowledge which again is identical with the book, and so the table would be identical with the book which is absurd. Some difference has to be granted between knowledge and its object and so the question of their relation becomes significant.

4. Is knowledge a mere relation? Relation between what? The knowledge-relation can exist only between the subject and the object. But what is the subject? The subject must be defined as that which knows. But to know is, according

to this view, to be related in a particular way, (since knowledge is a mere relation). We thus find that if we are to view knowledge as a mere relation, one of the terms turns out to be such that its whole being is constituted by this relation. But it is absurd that a particular relation should constitute the whole being of a term. We cannot therefore regard knowledge as a mere relation. Even Alexander who speaks of knowledge-relation speaks of it in a secondary sense.

5. This is an important issue. There are people who think that we cannot assert any relation between knowledge and its object. If we are to assert any relation, both the terms of the relation must be given. But object alone is given and knowledge is never given, and so we cannot assert any relation between them. If we still assert some relation between knowledge and its object, we shall degrade knowledge to the status of the given and thus deprive it of its real character, and so the asserted relation will not be really between knowledge and its object, but between two objects merely.

But is it a fact that we can assert a relation only between things that are given to us? Can we not suppose that a thing is related to something else, if our idea of that thing justifies such relation, even when the thing is incapable of being presented to us? My heart and my brain are not given to me and yet I can very well suppose that they are related. But it will be argued that we have objective notions of these things and can therefore relate them. Is it then seriously meant that we have no notion whatever of knowledge? If we have no notion of knowledge, we cannot significantly talk about it. It must be granted that we know what knowledge is and can therefore also know its relation to objects.

It may be objected that knowledge is, as we have maintained, different from object, and if knowledge is known, then it becomes indistinguishable from object which is also known.

We recognise the force of this objection but we must nevertheless point out that although object is known and knowledge is also known, they are not known in the same way, and so a distinction between them is still possible. It is the peculiarity of consciousness that it can turn back upon itself without withdrawing its look from the object. When I know, I may also know that I know. Object is given in consciousness which need not be reflective, i. e. self-conscious. Knowledge is known in reflective consciousness and is known as distinct from the object proper. If knowledge were not known at all, the fact that there is knowledge would go entirely unnoticed and we should not discuss any problem about it.

6. It is argued that the real relation between knowledge and its object, if there be any, must be direct and immediate, because object is directly given in knowledge. But what sort of direct relation is possible between knowledge and its object? The reality of knowledge must be admitted, as it cannot be denied. The object must also be real, if there is to be any real relation between it and knowledge. The only direct relations possible between two real entities seem to be contact (*Samyoga*) and inherence (*Samavāya*). They are obviously not possible between knowledge and its object, and so it seems we have to deny all relations between them.

But from the fact that the direct relations, which hold good between other real things, are not possible between knowledge and its object, it cannot conclusively follow that there is no relation between them. It may only mean that the relation is unique and is not like any other relation.

We thus come to the conclusion that there are no sufficient reasons to deny all relations between knowledge and its object, and so we accept the *prima facie* case we made out at the beginning that knowledge is related to its object.

We now come to the second question: What is the kind of relation that subsists between knowledge and its object? Is it internal or external? Is it like any other relation or quite unique?

It seems that there are difficulties in the way of regarding it as either external or internal. 'By an internal relation is generally meant a relation that makes a difference to its terms and an external relation is that which makes no difference to its terms. We can at once see that the knowledge relation is not internal, for the purpose of knowledge is to reveal its object as it really is and not to change it, and this purpose would be defeated if the relation of knowledge to its object brought about a change in the latter. If the knowledge-relation were merely external, i. e. made no difference to its terms, then an object known would be as good as not known, and there might be knowledge even without its relation to the object, which is absurd.

Mr. Ewing discussed at length the internality of the knowledge-relation in two issues of *Mind* 1925 and came to the conclusion that the internality of the knowledge-relation is consistent even with realistic presuppositions. He rightly pointed out the main objections to the view that the cognitive relation is internal. (1) It seems impossible for a present knowledge to change the past or a universal law or a mathematical truth. (2) To say that knowing changes its object seems to imply that knowing is a process of construction exercised upon the object known, and this seems to be incompatible with the nature of knowledge. But he thinks that these difficulties arise only if by 'change' we understand 'cause a change in'. An internal relation no doubt makes a difference to its terms but only in the sense that if either related term were different in a way affecting the relation, the other term would be likewise different. The relation of cause and effect is such a relation. A cause

That would make the doctrine absurd. What they mean or should mean is that when terms enter into any relation, they do not become different from what they were outside the relation, except in the newly acquired property of having this relation. This being so, a thing known need not be as good as not known, and so there should be no difficulty in regarding the knowledge-relation as external.

But we cannot bring out the peculiarity of the relation of knowledge to its object by saying that it is external. The relation is quite unique and can be described only as that of having an object (*viśayitā*). It is not like other relations which hold good only between objects. The fact of knowledge is quite plain and we also clearly see how objects are given in it. The relation of knowledge to object, as it is experienced in knowing anything, and which I have described here as that of having an object (or that of knowledge to object), cannot be made plainer or more intelligible by any elaborate characterisation.

Some people (e. g. Western Idealists) try to make our understanding of this relation deeper by suggesting that knowledge and object are not two different things but are only inseparable aspects of one and the same thing, because neither of the terms is available apart from the other. But in fact we are more mystified than enlightened by this description. Our notions of knowledge and object are so very different that we shall always find it very difficult to conceive of a real unity constituted by them. If the unity is not known, its reality, and so the validity of the conception, cannot be asserted. If it is to be known, it must be known subjectively (in reflective introspection) or objectively (in perception). But the alleged whole cannot be known in either way, because subjectively object cannot be known and objectively knowledge cannot be known, and so the whole, constituted by knowledge and object, if there is any, is bound to remain always unknown.

cannot be what it is if its effect is different. The effect makes a difference to the cause in this sense, but it does not produce a change in the cause. Similarly knowledge makes a difference to its object. An object cannot be what it is if its knowledge is different. Therefore the cognitive relation is internal.

Now when I have known an object, we cannot possibly suppose that my knowledge could be different from what it is and yet would remain the knowledge of the same object. This fact is probably never sought to be denied by anybody who may be inclined to deny that the cognitive relation is internal. But in my knowledge of a thing there are at least two things involved, (1) the fact of my knowing and (2) what I know of the thing or the content of my knowledge. When one denies the internality of the knowledge-relation, the denial has reference not to the content of knowledge, but to the fact of knowledge. When my knowledge is once there, the content of it cannot be different unless the object known were different. But the fact of my knowledge may not occur at all. If I know, I cannot know differently, but it is not at all necessary that I should know. The content of knowledge is certainly determined by the nature of the object, just as an effect is determined by its cause. But that there should be a subjective consciousness of the object in this or that individual is never determined by the nature and being of any object. The occurrence or non-occurrence of such consciousness is quite immaterial to the being of an object and the knowledge-relation is in this sense quite external.

To say that the knowledge-relation is external is not to say that it comes to the same thing whether we know an object or do not know it. Those who support the doctrine of external relation do not, I suppose, mean to say that there is no difference whatever between related and unrelated terms.

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within the apprehending consciousness, it cannot sustain any relation to things outside it, and without this there is no position. The particular belongs eminently to the field of action, and the universal to contemplation.

2. Several considerations of importance follow from this conception of the particular and the universal:

(i). The totality of spatial and temporal positions—the cosmos for instance—is not a particular, though entities within it are particulars with regard to other entities equally within. For, it cannot be fixed in position, moored to anything, there being nothing, by our definition of cosmos, external to it. It is a universal, and is repeatable indefinitely. In keeping with this view is the Hindu conception of cycles of creation intelligible.

(ii). This leads us to another point—the confusion between universality and necessity. Kant, as is well-known, speaks in terms which would imply that universality and necessity are identical, or that they are invariably connected. The necessary is that which is inexorably fixed; this is unthinkable if an entity were considered in itself; then it is absolutely free. Necessity is nothing if not a position, a relation to other entities. The absolutely necessary is thus that which is inexorably related to all things; it is the particular par excellence. The absolutely free, on the other hand, is the unrelated, for, if there were anything external to it, it could be related to that.

(iii) It might be thought that the universal is related to its particulars, in ways variously conceived by philosophers both in the west and the east. But the universal is not related in any way to the particular even. For, both of them never appear on the same plane to get related. To the universal the particular never appears in that light, for we have seen that the particular owes its particularity to its relation to,

position only with regard to entities outside the group. Position has somehow to be understood. Number, Language, causal chain etc. are examples of order. But there is no order which does not involve Space and Time, they are the greatest individualisers. For, a togetherness of entities having a certain dimension or spread outness is indispensable to any position. And without succession the position of entities is not sustainable. But spatial or temporal position is impossible without entities which sustain the relative positions, ciphers cannot engender position.

Merely spread outness and succession do not suffice to make anything particular, we are still in the realm of the ideal. The play of *Hamlet* has certainly spatial distinctions and succession of events, still it has no assignable position. To have one, an entity must sustain relationships not only with certain entities but with all and sundry. Herein consists the superiority of the world of action. My speaking can be particularised beyond any chance of repetition if it is related with the room I am in and that with other places, they in turn with others and so on until all conceivable entities are related or thought to be related. So too in the case of time my speaking shall have to be fixed in position with regard to other happenings, and these to others and so on. An historical event can sustain such relations to any extent, and, therefore, is a real particular. An ideal event, e.g. the death of *Hamlet* can have relationships only with other events in the play i.e. in a very limited sphere, it is, hence, not a particular. A particular is what it is in virtue of its position i.e. infinite relationships with other particulars. It is evident that when one entity is known all its relationships are not known, as this would mean the apprehension of the entire universe when a tiny drop of water is seen. Position is believed in, and is posited in action. It is not a thinkable. What is thought being wholly

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or position in the midst of other particulars. The universal itself is not a specific position; if it were so, the difference between it and any one particular will not be shared in common by others equally; particulars as such will not be different from it. This is to say they will not be comparable even on one plane of existence. Therefore, the difference between the particular and the universal belongs to a plane different from that of the difference among particulars themselves. From the side of the universal there is no particular, and hence there is no relation.

(iv). There cannot be one particular at any time; the very notion of particularity, as due to position, militates against it. Obviously, no position is possible with one entity. It would be indistinguishable from the universal and from thought. The particular is essentially and inherently many. It would thus appear that the particular is doubly conditioned; *it depends on the universal, for it is just the universal caught in the midst of external relations.* The contribution of other particulars to its nature is very evident. The dependence of particulars upon one another is reciprocal, while its dependence on the universal is not so. The being of the particular is a standing contradiction. For A, a particular, is what it is due to the being of other particulars which in turn depend upon A—an unavoidable vicious circle. No such contradiction is to be found in the being of the universals.

3. Hitherto we have been considering the universal and the particular without any reference to their relation with knowledge. It may at once be pointed out that all statements about the universal are valid in their entirety of knowledge. It is intelligible in itself and does not need to be defined in terms of others. It is never coincident with the object, which is essentially many and limited. If it were one, the object would be indistinguishable from knowledge. The object can,

therefore, be taken as particular. Knowledge must extend before and after the object to know it as an object. The difference between knowledge and object is not on a par with the differences among objects. Not being presentable in one plane of being, the relation between knowledge and object, like the supposed relation between universal and particular, is not tenable.

It is in keeping with this view of knowledge as universal, that Pure Being—Brahman—the highest Universal and Consciousness—Chaitanya—are conceived as absolutely identical in Vedānta. From the standpoint of Consciousness—Pure Being—the world of particulars does not exist, or even appear as such. Spirit or Pure Consciousness cannot know any particular; to do so it shall have to take a station in the midst of particulars, identifying itself thereby with one specific position and viewing other particulars from that privileged and prejudiced position. Spirit has to become the ego; consciousness has to become discursive thinking. Even the Ego, limited as it is, is still more universal than the objects it encounters. This particularisation of Spirit is inexplicable, but it has a *de facto* validity.

4. Can there be many universals? *Prima facie* there seems to be no objection to their plurality; there are colours, sounds, pains and pleasures of various kinds. The pertinent question, however, is to ask whether the plurality of the universal is in conformity with its self-intelligible character. When I see a colour, its being one among many universals is not an immediate datum to me as the colour is. Its plurality is a character acquired in relation to others, and hence the universal has *ipso facto* lost its self-intelligent character. But a universal must rigorously avoid all reference to things not immediately given, just as it does not countenance the particulars. Pure Being, therefore, is the only true universal;

other universals are particulars with regard to that. It alone is in itself, being self-intelligent. It is absolutely free, for its universality precludes its relationship with anything inside or outside it. It has no position. The essential character of the universal is not repeatability, but its self-intelligent and immanent nature.

The Epistemological Corollary to the Western psychology of Perception.

By
D. M. DATTA.

Western psychology is almost unanimous as to the view that in the perception of an external object the mind does not come into direct contact with it. Even those psychologists who admit causal interaction between mind and matter hold that the mind knows an external object through the impressions created in it by changes in the body generated by influences coming from the object. Among Indian philosophers there were some who held the theory of the direct contact of the mind with the object—secured in the case of visual perception, for example, by the going on of the *antaḥkaraṇa* to the object. But no such theory is found among Western psychologists. All Schools of Western philosophy accept the above psychology of perception; but they try to foist on or deduce from it different epistemological conclusions. The purpose of this paper is to consider the legitimacy of some of these important conclusions and to show what kind of epistemology is strictly consistent with this accepted psychology.

The specific epistemological theories which we consider in the light of this psychology are those which concern the two cognate problems, viz. (1) Do we know any external object? (2) If so, is it known immediately or mediately? Now, if it be a fact that the mind has no direct contact with the object of perception and comes to know the object through the sensations created by the physiological changes generated by the stimuli coming from the object, the most satisfactory answer to the two questions will be "Yes, we know an external object and that mediately." Two other answers also are

theoretically possible and actually given by some philosophers, though they are not in strict consistency with the psychological theory from which they start; namely: (1) We know the existence of an external object and that immediately; and (2) We do not know the existence of any external object and, therefore, the question as to how it is known does not at all arise. We shall try to show one by one how these two answers are inconsistent with their psychological premises and then show also the reasonableness of the view that external objects are known mediately.

Let us take the second answer first. It is the answer given, as is well known, either by sceptics who deny the *knowledge* of external objects or by subjective idealists who altogether deny the *existence* of the external objects. The chief objection against this answer is that unless we believe in an external object we cannot explain why there should be any sensation, the nature and duration of which are not wholly dependent on our minds. Some idealists have tried to explain this charge away by holding that the reason why there are some perceptions which are not wholly dependent on our wills is not that these are caused by extra-mental objects, but that these are caused by some forces within the mind which are not under the control of the mind as the knower. But this defence only admits in a round-about way the existence of factors other than and therefore external to ourselves as *knowers* and thus amounts to the confession that there are realities external to the knower. There are many other well-known grounds on which subjective idealism is rejected; but as this one is sufficiently conclusive, we need not mention any other here. In fact, so far as the psychological premise in question is concerned, subjective idealism is wholly incompatible with it, because the premise involves the belief in external objects as the sources of the sense-stimuli. The psychological account of sense-perception can stand only if

subjective idealism be false and subjective idealism also can stand if the psychological account be false. The attempt to deduce subjective idealism from the psychological view (as is sometimes done by some who start with the psychological origin of sense-impressions and showing thereby that all that we know about the objects are the mental changes, conclude that we do not know anything except these changes) involves the contradiction of the premise.

The first answer (namely that in sense-perception we know an external object and that immediately) which is held now by many realists is more consistent with the psychological account in so far as it does not deny the knowledge of an external object. But it is not consistent with the account in so far as it asserts the *immediate* knowledge of the object. For, the knowledge of the object takes place, according to this account, through the *mediation* of some factors, namely, the stimuli and physiological change which stand between the object and the mental state. In holding that an external object is immediately perceived, in spite of these mediating factors, the realists owe an explanation, and the explanation that is mostly given is that the mediating factors taken together constitute a series which leads in one knowledge namely the perception of the object and though this knowledge is thus obtained *through* many factors, it is not obtained through any other *knowledge*. If this statement be true and if the definition of 'immediate knowledge' be 'knowledge that is not obtained through any other knowledge', then this contention must have to be granted. But the correctness of the definition apart, this statement itself is open to objection. For the consciousness of the physiological change really amounts to a knowledge and the object being known *through* it cannot be said to be immediately known. In normal sense-perception the consciousness of the physiological change cannot be separated from that of the physical object. If this were always

the case, there would have never been any suspicion that the physical object is known *through* the consciousness of the physiological change; like a word and its meaning the two would have remained undistinguished. But this is not always so. We have at times, through artificial stimulation of a sense-organ, simply the consciousness of physiological change resembling the one we have when stimulation is really caused by a physical object. From such a case we come to know that in the case where a physical object is said to be known, we have no consciousness other than the one which we have when there is no such object. In other words, in both the cases we have nothing more than the consciousness of the physiological change. In normal cases, where the physical object is believed to cause the physiological change, the consciousness of this change comes to acquire, by repeated experience, the meaning of the consciousness of the object, in much the same way as the visual perception of cotton has come to acquire the meaning of the perception of softness as well. Again, just as in spite of the subjective feeling of immediateness, the knowledge of softness in such a case is revealed by logical analysis to be obtained only *through the mediation* of the visual knowledge and not directly as the knowledge of the colour, similarly in spite of the subjective feeling of the direct apprehension of the physical object, logical analysis irresistibly reveals the fact that the knowledge of the physical object is really obtained through the mediation of the physiological change. The knowledge of the physical object, therefore, cannot be held to be immediate, if we stick to the definition of immediate knowledge stated above.

But this irresistible conclusion is often avoided by taking 'immediate knowledge' as identical with the general and somewhat vague term 'perception'. In the above discussion it has been found that the knowledge of the physical object can be likened to and brought under acquired perception;

and if immediate knowledge is identical with perception, the knowledge of the physical object, in question, must be admitted to be immediate. The equation of 'immediate knowledge' to 'perception' only introduces confusion and prevents a clear conclusion by making it obscure. If 'immediate knowledge' be defined, as it should be, as 'knowledge not obtained through the mediation of any other knowledge' it can be easily ascertained, as shown already, that acquired perception cannot be thought identical with it. 'Perception' has come to include 'internal' and 'external,' 'primary' and 'acquired' and many other kinds, all of which are not cases of immediate knowledge, in the sense defined above.

Many realists take the case of the perception of an external object as the very type of immediate knowledge, and they have no difficulty, therefore, in asserting that an external object is known directly or immediately. But this is only cutting the Gordian knot by asserting a verbal proposition. To call the doubtful case of sense-perception a type of immediate knowledge is to beg the question. The correct procedure should be to take a case which is admitted by all as immediate, Consciousness of mental states furnishes such a case and should, therefore, be taken as the type of immediate knowledge. When compared with such knowledge, the perception of an external object, as analysed before, will at once be found to be much different from it, as regards the factors involved in the acquisition of the knowledge. The latter can no longer be brought under the same class as the former.

All these considerations show, therefore, that if the psychological account, of the origin of sense-perception be admitted, the theory of the immediate knowledge of external objects cannot stand.

But before we conclude, we must consider also briefly some objections that can arise against the mediate knowledge of external objects. The most forcible objection that can be

raised is to ask If the physical object is *never* known immediately how is it possible to know the existence of it at all? If we knew in any case that *k*, the knowledge of a physiological change, was accompanied by the existence of the physical object *p*, then it might have been possible for us to infer in a subsequent case *p* from *k*. But as *p* is never known immediately the physiological change being in every case the only consciousness we have, how can we know at all the invariable relation between *k* and *p*, so as to be able to infer *p* from *k*? How do we at all know the physical object and assert its existence?

In criticising subjective idealism we have already shown the reason why at all we are led to suppose something other than the knowing self as being responsible for a sense perception. We find that the nature and duration of the sensation are not wholly dependent on ourselves and hence we are not satisfied to think of the sensation as being wholly due to ourselves. But this will not wholly answer the above objection. We have also to show through what kind of knowledge we come to know the external object. Inference is usually known, in Western philosophy as the only kind of mediate knowledge and it has been pointed out that inference cannot yield the required knowledge. To answer the objection we have to point out that inference is not really the only kind of mediate knowledge. There is a kind of knowledge which consists in believing something without which a certain given fact cannot be explained. It is recognised by some Indian thinkers as an independent source of knowledge and called *arthāpatti*¹. The knowledge of the physical object is of that kind. The knowledge of the physiological change in the case in question, cannot be explained without supposing some extra subjective factor and

¹ For a defence and elaborate discussion of this method of knowledge reference may be made to the author's work—*The Six Ways of Knowing* (George Allen & Unwin)

“The Soul of Knowledge.”

By

P. NARASIMHAM.

— Introspection has become unpopular of late with certain psychologists, and yet it is forgotten that by that method of study alone we seem not only to understand ourselves as conscious entities but also put ourselves in a position to interpret others even by the results achieved by so-called external observation and analysis. There is no other method of enquiry to get at the self in *conscious* experience. In ignoring the self (whatever be its metaphysical status) in a psychological study, we are like the person who, seeing the world with his eyes open, and yet not “seeing” his own eyes, declares that the eye is not proved but that there is only seeing in evidence ! It is thus Hume denied the self, he forgot it was the subject “directly known as such,” but looked for it in the “objects” of knowing. Similar has been the case with the problem of knowing. The main question how “a subject” can know an “object” is ignored. We are dazzled and dazed by the achievements of sciences and are willing to believe that Science will one day solve the whole problem of existence and that there is no place for any metaphysics or philosophy in the field. We forget the weakness in such a stand. Science is not self-critical, introspective. It does not analyse its own right of knowledge or our ability to know. Where science is silent, philosophy strives to speak. But yet the philosopher or the metaphysician seems also to fall into the same habitual groove of the so-called “scientific” way of thinking. We are not yet clearly aware that we are using only the external or objective categories of knowing, and that there is besides, or must be, some internal or central view-point which puts us right into the heart of things where knowing and being are

not two but one. So long as we take that knowledge, even complete knowledge, consists in a thorough understanding of the inter-relations of all the parts which thus constitute a whole, so long we shall be far away from the "soul" of knowledge. The real whole is not and cannot be made up of parts; it belongs to a different dimension of meaning altogether. The parts are only parts of the whole; the parts, starting as parts, can never create the whole. Philosophy, as a mere unification or synthesis of sciences, building up a system of completely co-ordinated knowledge, can but be a fore-runner of sciences and scientific discovery, belonging to the same category of knowledge as the sciences. It does not touch the soul of knowledge. Philosophy has so far remained "outside" as a theoretic consolation, supplementing the defects of sciences, by its own bold thought-solutions which it one day hopes to "scientifically" prove. It is no doubt a worthy endeavour to so forerun and anticipate the sciences, if philosophy is to be worthy of any scientific respect; but yet it cannot claim to be the *ultimate* knowledge. We should strive to discover deeper still the very soul of knowledge from which the various other types of knowledge take their source and derive their authority, i.e. that *form* of knowing which transcends the common *judgment type*.

What is the psychology or rationale of knowing, what are its postulates, and what do we mean by logic and metaphysics? The psychology of knowing, as we now have it, however deep our analysis of its mechanism, does not reveal to us the *sources of knowing either internally in the subject or externally in the sense organs and the object*. We simply say we know and believe we know. We are like the denizens of Plato's cave, cognisant of the picture-shadows on the tri-dimensional screen of space, but knowing nothing of either their source or the *what* within us by which we *can* know. Further, we require to understand how we, as both bodies and minds, are

constituted and evolved to know what it is that knows and what is the known. There is again the awkward question how we know that we know. Our logics do not help us in this direction, either the quality-judgment logic of Aristotle, or the quantity cum space logic called mathematics, or even the logic of causal thinking of our inductive sciences including the semi-mechanical theories of Evolution. They all express only the *onlooker's* point of view, getting deluded by the ambiguity of the question "How". The charge of materialism is made against the scientific outlook because it is uncritical and unreflective of its own postulates, and does not admit or is unaware of a different way of knowing. It merely studies objects as only *objects*. The science that is honestly self-conscious and introspective can never become materialistic, but rather would point out that there must be an as-yet unknown factor within the very heart of nature which evades every objective observation. Even our metaphysics, though nominally *meta*-physics, seems to recede more away from reality as though attempting to draw sciences behind it, rather than introvert in a sort of fourth dimensional direction to look into and touch the very centre of *both* being and knowing. It unconsciously adopts the same "scientific" out-look of nature, it does not study nature as a "subject", nay, as *the one-subject*. We seem to require a new and real metaphysical in-look if we want to truly know. But we seem to be baffled at the very moment when we ourselves to ourselves seem to be hermetically sealed, dreamily feeling surrounded, as it were, by the "mystery of things". Where are we in this field when we try to know Reality when we are only a picture to ourselves as we see it in the "Evolutionary" stages in the beginnings of know-

ledge can be detected. In the external world we may not be prepared to speak of the "behaviour" of inorganic things in obedience to the "laws of nature" (a phrase, by the way, more indicative of the profoundness of our ignorance) as "knowledge" on their part. Yet, we might question, wherein lies the error in describing the responsive reactions of an "atom" as its own appropriate "instinct-intelligence"? A step higher, when we observe even in inorganic matter some symmetrical modes of growth, like those in crystals, even then we shall not concede them either life or "knowledge". A stage next, in the primitive forms of growth of little vegetable organisms, is there needed, shall we say, an intelligent principle to account for their being and sustenance? What are we to make of their larger variety, each in its form and yet with variations to pave the way for a higher that is not yet but towards which it is "unconsciously" groping? What is a seed, each of its own kind, produced from the parent (apparently) for the very continuity of its species? Shall we say that the apparent parent is not the parent, but it is the one fundamental principle of all Life that uses as its medium the apparent parent while itself is the real parent, remaining itself as the one abiding and sustaining "cause" of both the parent and the offspring? And so on, from tiny animal organisms up to man whom we take as representing the highest product of evolution, where are we to say "thus far instinct and thence forwards intelligence"? Are instinct and intelligence two distinct factors somehow brought into co-ordination with each other and yet different from the "uniform laws of nature"? Where are we to discover the unity of "mechanical nature", "instinct" and "intelligence"? Where and how are we to seek for the unity-continuity principle of knowledge which at the same time can be identical with the *being* of things? We answer, it must be by insight into our own being. If man does repre-

sent the final (not yet completed) product of evolution, then, just as a machine produced out of a factory must reveal to an intelligent mind how it has come into existence, so also the human-complex must tell us the story of its own evolution right from its beginning. It is thus that "man is the measure of things", the "microcosm" that some ancient thinkers described it to be. It is *man* that must be the one key to solve the double-faced riddle of knowing and being. The more we understand ourselves the more will be our knowledge of things, animate as well as inanimate. It is man that is the soul of knowledge. This is the secret of the endeavour called Raja-Yoga in India, Introspection *par excellence*.

Whatever our ignorance regarding inorganic nature and its laws, and even if we ignore the vast portion of the organic life at the earlier levels of evolution, if only we should strive to interpret what stands and must stand as the background in the life of well-evolved instincts, we may be able to see that instinct is very much more allied to our so-called intelligence than what may be evident on the surface. It is quite easy to conceive that it is the same principle that works at one level as instinct in the animal (man also is an animal) and at another is expressing itself as intelligence in man. Theories that try to account for instinct as a result or product of sundry actions (that somehow come) are like attempts to describe a circle without a centre. They are like "parts" accounting for the whole, when the whole has its own distinct individuality and the parts themselves obtain their meaning only from the whole. Such theories will not work forward to explain the formation of any instinct. They illustrate the proverbial "putting the cart before the horse". If we accept evolution as a fact of the process of *becoming* in nature, the living as well as the non-living, then there must be a whole, a unitary something, from which the process obtains meaning and intelligible status. The various activities and the corres-

ponding building up of forms are to be interpreted as the results inspired by an all-brooding and every-where-present principle, remaining as the one Source of Life and consciousness as well as accounting equally for the very formation of the original "lifeless atoms". It is as a sort of psychologist's fallacy that we attribute to each organism an individuality and separateness of its own and speak of it as prompted by instinct or as being itself intelligent. We forget that even our personality, is, on ultimate analysis, a camouflage, a myth, neither its beginning nor its ending being within our ken. We merely act and think as though we were individuals. It may be that the same Something that has worked out the inorganic world of "matter" with its various laws, and is the informing life of all the sub-human instinct-guided organisms, is also trying towards individualisation through "intelligent" action in man. In spite of all protestations to the contrary there is nothing that is one's own in the world either inorganic or organic. We have not yet become; we are yet in the process of becoming. A little introspection will convince any one that not only one does not know when and whence one has come into being as a conscious entity, but that one is equally ignorant and unconscious of the rising and fading of one's thoughts, and of where one is going to find one's end. A genius or a sinner can no more with any psychological honesty say that he is what he is by dint of himself than a fool or a sinner can account for himself by himself. All forms of existence from the lowest to the highest, the purely mechanical, the instinctive and the intelligent, are members of one and the same mighty structure of Life and Being, rooted in it and sustained by it. In instinct, therefore, as the immediate evolutionary predecessor, we ought to find the origins of intelligence,—the latter representing a process of centralising or being individualised of what, as the former, was working as an external and unconscious moulding principle. Our

intelligence, however, as it now stands, only just touches the fringe of such universal life from outside, —at the circumference. We are yet to enter into it, or rather it has yet to establish itself as a centro within our hearts that we may really know Life. Man represents the animal in whom the attempt has begun to be made to localise or focus the one Great Life that, up to man, was working externally, moulding and modelling the eutable forms of being. If God made man in His image, i.e. ideally and archotypally, it is man that “makes” God in His imago *really* and *literally*. What the next step will be when man has become more of a complete being, when the centralising becomes more fully established, we can only conjecture. We have not yet had in our midst any human form as a specimen that could be declared in any definite sense as being conscious of itself as such. On the other hand we find at present that the higher the genius the greater is its unconsciousness. Even the inspired, the gifted and the so-called mystic are to that very extent, as the names themselves betray, unconscious only. From the high to the low we act more as mediums of the Unseen and the Unknown than as self-conscious and self-directing agents or entities. Starting therefore in instinct-life we are being moulded to become self-contained intelligences as the fruition of Evolution. What now works as intelligence or “knowledge” within each of us is only the Parent-principle of Life and Consciousness. It fulfils itself by making us its “Sons” sharing all the meaning and reality that is itself as the one source of all. Until then our knowing is only external, “objective” and determined from outside of ourselves, a knowing that can work only in relation to a something that stands always, “opposed” as an “other” to us. We merely find ourselves as somehow constituted to know and act. We are not yet in the possession of the Soul of knowing; the “subject” and the “object” of knowledge are not yet become one through the very act of knowing, but remain as *two*.

Let us now look at the problem from the other point of view, viz, that of the Evolving Parent principle—which finally is the same as that of the fulfilled individuality. To such a one there can be no knowing of a “what” that is as an “other”; the process of knowing itself will consist in the unification of the object with the intelligence, the subject. The subject and object become as one. It is knowing by the process of becoming or rather being the very object itself. There, doubt and error find no place. The knower, the known and the knowing stand as one and the same. If from such a point of view we say we have known an “object” as for example, our own body, we become, as it were, the very body itself, the very units of the cells of our body with their various activities and inter-relations, *living* their very life both as parts and wholes. Such knowing will be a state of being at-one with the object in one’s consciousness; while now it is as a picture show working quite unconsciously and externally to ourselves by the fiat of the one Great Life called ordinarily Nature. Such is the inner and central, the timeless and spaceless knowledge that we associate with Divinity alone. It is called the knowledge “Brahmic” in the Upanishads. We do not possess it now. We are “knowing” at present “magically” as external observers, as in a show. We are merely presented a panoramic picture of the process—leaving good room for theorisation,—we are not become the *substance* itself, the Thing-in-Itself. Hence we say we know now only unconsciously. Man as a higher animal is slowly evolving to be En-souled, to be the temple of the one Great soul of the Universe. He is now only the “flower” of evolution waiting to become the “fruit” that contains within it the very “seed of Existence”. It is but so, because in any fundamental sense there cannot be *but* one Soul, one Life, one I, that is also the Universe. There can be no other meaning metaphysically tenable for individuality—there cannot be two “absolutes” in the Universe. “By Its Light alone all these

shine", says an Upanishad. That unique single principle is called at once Brahman and Atman, the former meaning the Reality or Object and the latter the Subject, the Eternal knower, yet one only in every sense. It is at once the Soul of all-knowing and of all Being.

Broadly speaking we may note three important stages of Evolution in knowledge: the unconscious, the pseudo-conscious and the conscious. The first is what is working as the uniformities or laws of the inorganic and a large portion of the earliest organic world. The second comprises the whole of the reflex-instinct system of the later organic world up to the animal man. And the third is the future consummation of the evolution process in the completed man commencing with his intelligence-instinct. We may say that the very trend of evolution, viewed from the inner or central point, is progress from the unconscious to the fully self-conscious, just as from the biological point of view, that is of forms, it is one of changes from a homogeneous and undifferentiated state to one of definiteness of structure and function. Form is the symbol externally of the definiteness in the stage of progress, and the perfection of form will therefore represent the goal of Evolution. Form has meaning and status only for Life, and conversely, Life without its form has no real existence. To speak of a life beyond and without any form will therefore be only an abstraction, a figure of speech, something that has not come to exist. Evolution would be a meaningless lie if the goal be considered as anything formless. We cannot therefore agree with any Vedantin or Buddhist that the goal of our life is a *post-mortem* state in some other "world" than here on Earth, but take it as what must be accomplished, completed and made to stand as a *fact* here, in the world of facts. The long and laborious process of evolution should otherwise appear as either childishness or lunacy. When the perfect

man is evolved, he stands as the *living* evidence of the so-called "Immortality".

From the above outline of the "Soul of Knowledge", of what we consider as the ideal hope of the Upanishadic thinkers, we may attempt to examine the significance of the idealistic "slogan" *Esse is percipi*, what is true about it and what false. It is easy to understand that it is only a psychological truism to say that the "being" of a thing for us is and can be only in terms of our experience, and that to speak of an existence in terms beyond such experience is psychologically at least *ultra vires*. This interpretation, however, does not help us any further as a theory of Reality. Of Reality as such, in terms of our ordinary knowing the statement is preposterous. We cannot agree with a Borkesian Idealism that shows scant respect to the normal "instinctive" distinction that man (let alone the brute, which is only an "idea" for Berkeley) makes between his subjective act of knowing and an objective being, that seems to voraciously swallow up all objects by simply knowing them, and that miserably impoverishes all reality by reducing it to "bare" human souls, a god and the play of "ideas" between them as if by a sort of miraculous wireless. It makes the story of evolution from the lowest to the highest forms a meaningless delusion. We would rather have a Leibnizian view that regards everything as at once both real and living. But from the point of view maintained here regarding *real* knowledge, the phrase *Esse is percipi* may be interpreted rather as containing a profound truth, as pointing out towards the very one-ness of knowing and being. While it is not true of the mere "mortal" man, it is utterly true of "divine" man. It is the "saving knowledge" of the Upanishads that the ultimate Subject is only one and the object is also Himself. We are not yet able to take up our stand at the centre of things to fully appreciate its significance; we seem to be roaming about round and the deluding circle at whose

centre lies the Soul of Existence, the Eternal Truth, Knowledge and Reality in unity, the Upanishadic Atman. Our highest scientific and philosophic achievements are yet only external "appearances". We have to get at the Heart of Reality, be It, to say that we have known. "That is the Atman". "That thou art" is the "ultimate" of the Upanishadic thought. It is only its implication that we have tried to outline here. The fruition of such knowledge when *real-used* is called Mukthi or Liberation or rather Emancipation; it is the Great Disillusionment. The liberation however should not be interpreted as escaping from existence into a non-being; such escape is meaningless and impossible. Mukthi is not annihilation. It is the state of true *being*, or *positive* existence; it is called *Sāvaltha* or *Eternity*. The liberation is rather from the present limitations of knowledge, from the illusion of separateness as of a "this" from a "that", of a "you" from a "me". The difference-seeing mind, the psychological "me" is merely the "negative", dependent and mortal self. It must be transcended; it is not the Atman. Says an Upanishad "one who sees differences goes only from death to death".

The "soul of knowledge" stands for us as the Ideal. When it begins to work out *even in any one of us*, there and then shall the Earth and her humanity stand for ever blessed.

The Individual in Kant's Philosophy.

By

HUMAYUN Z. A. KABIR.

The preponderance of epistemological over ontological interests which characterises modern Philosophy may have begun with Locke, but it is in the Philosophy of Kant that this tendency reached its full development. Locke started with an enquiry into the nature of the human understanding, but this enquiry was merely preliminary to an examination of the objects of our awareness in order to determine their ontological nature and status. The recognition of substance as a mystical "I know not what", mysteriously characterised by primary or original qualities, remains as evidence of his inheritance from the ontological metaphysics of his predecessors.

For Kant the problem always was, not what things ultimately are, but how is it that knowledge is at all possible. Human knowledge is a process in time, coming about in a finite individual mind and yet it claims to hold true for all minds at all times. To explain this paradox, it is necessary to examine the judgment and its types, for knowledge exists in the medium of thought and the most fundamental act of thought is the Judgment. Kant thought that formal logic had completed the analysis of judgment as pure form in abstraction from all content of knowledge. All that was therefore left for him to do was merely to analyse thinking in its relation to knowledge of objects and this he proposed to do in his transcendental logic. This respect for formal logic did not however prevent him from altering its scheme wherever in conflict with that suggested by his own analysis. Though he was not aware of the fact himself, he is therefore the pioneer of the tendency, both to recognise more forms of judgment than are allowed in the scheme of formal logic and to minimise the

differences between them to one of degree rather than of kind, which is characteristic of modern logic

The epistemological interest also explains why critical philosophy began with the *Critique of Pure Reason*. At this stage he thought that the empirical judgment of perception offered no difficulty, for in it the question of validity beyond the moment of experience did not arise. It expressed a particular perception of a particular finite mind at a definite point in the space time order and carried its validity in the experience itself. He did not here raise the question that even this judgment involved a reference beyond the individual mind, for as the objective unity of given representations it claimed acceptance from everyone, and was adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations that would have merely subjective validity. Similarly he thought that the analytic judgment also offered no difficulty as its validity was guaranteed by the concept itself. But the judgments of Science were different, for they claimed universal validity like the analytic judgments, and yet like the judgments of perception, applied to objects of experience which are given to us as particular and finite. The answer of the first critique was that the unique nature of space and time explained this paradox, for their uniform, self-external and intuitive character made the application of the categories to the manifold of perception possible.

Now this is no doubt the position of common sense, analysed and made self-conscious. For, we have, on the one hand, *merely general laws or pure forms of abstraction lying ready* in the mind, and on the other, the manifold of disorganised sense data to supply the material for these forms. The categories are shown to be involved in the structure of experience as such, but even on Kant's own analysis, the categories by themselves are not adequate to the constitution of experience, and require a further intuitive element

In the first critique, this intuitive element was assumed and characters attributed to it without any attempt at critical examination. Kant did not here even canvass the possibility, that if the manifold of sensations really was disorganised, it might refuse to submit to the forms which the categories sought to impose on it and thus destroy the possibility of experience itself. Now experience is no doubt an unquestionable fact and the starting point of Kantian as of all other philosophy, but the experience with which Kant started required the perceptual element no less than the categories.

The neglect of the perceptual element in the first critique is not however surprising, for Kant's main interest here was in the mathematical sciences. The individual instance or case is not considered sufficiently, because for Science it is the similarity of the class rather than the peculiarities of the members of the class which is important. But the class concept implies some recognition of the idiosyncrasies of the individual members of the class, at least in noticing their significant resemblances to one another in contrast with their important differences from members of other classes. Though with the progress of Science, the perceptual element tends to become less and less explicit, judgments of science are yet possible only on the presupposition of previous judgments of perception.

In conformity with the tradition of rationalist philosophy, the first critique began with an implicit belief in the adequacy of Reason to know the real, through its final conclusion was that intelligence could not go beyond what was given by perception and the categories were valid only of the empirical. But Kant did not in the light of this result examine his original assumption of the *thing-in-itself* and his insistence upon it as the nonmenal reality remained to prove that, for Kant, it was merely the limitation of the human intelligence which prevented the attainment of the rationalist ideal. This Kant expressed by saying that the categories

give knowledge only of the phenomena, because the human Understanding is not intuitive but must have intuitions given to it from some other source.

The Understanding gives knowledge, but the knowledge it gives is general and abstract. Strictly speaking, it gives only the form of knowledge rather than actual knowledge, for the general divorced from the particular is a mere abstraction. Its *a priori* constitutive principles have universal validity, but when we come to examine the territory where the Understanding rules, we find that it gives the barest skeleton or framework, which can be filled up only by what actual experience gives.

This neglect of the perceptual or individual carries with it its own nemesis. For the principle of mechanical causation which is exalted in the first critique leads in the end to its own negation. In causation, we start by premising that we must not regard the nature of things as determined by their spatio-temporal positions, but their time and space relations as determined by their nature. This however cannot be their nature merely as parts of a series, for they could not be even parts of a series unless they were something more than mere parts, for a system of relations without relata is a contradiction in terms. Yet in causation we state relations of things and the more we extend the causal chain, the more do things lose their independent individuality and become merely determined points in a space-time order. The perceptual element seems to become less and less important, till at last, the whole or reality is sought to be represented as the quantitative function of some element whose quality is neutral or indifferent. Change itself becomes impossible as the result of this attempt to reduce everything to a *synthesis* of the homogeneous. There are no qualitative differences among the elements of reality to allow for change from one quality to another, and quantitatively, its magnitude

remains constant, so that the process of explaining change comes in the end to denying change altogether. "In the Absolute there is no change."

The importance of the individual character of things is more explicit in the case of the dynamical categories, because they deal with the synthesis of the heterogeneous, for which the most important element to consider is the specific character of the object. That is why Kant regards them as regulative, not constitutive principles of the understanding in respect of perception, for they prescribe the form, but cannot anticipate our actual sensations. The mathematical principles are on the contrary constitutive, because they are involved in our perception of even space and time and the homogeneity of the time and space order guarantees that there must be a certain homogeneity in all that we can experience. Now, individual experience can be understood only against a background of a whole of possible experiences and is determined in its spatio-temporal relations by the one common spatio-temporal order of all experience.

This distinction between constitutive and regulative principles is important for Kant, as it distinguishes him from both the dogmatist and the sceptic. For the dogmatist, all *a priori* principles are constitutive, while the sceptic recognises no constitutive principles at all, but regards them all as merely regulative of experience. Kant, by recognising the two types, tried to make room for both the regularity and the novelty of the world, and explain at the same time the distinction between Reason and the Understanding. The conclusion of the Dialectic was that antinomies arise because the Ideas of Reason are taken to be constitutive. Reason demands the unconditioned totality, and thus prescribes the aim and sets the limit to the

work of the Understanding, but the Understanding is left to do the actual work of collecting data and systematising our experience. Reason deals, not with the individual, but with the system which the Understanding has built up by the application of the categories. Reason by itself has therefore merely the form of a system to which the matter is supplied by the work of the Understanding.

But if Reason gives merely the form of an empty system, Judgment is in no better case. For Kant, Judgment is essentially empirical, as it is concerned with the concrete exemplified in the individual act of apprehension. It is the power of applying the rule to particular cases or of finding the rule for particular given instances, so that the alive, elusive element in perception which we call feeling belongs essentially to Judgment. But in the first critique, Kant considers the faculty from only one of these two possible points of view,—as the faculty of applying a given rule to particular cases, or in other words, subsuming a particular instance under a given law. This however is characteristic of Deduction and Kant calls it the Determining Judgment. There is however the other type of empirical judgment, corresponding to Induction, in which the particular instance is given and we have to find out the law under which it can be subsumed. Now the distinction between the types is one of degree, for most empirical judgments are both determining and regulative, both use a concept and help to make one. The emphasis on the Determining to the neglect of the Regulative Judgment in the first critique can therefore be explained only by Kant's failure to draw the necessary implications of his limitation of the categories to the empirical, for this involves that the sensible individual element is as essential to knowledge as the abstract law.

The whole emphasis in the first critique is therefore on the Understanding, for the function of Reason in defining the end

is not adequately recognised, while Judgment is treated only from the point of view of the Determining Judgment which is hardly distinguishable from the Understanding. Reason deals with Reality as a system but presupposes that the work of the Understanding has been completed. This is a condition that can never be satisfied for man, for under the influence of the Ideas of Reason, the Understanding goes on continually extending the chain of conditions in its attempt to reach the unconditioned totality. But the principle of mechanical causation in itself involves contradiction, for we have seen that causality is unthinkable unless there is an element of spontaneity or freedom somewhere; and yet, the principle of mechanical causation is adequate to applying the categories in all empirical knowledge, as we know and can know things, not in their individual character, but only in their relation to other things.

The first critique therefore ends with the problem of the relation of the general principle of causation to the particular specific causal laws. It has established the validity of the *a priori* constitutive principles of knowledge, but cannot explain their application to the details of experience. This distinction is not merely that between form and matter, as Kant at one time tended to suggest. It is impossible to regard the second element as mere matter without form, for it obviously has laws and connections of its own, and explains the possibility of starting with the individual and from an examination of its own specific character, describing and classifying it in its relations to other individuals. This however is not recognised in the first critique whose final conclusion is that the Understanding gives us knowledge but not of the individual.

In the second critique, Kant attempts to go beyond the abstract universal of the Understanding by the realisation of the individual from the realm of conduct. The importance of Reason also becomes clearer, though the

confusion between the Understanding and the Reason still persists in the insistence upon rule or law. Side by side with this emphasis on the rule, morality which is the product of Reason as such, is seen to be self-legislation. In the first critique, the distinction between the subjective and the objective with regard to knowledge was that the objective was perception according to a law,—the law being somehow given by the *thing-in-itself*. In the second critique, there is the parallel distinction between the particular and the universal in conduct,—only the universal and objective character of the moral act is due, not to any external compelling force, but to the nature of Reason itself. The positive character of Reason as, not merely regulative but also constitutive, becomes more explicit here, and its contribution in experience is recognised. Though Reason in morals is concerned with the individual, it however gives us no knowledge, for knowledge is confined to the empirical which is governed through and through by the causal law. We therefore know and can know things; not as individuals exhibiting freedom or spontaneity, but only as determined links in a chain of mechanical necessity. On the other hand, they cannot be even the links of a causal chain unless they have an individual nature which determines their spatio-temporal relations and is not determined by them, so that reality must be regarded as a system which exhibits causality and freedom simultaneously. We cannot however know this freedom, for freedom belongs to things only in their character as individuals in the nonmenal realm, while we know them only in their relations to one another as parts of the phenomenal world. If however there be any sphere where we deal with things as individuals, we shall there be dealing with things as free and this is what occurs in conduct.

So far Kant's solution is that the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves explains how causality and freedom may and must be regarded as both applicable to reality, though in its different spheres. It is however no real solution, for it makes the relation between them even more difficult to understand. Besides, the restriction of the two categories to two different and mutually exclusive spheres of reality reopens the very problem which the recognition of the dual categories sought to solve. For we have seen that mechanical causation is itself inconceivable without an element of freedom or spontaneity in the terms between which the relation holds; on the other hand, the noumenal objects characterised by freedom remain outside our knowledge, and can appear to our consciousness only as parts of the phenomenal world governed by the law of causal necessity. The argument for spontaneity based on the fact that the individual nature of a thing must determine its time and space relations applies to all things which are individual, and therefore to nature as well as to man. On the other hand, the fact that individual things appear only as parts in a system demands strict causal connection among them.

Reality then must be regarded as a system in which the parts are both determined by their relation to the whole and also determine the whole in virtue of their individual character. In such a system, the adherence of the different members to the system need not be uniform, so that the whole may determine and be determined by the different parts in different degrees. But the sharp distinction between freedom and necessity made any explicit recognition of degrees of freedom impossible for Kant, for his position involved that the individual was

and must be regarded as purely individual. It could not be a member in any causal series and hence was also entirely free, but that meant that it had no character at all, for whatever had a determinate nature, must to that extent have limitations imposed upon its freedom of manifestations. Further, the sharp division between the phenomenal and the moral world required that the principle of moral actions must even in details be deduced from the pure form of the moral law. The law of morality therefore furnished its own particulars so that there was and could be no conflict of duties. According to Kant, the difficulty therefore lay in deciding to act according to the law of freedom rather than by the law of causality, so that once this conflict was resolved, there was no difficulty in knowing the dictate of the moral law in any given case. This is obviously a mechanistic interpretation of human action for in it the motive of duty is opposed to the phenomenal motives and they are compared to two opposing forces acting on the will. The attempt at complete divorce of freedom from mechanism thus results in the application of the category of causality to the sphere which is peculiarly that of freedom.

Nevertheless, in Kant's threefold meaning of freedom, there is some suggestion that he vaguely felt the need of some concept like that of degrees of freedom. In the antinomy, freedom means merely the spontaneity of all *things-in-themselves*, but we have already seen that the spontaneity cannot belong to individuals merely in their noumenal character but must also belong to them as objects of the phenomenal world. Freedom gets a more specific meaning when it is regarded as the peculiar attribute of moral beings,—the differentia which distinguishes man from physical objects and suggests that though subject to the mechanical laws of the phenomenal world he is

at the same time free as an individual in the realm of *things-in-themselves*. Man is not, however, always conscious of his noumenal character, and hence by a still stricter interpretation, freedom is confined to man only when he acts in a very particular and exceptional way, namely out of reverence for the law which is the product of Reason as such. The law of morality therefore emerges as self-legislation and moral acts are distinguished from particular actions demanded by inclinations and desires phenomenally caused. Yet the law is expressed as a categorical imperative, a command that is addressed to the will, and like all commands, suggests a duality between the source of the command and those to whom it is addressed. Thus even at this stage, there is a suggestion of externality in Kant's conception of the Reason, a suggestion due to the exaltation of the abstract rule at the cost of the concrete individual case.

The third critique is an attempt to soften the distinctions which the first two critiques had made too rigid, by showing that both the Understanding and the Reason require, though in different ways, a living individual element in thought. Knowledge of the Understanding, because it was concerned with relations, neglected the individual, as, for its purpose, no one thing was more individual than another. Morality was the expression of the individual will, but according to the law of Reason, which, as noumenal, was indifferent to the actual results of the action in the phenomenal world and remained beyond the reach of our human knowledge. Thus the Understanding gives knowledge, but not of the individual: the Reason is concerned with the individual but gives no knowledge. The Judgment is therefore invoked to explain the relation of the two, for the Judgment is concerned with the individual and yet gives knowledge.

Kant describes his task in the third critique to be the discussion of two problems concerning the application of law to the individual case. The relation of the sphere of causality to that of freedom, and, the task of knowing the details of experience, are both problems which depend for their comprehension on an adequate understanding of that, which is individual in the sense that it cannot be fully explained by anything beyond itself and yet at the same time manifests law, i. e., has a universal aspect which necessarily transcends its existence as a more particular. The main defect of mechanism as a principle is that it offers and can offer no explanation of individuality, but reduces it to a mere point in a mechanical order. This makes change itself inconceivable, and it becomes imperative to find some way of regarding objects as individuals and yet related to other objects. Freedom as expounded in the second critique satisfies the first condition, but only at the cost of the second. The third critique tries to solve this problem by an examination of art, for art is concerned with the individual and yet it obviously exhibits law or form, though law or form of a kind which cannot be divorced from its individual manifestations.

The advance in the third critique is that the principles of the hypothetical Reason become the principles of the Regulative Judgment, with come into play as soon as we begin to consider the individual, not after we have already determined and described it. *The Regulative Judgment starts with the individual* and tries to relate it to the whole of our knowledge by describing it in its true character. Out of the indefinite number of resemblances and differences to other things which result from the infinite aspects of any individual thing, only some are vital for our knowledge. An ordinary empirical judgment about an individual thing is an answer to a definite, determinate question,

in which the concept comes first and the judgment is merely determinant. At first sight, it seems that the only alternative to such a judgment is the casual noticing of some accidental difference or resemblance. We seem, however, to find a third possibility in the aesthetic judgment, for it is not determined by a concept and yet seems to express the true nature of a thing and claim universal validity. An artistic representation of an object answers no questions as to whether the object is this or that, and yet calls attention to resemblances and characteristics which are recognised by all as significant of its truest character.

Reason is fully creative here, for there is no longer any suggestion of an abstract rule which comes to it as a command from some external source. The necessity is now its own necessity, and the law merely the expression of its own nature in instances where form cannot be divorced from matter. The emergence of the Regulative Judgment brings with it the further recognition that the spontaneous creative activity of the mind is necessary, not merely to think of the unconditioned totality which the Reason seeks to know, but also for the awareness of the barest particular which the Understanding grasps by the application of the categories. We now know that within the limits of the constitutive principles of the Understanding which make knowledge possible, there is room or rather necessity for the regulative use of the principles of Judgment, whose results must agree with the former principles though they are not and cannot be deduced from them. So, in the conduct, the categorical imperative is seen to be, not a command to, but an expression of the nature of Reason itself, and the laws of morality, not deductions from but only in accordance to it. For, the symbol of morality is beauty in which the individual displays form or law. Only it is a law by which the individual cannot be deduced from the general law, but is the only

way in which the general law can be manifested or understood Art is significant and is recognised by all to be significant, without being significant of anything which we can experience in any way other than by art itself.

The Cardinal Principle Of Idealism

By

HANUMANTA RAO

I

It is said that a good cause suffers more often by its adherents than by its opponents. Of no other thing could this be spoken with greater truth than of idealism in recent times. It is difficult to find any one who has any serious concern in life who does not love ideals and hitch his wagon to them. Idealism is the most natural and normal attitude of man. Yet, it is strange that philosophers should be at such great pains to defend it. The reason is not far to seek. If one looks at the literature on idealism that has grown up within the past decade or two, it will be found that much of it is by way of its defence and the defence has invariably been the defence of some corner of it rather than the central shrine. When philosophers speak in the name of idealism, they are no longer stressing the cardinal principle of idealism but each of them is striving to put up his own favourite idea as the cardinal principle of Idealism. The time has therefore come, for persons interested in idealism, to seek the cardinal principle of idealism and to state it in clear terms.

II

What is the cardinal principle of Idealism? Is it absolutism? Is it Mysticism? Is it Theism? Is it the epistemological assumption that the world as a system of interrelated things is "Idea"?

1. It cannot be Absolutism, for all idealists are not Absolutists. No one will admit that if Absolutism should fall with it idealism would fall also. Besides, experience does not warrant either the urgency or the reality of the absolute. On the admission of the Absolutists themselves, the Absolute is nowhere actually realised, nor is there any chance of its being realised as such at any time. Such an entity is far removed

from experience to be true to experience. All that experience directly delivers to us is an ideal element that is immanent in the actual. All that we are warranted to assert is that the reality of the actual facts of experience lies in their being expressions of the concretely and practically possible. Everything that we come across in experience is seen as arising from an ideal impulse, unconscious in the main but tending to become conscious here and there. Facts do not stop at being mere facts, but tend to become more of themselves. This principle of self-transcendence, the tendency of things to rise on their dead selves, the tendency to perpetual resurrection, is all that experience reveals and that is all that is necessary as a working principle to render experience intelligible. To assert more than this is to assert the pure possible, not the possible that is actually realised and realisable. Absolutism tends to make philosophy speculative, transcendental, and preposterous in theory and unprogressive in practice. Even if we admit the absolute as a philosophic principle for the sake of argument, the assumption leaves us no better to-day than it left us in the days of Plato. To have recourse to the Absolute as a solution of life's problems is like a person in financial difficulties having recourse to day-dreaming as a solution of his economic problems. What experience needs for the solution of its problems is a dynamic whole that transforms the possible into the actual, a whole in the construction of which our thought and will are exercised from time to time, a whole which when thus constructed leaves us intellectually, economically, ethically and religiously in a better position. The chief defect of Absolutism is that it asserts a mere unverifiable possibility or as Newton said, *a hypothesis non fingo*. What is needed is a working programme or, in the phraseology of science, a working postulate which we may check and verify and record progress.

2. If Absolutism cannot be the cardinal principle of Idealism, may it be mysticism? It cannot be mysticism either. For mysticism is not what a philosophy starts with or works with; it is something which it has recourse to in the last resort. It cannot be asserted as philosophy though a philosopher may have to assent to it when he is at his wit's end. This is not to disparage mysticism. Mysticism has its own legitimate place—perhaps, a place higher than the one assigned to philosophy, but it has no place in philosophy as a philosophic principle.

3. Nor can theism be the cardinal principle of idealism. Theism is more a postulate of religion rather than of philosophy. To make theism the chief principle of a philosophy is to allow religion to reign supreme in philosophy. This militates against the catholicity that should characterise all genuine Philosophy.

4. The epistemological assumption that the world as an intelligible whole is an idea, has in recent years played so important a rôle in the history of idealism that it has technically come to be recognised as the cardinal principle of idealism. It is no doubt true that the assumption is epistemologically important, and idealistic philosophers have striven hard to develop it. But the stress that has been laid upon it so as to make it the cardinal principle of idealism, is out of all proportion to its real importance. The fact that much thought and effort has been expended in developing and elaborating it from the days of Descartes down to our time, does not entitle it to be called the cardinal principle of idealism. It can at best be regarded as one of the important features of the idealistic programme. It was the peculiar epistemological turn that Descartes gave to modern philosophy that is responsible for making much of it. The

fact that such a turn was given does not make it valid. An ethical or religious turn might as well have been given and that would not have justified our making an ethical idea or a religious idea the cardinal principle of idealism. Just as it would make a philosophy narrow and stunted, if an ethical or religious conception is made its cardinal principle even so it would make a philosophy narrow and stunted if it would make an epistemological assumption its central assumption. For a healthy philosophy, epistemology should be no more important than physics, or ethics or religion. Each of them is a basis of philosophy not the basis of philosophy. It is the aim of philosophy to evolve a conception of the universe that explains and unifies the manifold forms of experience. To unify experience in terms of any one of these is to turn away from the true aim of philosophy. Such a procedure has tended to make idealistic philosophy sectarian and it has left us without a cardinal principle that could serve as a common platform for idealists to meet. Each idealist in trying to make his own basis—epistemological¹, ethical², aesthetic³ or religious⁴—the principle basis of idealism, has contributed to the disintegration of idealism. It is of utmost importance for the revival and reintegration of idealism to create a platform wide enough for idealists of different interests and temperaments to meet and work in a co operative spirit.

III

What should such a cardinal principle be? What should be its main features?

-
- (1) Bradley and Bosanquet have made the epistemological basis the principal basis of idealism
- 2 Soreley and Schiller have made the ethical
- 3 Fawcett has made the aesthetic
- 4 James Seth and Pringle Pattison have made the religious

1. It is essential for idealism to be what it is to conceive reality as a dynamic whole which has the actual and the possible as its inseparable aspects. The actual has no meaning apart from the possible and the possible has no meaning apart from the actual. The actual was the possible of yesterday and the possible is the actual of tomorrow. Experience is the dialectical back-and-forth movement from the actual-possible to the possible-actual. As Tennyson has conceived it :

"Experience is an arch wherethro'

Gleams that untravell'd world whose margin fades

For ever and ever, when I move."

2. Reality as a dynamic whole of actual-possible is at once individual-universal ; It is a whole in which the individual and universal are inseparably related—the individual enriching the universal and the universal enlarging the individual.

3. Reality as actual-possible, individual-universal is also a unity in diversity.

4. It reveals three important features characteristic of a self-freedom, creativity and conservation of values.

(a) It is characterised by freedom in so far as everything that we experience is instinct with a tendency to become more of itself, a tendency to express itself more fully, a tendency to transcend itself.

(b) It is creative by virtue of the fact that every whole is characterised by a certain freshness and novelty that cannot be explained merely in terms of the antecedent factors that condition it. Though everything has had a past and is largely determined by it, yet it is never completely bound down by it. Everything has immanent in it the creative energy whereby it can transform itself and give to itself a freshness and vitality that can never be analysed into its antecedent factors, however thorough our analysis might be. No philosopher has done so

much to bring home this feature of reality as Henri Bergson, perhaps, with the exception of a person like Bertrand Russell. It has won recognition at the hands of almost every contemporary philosopher—idealistic, realistic and pragmatistic. In the philosophies of such eminent realists like S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and A. N. Whitehead it has come to figure as the fundamental feature of reality.

(o) It has a tendency to conservation of values. This tendency is implied by its freedom and creativity. There cannot be creation unless there is conservation. Every creative act has a back and forth glance, it implies at once the realisation of a value that is new and the conservation of a value that is old. In fact, the one is possible only in and through the other.

These attributes of freedom, creativity, conservation are true not of any one part of reality, but apply to all life and being. They are true no less of stones and stones than they are of human beings. The stone has a value to conserve even as a saint has a value to conserve, though of course the value that is conserved by the stone is different from the value that is conserved by the saint. There is a tendency to outgrow the actual in the stone as well as in the saint, though the forms in which the stone expresses this tendency are different from the forms in which the saint expresses it. There is a norm on the plane of matter, just as there is a norm on the plane of life or consciousness and deviations from the norm are as numerous in the one case as in the other. Just as we say that a certain person has a more highly evolved intelligence than another, even so, we say of a piece of matter that it is more highly evolved than another. Evaluation is not peculiar to only certain forms of science, but is common and crucial to all science. So long as science is concerned with the

interrelation of facts and all facts are not on the same level, it is inevitable that it should evaluate. You cannot study the idiot or even call one an idiot, unless you place him in relation to a normal man. You cannot study actual facts as actual facts unless you study the ideal also, for the ideal is one of the actual forms. Nor can you study the ideal as ideal unless you study the actual, for the actual is one of the ideal forms. It may be that such a view of science may appear startling, but it is coming into vogue in scientific circles and is known as the Gestalt or configurationist view of science.

IV

Such, in its broad features, is the cardinal principle of idealism. It emphasises such features only as are absolutely necessary to idealism and only such as are necessary to form an idealistic platform. The principle as thus formulated must have for its programme (1) the detailed working of it with reference to every field of experience—scientific, artistic, economic, ethical and religious; (2) the placing of each of these studies in their proper relation, so that physics may not usurp the place of psychology, psychology of ethics, ethics of religion and so on, and (3) the evolving of a conception that will tend to reveal reality as a self-expanding universal with distinct but complementary dimensions like the *śānāmayakośa*, *prānamayakośa*, *manomayakośa*, *vijñāmayakośa* and *ānandamayakośa* of the upanishadic Brahman; (4) the statement, from time to time, of the progress that has been achieved in working out this fundamental postulate and the modification, if necessary, of the postulate itself in the light of growing experience. If this last fact is overlooked, idealism will cease to comprehend the possible in its actual forms and would degenerate into apriorism and formalism.

Philosophy would then cease to be the "empirical study of the apriori", and would become the apriori study of the apriori.

V

Conceived thus, idealism will gain in strength and vitality. It will considerably weaken opposition in so far as each of the fundamental human interests—*aesthetic, scientific, economic, ethical and religious*, is given its proper place on the idealistic platform. It would not be inconsistent for an idealist to be a scientist as well as a theist, a logician as well as a mystic. Just as being a scientist does not come in the way of one's enjoying a novel or a poem though the novel or poem is not science, even so, being a scientist does not prevent his heart from going up to God even though God is studied by other methods than those that physics employs. Similarly, being a logician does not prevent one from becoming a mystic though the method of mysticism is not the method of logic. Though I should admit that if a thing is to be known it should be known according to the laws of logic, yet I am not prevented from giving myself up to feeling when knowing fails to put me in possession of reality. If idealism is worked out in a catholic spirit as a method of viewing things, it may even win many a realist to the side of idealism. Though it would take a long time for persons like B. Russell to come under the sway of idealism, it would not take a long time for persons like S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and A. N. Whitehead to come under its banner. Then we could say with Croce that all philosophy is essentially idealistic philosophy.

The Empirical Tradition in Bradley's Logic.

BY

R. N. KAUL.

In a recent publication by Prof. Muirhead, entitled '*The Platonic tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*' we find a masterly analysis of the development of thought, as it took place in the works of F.H. Bradley beginning from the date of his first publication in 1875 of a Pamphlet, which was "long out of print and even out of reach in Second-hand-book stores", viz. '*The pre-suppositions of Critical History*'. Prof. Muirhead rightly points out that even in this early work of Bradley, though Hegel's name is not mentioned, it is not difficult to discover the essentially Hegelian trend of argument. Bradley himself tells us in the Preface that the essay was suggested to him by reading C. F. Baur's "*Epochen der Christlichen Geschichtsbeschreibung*" which work was itself inspired by the Hegelian conception of History. This early work, together with "*Ethical Studies*" and the essay on "*Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism*" which appeared in 1876 and 1877 respectively mark the first phase of Bradley's thought. These essays went to form the foundation of the Idealistic contribution that Bradley was destined to make towards the Development of British Metaphysic.

2. But with the publication of his "*Principles of Logic*" in 1883, a new era in the history of Bradley's thought begins. It is true that this monumental work stands unique in the history of modern thought in general and in the development of logical doctrine in England in particular. It stands aloof and apart from the general confusion prevailing both among English and German writers about the sphere and scope of Logic. In England in particular the confusion was worse confounded by the writings of the Empiricists such as

J. S. Mill and Prof. Bain, and by "the psychological method" which they had inherited from their brilliant predecessors, Locke, Berkely and Hume. The use of the term "idea" in a rather loose and vague sense was one of the prevailing confusions. Owing to the psychological attitude prevalent, an idea meant a state of consciousness, a subjective entity existing in our heads, and judgment, like Association, meant the linking of these isolated atoms on the analogy of physical or chemical principles. It is no wonder then that in logical theories of judgment and inference, current at the time, this fictitious atomism of the idea crept in almost as a matter of course and right, and gave rise to disastrous results. Thus Bradley was compelled to start by clearing up this confusion in the use of the term 'idea' and he does so by the statement that for logical purposes we have to take 'ideas' in a particular sense viz. Symbols. To Explain what he means, he makes a three-fold distinction between (i) existence (ii) content and (iii) meaning. Every idea has the first and the second aspect, but it is with its third aspect viz its meaning, that the Logician is concerned. For logic all ideas are signs used for the sake of their meaning or significance "The idea, in the sense of mental image, is a sign of the idea in the sense of meaning"

3. Having thus cleared up the ambiguity in the use of the term 'idea' Bradley proceeds to define Judgment as the reference of an ideal content to reality. This general theory in itself was a great advance on the Empirical Logic of Judgment, current in English thought of the period, and there is no doubt of the new departure in logical doctrine which Bradley signalises, whether we trace it to the immediate influence of Hegel or to the remote influence of the Platonic tradition as Prof. Muirhead characterises it. Without denying the presence of this influence in Bradley's logical doctrine the aim of this paper is to trace the remnants of English Empiricism in his modified logical theory of Judgment. The presence of this

element in Bradley's thought seems to strike us more and more, as we stumble again and again on passages where he sweeps aside not only the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of thought and reality, but also the Platonic suggestion that "our sensuous presentation may be misrepresentation that cannot give fact." That famous passage in his *Principle of Logic* which is perhaps the most frequently quoted in modern idealistic literature remains as a striking reminder to us of his empirical and dualistic tendencies. "That the glory of this world in the end is appearance, leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral web of impalpable abstraction, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. Though dragged to such conclusions, we cannot embrace them. Our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more make that Whole which commands our devotion than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful".

4. This change of front, this backsliding, as it were, puzzled even the most sympathetic and understanding of his readers. Bosanquet, in his *'Knowledge and Reality'* a criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, which appeared in 1885 writes "If I have read Mr. Bradley right, he joins a thorough understanding of the ideal of knowledge to a peculiar impatience of something, *I do not quite know what*, in the ordinary doctrine of relativity". It was only natural that a hostile critic should suspect Bradley of playing fast and loose with a double standard—on the one hand, that of a stable intellectual construction; on the other, that of correspondence with *sense-given* fact. In the words of Bosanquet, Bradley "cherishes a deep discontent with any effort to resolve reality into an intellectual movement". "Only a rich man may wear

a bad coat and only a philosopher of Mr. Bradley's force should escape suspicion of a crude dualistic realism."

(*Kn & Reality* ; P. 18)

5. But we regret to note that even Bosanquet did not hold himself high enough to escape pollution from the empirical touch. Even he, while formulating a theory of judgment in his "*Logic*", seems to grant a dual nature to judgment and thought in general. All judgments are no doubt the developments of significant contents, but this is not their complete nature. They have also another side or aspect—which appears as 'my judgment' or 'your judgment' qua mine or yours respectively. They are mental occurrences or processes and events in time in the life-history of a sentient being. Bosanquet sometimes distinguishes the two as the internal or external aspects of judgment.¹ "Thus the duration of the judgment as a transition in time is, so to speak, its external aspect, the aspect which, as a whole, it presents when compared with other occurrences in consciousness."² The fact, however, that Bosanquet calls these aspects 'internal' and 'external' shows that he is prepared to give the latter only a secondary importance. In fact, as a logician, he has to disregard it as more or less irrelevant.

6. *Bradley's Logic: Terminal Essays (1922): the same contrast appears.*

Again, in Bradley we find the same idea implied throughout in his treatment of judgment. But it is in the "Terminal Essays", added to the second edition of his *Logic*, that we find a clear and explicit statement about it. It is important to see that this view, appearing in an explicit form, in Bradley's latest writings, was not a result of his immature thought, but on the contrary is a fundamental and essential part of his system to which he clung in his maturest work.

(1) *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 95.

(2) *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 82.

7. *Aspect of truth as "psychical occurrence": the "personal" aspect, not confined to a particular person.*

Truth, according to Bradley, necessarily implies an aspect of psychical existence, — it must happen and occur in a mind and must exist as a mental event.³ But if judgments are recognised as things which somehow or other exist *in my head* or *psychically as events in me*, there is an obvious objection, because they would then seem to depend, at least to some extent, upon my activity.⁴ Bradley seems to have found some difficulty in accepting this psychical factor without more explanation. And he adds that he does not mean that "this psychical existence is *"merely mine"* or that my activity is not essentially also the "activity of the Universe."⁵ In a different context he shows that the objection is made on the assumption that "whatever is, is mine only." Judgment or inference is not vitiated on this ground because inasmuch as the real whole works in and through me, its activity and mine are identified. "And hence to take the personal aspect as implying confinement to a particular person is a fundamental error."⁶

8. *Logic compelled to abstract from an important aspect of truth. Hence a special science, coordinate with and complementary to Psychology.*

Thus Bradley is quite clear in his mind about the distinction between the content of the judgment and its psychical duration. As every judgment is a psychical event it must have duration, and to ignore or deny wholly the existence of this aspect is to commit a serious

(3) *Principles of Logic* p. 612.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 631.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 632.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 615.

error' But this distinction has a fundamental importance for Bradley's antithesis between the point of view of Logic and that of Psychology And the implication in Bosanquet's distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' aspect of judgment is clearly worked out by Bradley into the explicit assertion that for logic, the aspect of judgment as a psychical event is irrelevant 'Every judgment may be taken to involve a psychical lapse and succession, but this aspect of its existence falls outside of the *judgment as logical*'⁷ Thus logic is compelled to abstract from a certain necessary aspect of judgment, and in so doing, it falls into the position of a special science Psychology on the other hand, deals with judgment as psychical lapse and succession, abstracting from the content and meaning Both are equally abstract and defective, and 'if we could have a view of the world which was wholly intelligible, then the logical and the psychical side of any truth would not only be necessary each in its own way, but the connection of both would follow also as a result from intelligible premises'⁸ Bradley thus comes to the conclusion that logic should not attempt to "struggle with final difficulties", because it is clearly beyond its scope as a special science.

9. *The nature of the abstraction the naive realism of "event" implied*

At this point it seems that we should pause for a moment and reflect on the nature of this abstraction, which logic employs and by which it is doomed to remain perpetually one of the special sciences, as ultimately

(7) *Essays, Truth and Reality* p 403

(8) *Ibid*, p 389

(9) *Principles of Logic* (T E) p 612

defective and provisional as the rest. According to Bradley, Logic deals only with the 'contents' of judgments, leaving out their temporal aspect, the aspect of their happening or occurring as events in the human soul. But we have to ask the question, Does this supposed temporal aspect really add anything to the totality of our judgments? If it does and we can make out what the addition is, surely it will, ipso facto, become a content or meaning. And, on the other hand, if it does not really add anything, nor can we make any sense out of it (for fear of turning it into 'content') in what way does it exist? The same conclusion is forced upon us if we ask, what empty duration of a process is and how we can study it. We can study the development of contents and meanings, but as soon as we have abstracted from them, we find that there is nothing left to study. The whole situation seems strikingly unreal like shadows. The 'shadows' in our discussion are the 'events', which have been taken over into the realm of 'mind' from the popular physical conception of them. The rising and setting of the sun are physical events, and so it is argued that my '*thinking*' about a philosophical argument is an analogous mental event. But as soon as we move out of this naive realism which makes the physical event an independent happening in the physical world (whether there be any mind to conceive it or not), we find that we have removed the only foundation there could possibly be for creating a new fiction, viz. that of a mental event or a happening in the soul. Just as there is no independent nature in the event called 'rising of the sun' apart from the *meaning* it has for the conceiving mind, similarly there is no independent aspect of my '*thinking*' a particular thought, apart from the meaning and significance of the thought itself.

10. *Bradley's distrust of Hegelianism — a possible reason for Bradley's distinction.*

Indeed, the whole situation seems so fantastic that it might have been suspected that it is not worth while wasting one's time and labour in discussing it, had it not been for the fact that thinkers like Bradley and Bosanquet, who have been among the greatest champions in Modern Philosophy in dispelling these shadows and illusions, have themselves unconsciously fallen a prey to them. And it seems that it would repay one's labour, if one could trace the origin of a confusion in the writings of such distinguished thinkers.

• What, then, could have been the aim and purpose of Bradley, for instance, in maintaining the untenable distinction between the two aspects of judgment? It might be suggested (though of course the suggestion is only a surmise and should be taken for what it is worth) that one of the reasons which consciously or unconsciously influenced Bradley in this matter was his irreconcilable distrust of Hegelianism. Though he never claims to have mastered Hegel's system perfectly, yet so far as he understood it, he could not accept what seemed to him an essential part of that system.¹⁰ "Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if 'thinking' is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational ... the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism ... our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more make that whole which commands our devotion, than come

(10) *Principles of Logic* ; Preface to First Edition, p. x.

shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful."11

11. *The attempt to save Individuality by preserving the temporal aspect of judgment*

The general relation of Thought and Reality in Bradley and Bosanquet is outside the scope of this paper,¹² but here we have to see how far that attitude was responsible for their theory of judgment. It seems that Bradley was anxious to retain the individuality of finite judgments, qua 'mine' and 'yours', in the absolute system of 'judgments'. And for this purpose, he found that mere distinctions of content between one judgment and another were not enough. It is true that our judgments, all being finite and fragmentary, are different from one another and it is in and through this finite diversity that the identity of the Absolute Judgment is manifested, yet if we regard this distinction as one of content only, we cannot distinguish between 'my' judgment and 'yours.' 'My' judgment has an individuality not qua mine, but qua 'judgment manifesting a finite content' and the personal pronoun becomes purely irrelevant in any ultimate sense. When Bradley emphasised the temporal aspect of judgment, it seems to me that he was really anxious to preserve its *personal* aspect intact. And at first sight it appears that Bradley's suspicion was not wholly unjustifiable. Because to rob the personal pronoun of all meaning for the Absolute Reality seems to be falling into the most abstract Pantheism; and if we regard finite minds as 'sheer appearances' we are in danger of losing the rich complexity which they contribute to the Absolute system. And surely no one would condemn Bradley for recoiling from such a horrible situation.

11. *Ibid.*, PP. 590-591.

12. See below §§52 and ff.

12. *Failure of the attempt. Individuality a matter of content and system.*

But it seems that here again it was a confusion which led Bradley to take recourse to a theory which not only involves him in difficulties, but does not even help him in the least in achieving his end. And we have here to face the question 'Does the temporal aspect of judgment contribute to its individuality? Does it help to make the Absolute richer or more concrete?' And the answer, if we so face the question, is a clear 'No'. It is a confusion to think that Individuality lies in something 'unique' or 'arbitrary' something which cannot be reduced to a 'universal content'. And judgment, if it had the supposed aspect of being an event, apart from being a content could not possibly enrich the Absolute by that fictitious uniqueness. It seems an instance of the old fallacy of setting the individual over against the universal. The individual is thus reduced to an arbitrary whimsical being, without any system and coherence. But, as it has been pointed out by Bosanquet, true individuality does not consist in the denial of such law and system, while true universality, on the other hand, does not mean sheer repetition or bare uniformity. Individuality, therefore, meaning not "empty eccentricity" but a coherent and self-contained system, is quite compatible with Universality or Uniformity. In our completest types of individuality, such as a work of art or a highly organised society, it is obvious that the different parts having something unique and distinctive of their own, go to form the nature of the whole system, from which they derive their value and importance.¹³ And it is no less true and obvious that our judgments retain their importance and value for the Absolute Reality—not as arbitrary and eccentric, but as a development of a coherent system of contents or meanings. Thus, if we are to safeguard the individuality of our finite judgments, the

(13) *Principle of Individuality and Value*. pp. 98, 105, 120.

argument from their being events in the finite mind does not help us in the least. And here again we have to note that Bradley and Bosanquet who have done most to dispel the doubts about individuality have failed to be true to their own doctrines in this matter

13. *What is the nature of "psychical processes"? 'Is anybody aware of it?*

The next question, then, to be asked is: "What exactly is the psychical process which we have assumed to be an aspect in the making of a judgment? Is anybody aware of it and if so, of what precisely is he aware"? It may be assumed that when I am judging, I am not aware of the 'process of judging' in me. What I am apprehending is the problem before me, a question of complex content and meaning. For me, when judging and apprehending, the process of that judging does not exist at all. But it may be retorted that though I am too much engaged with the problem before me to notice the 'process' of the mind, it does not prove that this process does not exist at all. And if I, the judging subject, subsequently return to my judgment and reflect upon it, I can detect the changes and incidents, which constituted the 'psychical process' of the judging. And apart from this subsequent reflection of my own, the psychologist can reflect on my judgment as an incident in my mental history and in so doing, he is studying the 'psychical process' of my judging. In this way, it might be said, we can surely understand the nature of 'psychical process' and can study it.

14. *In reflection the 'process' is changed into a new judgment. An infinite pursuit.*

But in all this there is apparently a confusion. The process of judging in my mind is a unique and singular process and the psychical events or facts which are its parts are the unique and singular steps in the unique and singular process of my

judging. But when I subsequently turn back and reflect on my judgment or when the psychologist studies the 'psychical process' in me, in each case the object studied is a new 'object', and this is again for us a logical content, with its fresh complexity. Supposing the content of my previous judgment to be P, we wanted, in this subsequent judgment, to study the 'psychical process of judging P', but instead of that we find a judgment meaning Q. And in this judgment again, according to the theory, there must be a psychical process; but when we look for the 'psychical process' in the new judgment meaning Q, we shall find a judgment meaning R. Thus we are committed to an infinite pursuit, in which at every step, the supposed 'psychical process' eludes our grasp and leaves us in possession of a fresh 'logical content'. And the pursuit is by its very nature self-defeating. For we set out to study the "living process of a judging mind", but in making it an object of study, we have removed it from the mind whose process it was, and in so doing, it has ceased to be the same *it*. Our study is now directed "upon a lay figure, a thing of straw and stuffing, a caricature of the living process"¹⁴. Thus the supposed psychical process of judgment exists neither for me, when actually judging or subsequently reflecting upon my judging, nor for the psychologist who sets out to study it. And we can safely say that in the sense in which we have been taking it, there is no such thing; or at least if there is, it cannot be known, and much less made an object of study.

15. *Logic does not make any abstraction. The transition to an examination of Bradley's complementary assertion about psychology.*

Thus Bradley's contention, that Logic abstracts from the aspect of judgment as psychical lapse and succession, falls to

(14) H. H. Joachim on "Psychical Process" *Mind*, 1909 pp. 67-70 [This paragraph and the last are based on the above article]

the ground. There can be no plausibility whatsoever in maintaining that judgment is an event in the soul. For judgment is nothing but a development of universal content towards a coherent whole of truth and finite judgments have their importance in proportion to the richness of their contents, or to the contribution that they have to make to the Absolute system. Thus Logic deals with Judgment in its entirety and not in one aspect abstracted from the rest. It follows that Logic is not a special science, in the sense in which the other special sciences are so called; the latter employ legitimate abstractions to define their scope and subject-matter. Whether Logic is to be identified with Metaphysics or not is a question which requires further consideration, which is beyond the scope of this paper, but the grounds on which Bradley rejects Logic as abstract and defective from an ultimate point of view are surely baseless.

Concluding Remarks:

Thus the suspicion of an empirical tradition in Bradley's Logic which was entertained by us in the beginning of this paper, has been thoroughly confirmed. The part of Hegel's teaching which was most unsatisfactory for Bradley was the place that was claimed for *thought as not merely apprehensive but, in some exclusive sense, constitutive of reality*. And this side of Hegel resulted in the new Logic which he gave to the world viz. a Logic of Thought-Determinations which were at once the stages by which the Absolute Reality unfolds itself to itself. This could not but be distasteful to the mind of Bradley who to that extent always remained an empiricist in his Logical doctrine.

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Contents.

	PAGE
I.—Nagarjuna's Refutation of Motion and Rest : T. V. R. Murti	191
II.—The Realistic Analysis of Perception : Tatini Das. ...	201
III.—The System of Ramanuja : K. A. Krishnaswami Iyer ...	213
IV.—Social Changes and The Brahmasutras : Rai Bahadur Amarnath Ray,	217
V.—Brahmasutra and Adhyasa-vada : Akshya Kumar Banerjee...	222
VI.—The "Cathartic" Theory of Morals : K. R. Srinivasiengar...	235
VII.—Value and Obligation : A. F. Markham ...	246
VIII.—The Idea of Duty : Dhirendralal De. ...	253
IX.—The Practical Outlook of Indian Philosophy : N. Venkataraman,	262
X.—Proofs of the Soul in Tamil Saiva Siddhanta : Violet Paranjoti.	270

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY.

Nagarjuna's Refutation of Motion and Rest.

By

T. R. V. MURTI.

Nāgārjuna's refutation of motion and rest presents several interesting features and raises some big issues. Zeno denied motion; he did not disturb rest. Nāgārjuna performs the seemingly impossible task of denying both at once. Zeno's argument, repeated in all the famous examples, rests on the infinite divisibility of space without taking into consideration a similar circumstance with regard to time. His arguments do not bring out any epistemological or metaphysical standpoint; Nāgārjuna's do. An attempt will be made to elucidate his general standpoint, after a presentation of his dialectic against motion and rest.¹

1. Motion is denied by showing the untenability of the factors indispensable for its generation—viz, the space traversed, the mover and the commencement of motion. To take each in turn :

What is traversed? Not that which has been already traversed; nor even that to be done so; there is no third division of space as 'the being traversed'. When a foot-step is put forward, it divides the space exactly into two—the one already traversed and the other yet to be done so. It will be pointed out that there is some such space that is *being*

1. Section 1 of this paper is an analysis of Chapters II & VIII of "Mādh. Kārikās," while the other sections are based on the general standpoint exhibited in the whole book, esp. in Chap I.

traversed ; for that is the place where activity is present ; and this activity does not pertain to the traversed or that portion yet to come. But as the activity belongs to the moving body and not to the space, this too will not help us to distinguish that space, unless we accepted motion in both—two motions in the space covered and in the moving body. If there were only one motion—namely, that of the moving body—how can the space, though unrelated to motion, be still said to be ‘being traversed’ ? there is nothing to differentiate it from other spaces. With two motions, two moving bodies shall have also to be accepted, unless we hold that *motion can exist disembodied, apart from the moving body*. We here come to an impasse. There is no space which is being traversed. The divisions in space are relative and unreal ; from the standpoint of knowledge no such distinctions are tenable.

Motion is possible, because there is the mover in which it inheres. We must make the distinction between the two. But is the mover intelligible with or without the motion ? Can we say that the mover moves ? He is either motionless in himself apart from the motion, or has a motion other than the motion which inheres in him. In the first case, we have the contradiction of a mover without motion ; in the second, there are two motions, for it is a mover that moves, not a non-mover as in the first case. But this too is unpalatable ; disembodied motion cannot be contemplated.

It may be thought that these difficulties are really about the locus of motion, whether it resides in a body which is itself bereft of motion or not, and have nothing to do with motion at all. When and where does motion begin ? Not at the place already traversed, nor even in the space yet to come ; and we have seen that there is no such space like ‘the being traversed’, for this would involve

two motions and two bodies. When does motion begin? Not when a body is at rest; for at that time, before the commencement of the activity, there is no space that is being traversed or that traversed etc. Can there be motion in the space not yet traversed? This is a veritable contradiction; motion is to commence where it does not exist. Without motion, the divisions of space into the 'traversed' etc., are untenable. It would be seen that on the basis of these distinctions can motion be conceived to arise, and only with its commencement are such distinctions tenable, involving thereby a vicious circle.

2. Motion does exist, it might be asserted, for, its opposite—rest—does do so; that exists whose opposite exists, as darkness and light, or as this side and the other side. Logically therefore, a denial of motion involves that of rest as well. It is here precisely that Nāgārjuna proves himself a truer dialectician than Zeno.

Hence too, as in the case of motion, the indispensable factors are denied. Who rests? Not the mover, nor the static—the non-mover; and there is no third who can rest. The static does not rest, for it is already stationary; there are no two rests, as these would involve two stationary bodies. It is a flat contradiction to say that the mover rests, when a mover is impossible without motion; when any body rests, it is, *ipso facto*, not a mover. It will be said that rest is possible, as cessation from motion is possible. The mover can stop; stopping is an opposite activity. Not so; for, whence will he stop? Will it be from the space already traversed, yet to be traversed, or that which is being traversed. Now this activity brought in to ensnare rest is on a par with motion, and will be assailable on that score. There is no motion in all these three spaces for the said reasons; and hence there can be no cessation of it.

- Rest is possible, for it can be begun, it might be said. But is it begun when someone is at rest, or not at rest, or when about to rest?—precisely the very alternatives considered in connection with the commencement of motion.

A general difficulty about motion is that it can be conceived neither as identical with the mover nor different from him—the difficulty of all predication. If identical, the subject and his activity cannot be distinguished, but to assert this identity a distinction is necessary. If activity be different from the subject, the latter can exist without activity and vice versa; motion should be possible without the moving body. Nāgārjuna comes to the conclusion that both those things do not exist which can be conceived neither as identical with nor as different from each other. ("Ekibhāvena vā Siddhiḥ nānā bhāvena vā yanyoh; Na vidyate tayoh Siddhiḥ katham nu khalu vidyate" "Mādhyamika Kārikās" -Ob. II 21.)

3. What is the general principle involved in this dialectic against motion and rest? It is undertaken from the standpoint of pure immediacy of experience, and is a consistent Solipsism of the 'present moment'. Santayana has very admirably developed this method in his "Scepticism and Animal Faith". Far from being self contradictory, solipsism of the present moment is the only attitude that demands radical evidence—experience—for any assertion; it is not to be frightened into acquiescence of universally believed notions. Confine yourself at any time rigorously to the immediately given, the distinctions of space into the traversed, yet to be traversed, etc., and of motion as originating, progressing and ceasing cannot arise; for these issue out of relating, out of positing characters that transcend the immediately given. All such relating and positing involve a vicious circle. Distinctions in space are possible on the commencement of motion, which itself cannot be understood without these very distinctions it engenders. The Mādhyamika Dialectic is a call to purify the

given object of thought of all beliefs in the transcendent, of dogmas. It finds that when such a purification is effected, no assertion—affirmation or negation—is possible. Everything is *Śūnya*. The *Mādhyamika* cannot have any thesis of his own—positive or negative.

4. This raises two fundamental issues: Is Criticism of any thesis possible without any counter thesis; and can all the alternatives under any head be rejected, without thereby violating the Excluded Middle?

It is commonly held that to criticise a theory, we should have a rival theory or standpoint of our own, or that some tenets should be held in common by the disputants. But the acceptance of a common tenet, a common platform cannot serve to favour any of the rival hypotheses; nor does a special tenet or thesis particular to each party fare any better; for to claim peculiar strength on the basis of a special tenet will cut both ways. How then is any hypothesis to be demolished at all? It is by pointing out that all the consequences of the hypothesis contradict either the hypothesis, or are mutually contradictory. The holding of a rival hypothesis is not only unnecessary but is clearly irrelevant. Nor is it necessary that the consequences of a hypothesis should be believed in by the party which urges the objections, but merely that the consequences should be shown to be implied in the hypothesis to the satisfaction of the party concerned. This is the only way by which we can confute an opponent. The absurdity of his position must be brought home to him. The *Mādhyamika* claims to do nothing else. He is a *Prāsūgika*—having no tenet of his own and not caring to frame a syllogism of his own. "An opponent in putting forward a thesis is expected, as he is a believer in *Pramāṇas*, to validate it; he must prove to his opponent the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusions. . . . But the case of the *Mādhyamika* is different; he does not vindicate any asser-

tion in order to convince his opponent. He has no reasons and examples which he believes to be true." Every endeavour of the Mādhyamika is, therefore, exhausted in reducing the opponent's position to absurdity on principles and consequences which the opponent himself would accept. So we may answer the first question by forcibly asserting that to criticise a position it is not only unnecessary but irrelevant to advance another position.

It might be urged that criticism is the application of certain logical canons—the valid sources of knowledge etc. These at least shall have to be accepted even by the Mādhyamika. But for a critic of knowledge, for a Transcendentalist, there are no first principles, no inviolate axioms which he should respect, or at which he should arrive at the end of his enquiry. If the first principles and the valid sources of knowledge are themselves under discussion, will it do to start by unquestionably accepting them? Just as this enquiry can proceed without being saddled with the acceptance of any dogma, other enquiries can fare equally well. Formal Logic may proceed on certain assumptions, but a self-conscious dialectic cannot, without being false to its position, accept them.

5. Another line of objection may be adopted to confute the Mādhyamika. When one alternative is rejected or accepted the other is, *eo ipso* accepted or rejected, else the Excluded Middle is violated. The Mādhyamika flagrantly violates the rule; we find him cutting down all alternatives that are exclusive and exhaustive. For instance, four alternatives are framed by him with regard to causation, but none is accepted:

(Parataḥ) nor from both (Ubhuyataḥ), nor at random (Ahetutaḥ) have entities sprung into being" (Mādḥ. Kār. 1. 1.) Here too both motion and rest have been denied. The Mādhyamika alone is not the sinner in rejecting the Excluded Middle. Kant does not accept this when he formulates his antinomies and rejects them both, e. g. "the world has a beginning in space and time" and that "the world has no such beginning" etc. Hegel himself does not recognise it; had he done so, he should have chosen either Being or Non-Being instead of seeking a third.

i. No logical flaw is involved in not observing the Excluded Middle. If any one wants to vindicate this law, he must not only resolve the antinomies which any dialectic presents, but show that in rejecting one alternative we do so by covertly accepting its contradictory or vice versa.

ii. The law of Excluded Middle assumes a sort of omniscience and makes capital out of our ignorance. That any two alternatives together exhaust the realm of discourse and that no third is possible cannot be known from the alternatives themselves. Such is not the case with the law of Contradiction; it derives all its force from the material in hand, what is actually presented to us. We can, even on the strength of immediate experience, say that both the contradictories cannot be true. Excluded Middle too, it will be urged, does not presume anything more than the particular kind of disjunctives called the Contradictories—as Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. Such contradictory alternatives can easily be recognised by any one. To this our reply is that the doctrine of Contradictories conceived by Formal Logic is defective; for, it is always possible to suggest one other alternative in all cases; besides being and non-

being, we can admit the Indefinite; affirmation and negation do not exhaust all attitudes towards an assertum; we may not assert anything at all, but simply entertain a datum without these two modes. The contention is not merely academical. Consider for instance the two propositions—"An integer between 3 and 4 is primo"; "An integer between 3 and 4 is composite, not prime." Neither of these propositions is true, though they are contradictories in the formal sense. Can the Excluded Middle help us here? For, this is a case where no adjective, no alternative can be predicated without absurdity. The illusory snake is another example; it cannot accept the predicates *Sat* or *Asat*, for it is not an existent.

If we want to formulate the contradictory of any proposition 'S is P'—, it is not merely 'S is not-P' but also 'S is not'— i.e. the proposition is contradicted if the subject does not exist. It is clear that because there are two contradictories to any position we can never pass from the denial of the position to any one of the contradictories or vice versa. This is tantamount to giving up the Excluded Middle.

A formal objection, pointed out by Johnson, can also be raised against the law. If it were true, the existential import of a proposition and that of its converse must be neither less nor more. 'S is not P' says nothing about the existence of S or of P; the proposition will be valid even if they had never existed. What is required is that the combination SP should not be found, and this is available 'with or without the existence of these terms. Now, if we take the formal logic, we shall be told that 'S is not P' can be rendered 'S is non-P'. But this is more than a change of subject; a new proposition affirms a negative proposition. If S were not an existent, the proposition would be empty. -P.

we have seen, the original proposition gives no guarantee of the existence of S or P. The obverse imports, tacitly under cover of an indubitable law, existential matter not to be found in the original proposition. The obverse will be valid, only if one implied premise 'S is' is supplied. Therefore it is clear that the principle on which obversion is based, namely the Excluded Middle, is not valid. 'S is not P' does not commit us to any position, while 'S is non-P' commits us to the existence of S and possibly of P and non-P. It is apparent that Excluded Middle is not a purely formal principle, but a device to serve a metaphysical doctrine, in which to negate a judgment is taken as affirming a negative predicate. It seems to be a very cheap device for asserting the existence of any subject. As a matter of fact it does not question the existence of the subject; its only trouble seems to be confined to the assignment of a positive or negative predicate; the fundamental question of the existence of the subject of a judgment is left to take care of itself.

The Mādhyamika, on the other hand, questions the very existence of the subject of which there may be any dispute about the proper predicate. And as the subject cannot be discussed or known apart from the predicates, he formulates a general rule—that a subject, an entity of which all assignable positions, predicates, either taken singly or collectively, are inadmissible, does not exist. If the existence of the subject is not assumed at the outset, non-existence is also not presumed, but everything is decided on its own merits. The Mādhyamika finds that he can formulate at least four theses or alternatives in any case. One can assert existence of a subject, or deny it, or assert both existence and non-existence, or assert neither existence nor non-existence. It will be seen that the first is the Positivist or Realist thesis; the second is purely negative, the third is a synthetic position, say that

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The Realistic Analysis of Perception

By

TATINI DAS, M.A.

In discussing anything the first thing expected is a clear-out definition of the subject intended for discussion. But in dealing with Realism, this demand cannot be fulfilled, and the reason for this is that Realism is not a body of systematic doctrines to which numbers of different philosophers can be found to have subscribed. The Realists for the most part content themselves with dealing with a number of isolated problems without even attempting to bring them into any rational connection with one another. Perhaps the only thing which is common to all realists and which justifies their designation as 'realists' is their Refutation of Idealism.

Besides the refutation of idealism there is another topic, on which most, if not all, of the modern realists have something or other to say. This is the 'Problem of Perception.' The analysis of perception, is in a sense, the starting point of their philosophy—that is to say, of the *positive* part of it; and the reason is obvious. If, as their refutation of idealism proves, objects, in their opinion, are not to be resolved into the states of the knowing mind, the next thing that should engage their attention, is an account of the process by which the 'independent' things come to be related to the mind.

Realistic views of perception may be divided into three types, the first of which maintains the existence of three, the second, of two, and the third, of one element only in perception.

The Austrian philosopher Meinong may be taken as a typical representative of the first class. He distinguishes three elements in perception—(i) the act of perception, (ii) the content of perception and (iii) the object of perception, which

of Hegel or of the Jaina, the fourth is the purely agnostic thesis. All these, singly and collectively, are wrong and Tattva is that which escapes all these predicates

“Na san nāsan na sadasin na cāpyanubhayam ;

Catuṣkoṭi-vinirmuktatā Tattvaṁ Mādhyamikāḥ viduḥ”

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"Na sa nāsa na sadasa na cāpyanubhayam ;

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analysis, the '*pramātri chaitanya*,' changes as well as the '*Vritti-chaitanya*,' with the change in the object of perception. For the '*pramātri chaitanya*' is always determined (*upahita*) by the '*vritti*'-consciousness and thus, is dependent for its form (the essence of course being no other than *chaitanya*) directly on the '*vritti*,' and therefore indirectly on the object.

The superiority of the *Vedāntic* analysis to that given by Meinong, is evident from the fact, that Meinong's characterisation of the 'act of perception,' as remaining unaltered even if the object of perception changes, renders it a bare act of thought, divorced from all the characteristics which give it form, and therefore makes it an unthinkable something. It is psychologically impossible to distinguish in consciousness a thought which is not a thought with a definite content. Epistemologically also, one can be conscious of an act of perception only so far as it is distinguished from the object which is perceived through it.

There are differences regarding the conception of the content of perception as well. In the first place, as regards the origin of the '*vritti*' the *Vedānta* is explicit in stating that the '*vritti*' originates as a consequence of the mind going out of itself to the object and being modified in the form of the object (*Antaḥkṣāṇam cākṣhurādi-dvārā nirgatya ghaṭādīviśayadeśam gatvā ghaṭādīviśaya-lāreṇa parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vrittirityuchyate*). But Meinong is silent on the point. According to him the content of perception is altogether mental, and the object is something altogether external. On this theory it is difficult to perceive how the object can ever come into relation with the content, so as to enable the latter to take the form of the former. Thus Meinong's theory is open to all the defects that vitiate the 'representation,' etc., theories of Perception of Descartes, Locke and others. He ends by tacitly assuming the possibility of the content

correspond roughly to the three elements distinguished in perception by the *'Vedānta-paribhāṣhā viz., 'pramātri-chaitanya* 'pramāṇa-chaitanya', and 'vishaya-chaitanya, respectively. The similarity of the conception of the 'act of perception' with that of the 'pramātri-chaitanya,' is apt to seem a little doubtful at first; but their resemblance becomes obvious if we look a little below the surface. For, the 'pramātri-chaitanya' is an exact analogue of the Kantian conception of the 'Synthetic unity of apperception, which is evident from the part the 'pramātri-chaitanya' has to play in the perception known as 'vishaya-gata' or 'jñāya-gata' *pratyakṣha* (i. e. the perception of object as object) as distinguished from 'jñāna-gata *pratyakṣha*.' The 'synthetic unity of apperception' is the correlate of the object, according to Kant; so also is the 'pramātri-chaitanya', in the *Vedānta*. If the object is to be perceived as an object, the 'pramātri-chaitanya' must be explicitly opposed to it; so also in Kant, the object can be perceived as an object at all only in distinction from the synthetic unity of apperception. But the 'Synthetic unity of apperception' is more an 'act' than a 'fact,' i. e. it is not as a substance but only because of the synthesising function it has to perform, that the 'ego' had importance with Kant. The same may be said of the *Vedāntic* conception of the 'pramātri-chaitanya.' Thus it is not far from the truth to trace a sort of resemblance between the *pramātri-chaitanya* and the 'act of perception' admitted by Meinong.

But there are important differences as well. Meinong thinks that in the perception of different objects the 'act of perception' remains the same, and it is only the 'content of perception' that changes, e.g., in the perception of the 'cow' and in that of the 'horse', Meinong will suppose that the same act that is capable of perceiving the 'cow', is capable of perceiving the 'horse' as well, the difference lying in the content only, the content in the one case being a cow-content, in the other a horse-content. But, according to the *Vedāntic*

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The superiority of the *Vedāntic* analysis to that given by Meinong, is evident from the fact, that Meinong's characterisation of the 'act of perception,' as remaining unaltered even if the object of perception changes, renders it a bare act of thought, divorced from all the characteristics which give it form, and therefore makes it an unthinkable something. It is psychologically impossible to distinguish in consciousness a thought which is not a thought with a definite content. Epistemologically also, one can be conscious of an act of perception only so far as it is distinguished from the object which is perceived through it.

There are differences regarding the conception of the content of perception as well. In the first place, as regards the origin of the '*vritti*' the *Vedānta* is explicit in stating that the '*vritti*' originates as a consequence of the mind going out of itself to the object and being modified in the form of the object (*Antahkaraṇaṃ cakṣhurādi-dvārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviśaya-deśam gatvā ghaṭādiviśaya-kūreṇa pariṇamate. Sa eva parināmo vrittirityuchyate*). But Meinong is silent on the point. According to him the content of perception is altogether mental, and the object is something altogether external. On this theory it is difficult to perceive how the object can ever come into relation with the content, so as to enable the latter to take the form of the former. Thus Meinong's theory is open to all the defects that vitiate the 'representation,' etc., theories of Perception of Descartes, Locke and others. He ends by tacitly assuming the possibility of the content

being of the form of the object without bothering himself by entering into the 'how' of it. Another important difference follows from this difference between Meinong and the *Vedānta*. Past and future objects as well (i. e., object of memory and anticipation respectively) may constitute the objects of perception, according to Meinong. But *prima facie*, the *Vedāntin* cannot accept this for, in as much as, according to him, the mind must go out to the object in perception, it follows that the object must be a *present* one, i. e., must belong to the same *time* as that when the perception takes place. The *Vedānta* itself anticipates Meinong's position and refutes it (*nanveram svavrittisukhādismaraṇasyāpi sukhādyamāe pratyakṣāpattiriti chet na...aham pūrvam sukhī itvādismitau ativyāptivāraṇāya varitamānatvam viśaya-viśeṣhanam deyam*).

The *Vedāntic* analysis of perception should however, be dwelt on a little more at length in this connection, as the *Vedānta* furnishes the best type of the realistic analysis of perception in India. The *Vedāntic* analysis can best be studied in connection with that of Meinong, the latter having many points of similarity with the former, as has already been pointed out. Considered *a priori* also the *Vedānta* should find a place in the same class with Meinong, according to the standard of classification proposed in the present discussion, for it also is an upholder of the three-element theory of perception.

From the ultimate metaphysical point of view, the *Vedānta* admits the reality only of one all-pervading *Chaitanya*. But all determinate knowledge involves a stratification of this one *Chaitanya* into three determinate forms,—the *pramātri-chaitanya*, the *vritti-chaitanya*, and the *viśaya-chaitanya* (The suffix '*Chaitanya*' by the way, at the end of each of the terms, serves as a constant reminder of the fact that they are in their metaphysical essence, nothing

but '*Chaitanya*,' the only reality admitted by the Vedānta). However this distinction between the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' and the '*vishaya-chaitanya*,' explains Vedāntic realism so far as determinate empirical consciousness is concerned. These three—the '*pramātri-chaitanya*,' the '*vr̥tti-chaitanya*,' and the '*vishaya-chaitanya*'—correspond roughly to Meinong's distinction of 'act of perception,' 'content of perception' and 'object of perception' respectively, as has already been shown. Now, what happens in perception is as follows. First of all there is the mind and there is the object independent of the mind. The mind goes out of itself to the object and takes the form of the object (योग्यवर्त्तमानविषयकत्वे सति प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य विषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वम् इत्युक्तम्). This gives rise to the '*vr̥tti*'. The perceiving subject also is determined as to the particular form it is to take, by the '*vr̥tti*' (स्वाकारवृत्त्युपहितप्रमादचैतन्यसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वाभावः). All three, the '*pramātā*,' the '*vr̥tti*' and the '*vishaya*,' are then mingled together into a homogeneous whole. Then there is the perception of the object.

In their analysis of illusory perception they try to keep their realistic position intact, by bringing in their peculiar theory of an indescribable reality (अनिर्वचनीय-सत्ता). An illustration is necessary. The usual instance they give in the case of illusory perception when the 'nacre' is mistaken for 'silver'. The explanation offered is that, defects in the eye or in the adjustment of light, etc., cause the really existing nacre to be modified in the form of silver, owing to similarity between nacre and silver. Thus the object no longer continues to be nacre but becomes *silver* which also is not altogether unreal, though not of the same nature of reality as the nacre is. This peculiar reality is a kind of reality which is not real but apparent, i.e., a '*prātibhāsika satta*' as distinguished from a '*pāramārthika*' or '*vyāvahārika*

sattā in the Vedāntic terminology. Thus instead of the *pramātā*, the '*vritti*' of the form of nacre and the nacre, we have now the *pramātā*, the '*vritti*' of the form of the real-apparent-silver (पारमार्थिक प्रातिभासिक रजत) and the real apparent-silver. Everything else happens as in ordinary perception, and thus the perception of silver ensues. The silver also being ascribed a sort of reality, illusory perception also is quite in keeping with their realistic theory of perception; at the same time the illusory nature of the cognition is not explained away because the object of the perception is not ascribed a real reality but only an apparent one.

Two-element Theory of Perception.

Next we have to take into account the second class of thinkers, viz., those who hold that only two elements are involved in perception. It has been urged with great force and clearness by Professor Alexander, who speaks of perception as a process in which the mind enjoys itself in compresence with an object.

The two elements involved are the mind and the physical object. Meinong's 'act' and 'content' are run together by these realists and expressed by the single word 'mind'. They do not regard the 'act' and the 'content' as two distinct elements, because they think that one and the same physical object determines both (This analysis seems to bring the realistic analysis of perception into a closer connection with the Vedāntic one, because according to the Vedānta also, the object determines the form of the *vritti*, and the '*vritti*,'—which is thus indirectly the object,—again, determines the form of the '*pramātā*.' Of course, in making comparisons, it should always be remembered that analogy does not walk on all fours. The physical object is at once the *stimulus* and the content of the conscious act (determines the *pramātā* as well as the '*vritti*' in the '*Vedāntic*' terminology. Their explanation

is as follows : the physical object, when placed in a certain juxtaposition to the sensory organs, produces a stimulation of those organs. The stimulation is conveyed to the brain and enters into consciousness. The consciousness is then directed to the physical object and thus the content of consciousness takes the form of the physical object. From the fact that the physical object determines the act it follows that the 'act' differs with the difference in the object. (This also distinguishes the theory from Meinong's according to whom the 'act' remains the same in all perceptions, and connects it with the *Vedānta*, according to which the form of the *pramātā* differs with the difference in the object, e. g., the form of the *pramātā*, when the object of perception is the *parimāṇa* of the *ghata* is different from the form of the *pramātā* when the object of perception is the *rūpa* of the '*ghata*'). Thus the 'act' in the perception of 'red' will be quantitatively different from the 'act' in the perception of 'green.'

One-element Theory.

Next we have to take into consideration the account of perception given by those realists according to whom only one element is involved in perception. These realists are generally known as neo-realists. The designation neo-realist is rather ambiguous. It has been used by some writers to denote any modern realist—more usually, however, it has been applied to the particular class of thinkers we are now going to deal with. Throughout this discussion, the term will be used in this narrower sense.

Neo-realism in this sense, can best be studied in connection with realism in its oldest form. Descartes and Locke may be taken as the best exponents of the oldest type of realism. Both of them believed in the existence of a world of things independent of the mind and both of them believed that the independent world can be known through the medium of

ideas, truth consisting in the correspondence of the idea with the thing, i.e., both were 'representationists' with regard to the relation of the mind and the world.

Now, neo-realism is at one with old realism with regard to the first position, viz., the belief in the existence of an independent world of things, but the two theories differ with regard to the other position, viz., the knowability of the world through the medium of ideas. The neo-realists think that the object is directly *presented* to the mind when the latter comes to know the former, and is not *represented* to it through the medium of ideas, as older realists would have it.

The neo-realistic analysis of perception may be summed up in the single phrase 'immanence of the independent,' or what Perry terms as 'epistemological monism'. What the phrase means is simply this, that objects exist, independently of the knowing mind (independence) but they are *identical* with the perceptions of the mind when they are perceived. The object is not perceived *through something* which is other than itself. It itself is immanent in the mind, becomes itself the perception and thus makes its own perception of itself possible. This explains why these realists have been described as holding 'the one-element theory of perception.'

The explanation of the possibility of this immanence, they find in the peculiar way in which they construe the duality of mind and matter. The neo-realists think that the difference between mind and matter is simply a difference of organisation. Neither mind nor body is really simple—both are complexes capable of being analysed into more primitive terms. These primitive terms are neutral elements, in themselves they are neither mental nor physical. When considered in one relation they constitute mind, when in another, they constitute body. This view is best set forth by Ernst Mach in a little book (*Die Analyse der*

Empfindungen). The elements of the physical and the psychical, according to this author, are the same. But while the physical studies one type of relationship, such as the relation of colour to the source of light, the psychological studies its peculiar relation to the *retina or nervous system* of a sentient organism. The colour itself is neither physical nor psychical.

Ralph Barton Perry may be taken as the most well-known representative of the theory sketched here. This theory became generally recognised through the publication in 1912 of a co-operative volume by six American writers, Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperrell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin and Edward Gleason Spaulding,—called the New Realism. All these writers agree in what has been described above as the definitive characteristic of neo-realism, *viz.*, the insistence on the identical presence of the object in knowledge. Neo-realism has English representatives also. Mr. Russell, the most formidable of realists in some of his writings, drifted towards this theory. Of course it is not possible to class him with any realist in particular, for he does not adhere to one single view throughout his philosophical career. It is impossible to do justice to all the phases in his philosophy in this short paper.

There is another type of realism, *viz.*, that represented by the Scottish School of Common Sense. This theory agrees with neo-realism in admitting a sort of real presentationism, so far at least as the primary qualities are concerned. The main difference is that the Scottish realists dogmatically asserted presentationism without offering any explanation as to how it could be possible in spite of the dualism of mind and matter with which they started. Though this theory has been receiving attention since only 1912, Perry traces the germ of the theory as far back as Hume. Perry thinks that Hume regarded things not only as possessing being indepen-

dent of the mind, but *identical with perceptions when present to the mind*. For this view of his, he refers us to Hume's 'Treatise on Human Nature' (Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 207) and also to an article by W. P. Montague in the *Philosophical Review*, entitled 'A Neglected Point in Hume's Philosophy.'

Another analysis of perception has been offered, under the name of Critical Realism, by seven American professors—Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars and Strong,—in a co-operative study entitled the "Essays in Critical Realism."

The peculiarity of these thinkers consists in this that, unlike the other realists, they do not believe in the independently existing physical objects as constituting the data of perception. They must not, however, be supposed on this account to be following in the footsteps of the Idealists according to whom the data of perception are nothing but the states of the mind.

But if the datum is neither the physical object, nor the mental state of the perceiver, it follows that there must be a third term which is supposed by the Critical Realists to be the datum, and hence the analysis of these Realists makes perception involve three terms. Still these realists cannot be classed with Meinong because these views differ from Meinong's on a point of fundamental importance, viz., that they do not believe in independently existing physical objects constituting the data of perception.

The datum of perception, according to the Critical Realists, is a 'character-complex', or as Professor Santayana would express it, an 'essence,' which is not the object itself, nor any selection from the object, but in perception is supposed to be a characteristic of the object. What happens in perception is roughly as follows: when an object O comes into contact with a conscious organism A, it causes the appearance to A

of certain character-complexes. These character-complexes are imagined by A to be out in the world. These constitute the data of perception. When these character-complexes are the actual characteristics of C, the perception is correct ; when otherwise, the perception is erroneous. These character-complexes *have being* or subsistence only, but they do not *exist* in the same sense as physical objects do. Professor Santayana speaks of these 'essences' much in the same way as Plato spoke of his Ideas. But inasmuch as in true perception these 'essences' are identical with the actual characteristics of the object, the Critical Realist, in holding these essences to be the data of perception, holds that in perception, they perceive a 'physical object, so far, at least, as its nature or 'what' is concerned. The object itself, however, he is forced to admit, always eludes the perceiver's grasp. All this, however, is falling back on the defects involved in the representationistic theories represented by Descartes and Locke.

Lastly, any account of realism remains incomplete, if at least a passing reference is not made to the *Vaibhāshika* and *Sautrāntika* Schools of Buddhism, and the Jinas. The *Vaibhāshika* analysis of perception resembles that of the naïve realists of the Scottish School of Commonsense in their acceptance of a real objective world independent of thought, together with their belief in *presentationism* in perception. But though the *Vaibhāshikas* agree with the natural dualists in holding that our knowledge of things is *not creation but only discovery*, still there is an important difference—a difference which is due to their atomistic metaphysics. The objects of perception, they say, are constituted by permanent atoms but the objects themselves are momentary. The atoms constitute the object on the occasion of the perception, but separate as soon as the perception ceases, and so the object also vanishes. But

inspite of this apparent Berkeleyanism, it is interesting to notice that they are far from holding that the *esse* of things is their *percipi*. Their peculiarity consists in their combination of Berkeleyanism with natural dualism. Objects cease to exist the moment we cease to perceive, still it is not perception that makes them into objects.

The difference between the *Vaibhāshikas* and the *Sautrāntikas* is like that between Locke and the naive realists. The *Sautrāntikas* agree with the *Vaibhāshikas* in admitting the independent existence of the outer world. Only they deny the possibility of a direct perception of it. We have, they argue, mental presentations through which we infer the existence of external objects.

The Jainas give a detailed analysis of perception, into the technicalities of which it is impossible to enter here. In short, their analysis reveals the mediate character of perception, and also tells us that things are extra mental realities. It is to be noted that unlike the western Realists who start from the independence of the external world and then go on to analyse how that world can be related to mind, the *Jainas* start from the empirical fact of perception and then at the end of their analysis are brought to the conclusion that an independent reality exists. The question how consciousness can be related to objects—a question which puzzles the Western mind so much, is dismissed by the Jainas as absurd.

"The System of Rāmānuja"

By

K. A. KRISHNASWAMY IYER

(*Indian Philosophy Section*)

Besides political, social and economic wars, there were bloodless fights in the thought-world for centuries over the respective merits of Idealism and Realism. In Europe, the cause of Idealism long supported by leading thinkers like Kant, Hegel, etc. is fast declining and making room for Realism. In America, Pragmatism and Behaviourism together with New Realism are finding favour with the people. Similarly in England, Bertrand Russell and others declare themselves for Realism and Pluralism. This change is mainly due to the advance of Physical Science.

In India, the same influence has been at work to revive the dying embers of controversy between the Illusionism of Sāṅkara and the Realism of Rāmānuja and Madhva. Modern conditions demand a resurvey of these thought-positions. Discoveries in Science must react on the philosophical concepts.

Old notions of Substance, Cosmic time, Infinite space, Matter and Causality must be revised and the claims of consciousness re-examined. Religious beliefs must pass through a fire-bath of fact and verification. The opinion of Modern Science is "there is no absolute truth.". Laws are formulas subject to change in the light of experience.

The basis of Theology and Vedānta must be scrutinized and Hindu theism must face the storm of modern research. Idealism may not be affected so much by modern criticism as Realism. But a realistic theology like Rāmānuja's must have its position carefully reviewed.

When Rāmānuja appeared, Sāṅkara's system had fallen into decay, and people anxiously looked for a thinker, who

could confirm their natural prepossession in favour of a Real World, a Real God and a Real Soul assured of a Real Salvation. The land had been thrown into a religious ferment, and a class of Vaisṇava theists had come into prominence, under the name of Bhāgavatas. Rāmānuja's learning and extraordinary intellect came to be widely known and the Bhāgavatas induced him to write a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras in support of their cult.

Rāmānuja hesitated before accepting their doctrines, but an oracle decided him. Such is the origin of Śrī Bhāṣya.

The stand-point of Sankara greatly differed from those of Rāmānuja and Madhva. The last two depended on faith and the reality of practical life and interpreted the Upaniṣads so as to harmonize with them. Sankara relied on reason and all-sided experience and the truth he so derived he found in the Upaniṣads. In deference to the prevailing tone of the Scriptures, Rāmānuja believed that the Brahman was the only Reality, but included within Itself the elements of multiplicity, such as the world and the souls with which It invested Itself as Its body. This Brahman is a Personal Being; in short, God. The points of agreement in the three systems are then pointed out.

Doctrines

There is one God. He is a Personal Being and the only Reality. The world and the souls are His body and are eternal. His body periodically expands and contracts leading to Creation and Destruction. The Soul through Karma becomes embodied and is subject to Birth and Death, which never cease till it obtains the Grace of God through meditation and holy works. With Release, the Soul enters upon a new life of Bliss in Heaven and participate in all the privileges of God, except the Power to create and to control the Universe. One Soul does not differ from another in essence, not even from

God. Their individuality is preserved and are eternal. The existence of God and of the Soul as an independent entity are all known only from the Scriptures. Evil is the effect of Karma and can be overcome only by devotion and prayer.

Madhva does not believe in the embodiedness of God. To him every Soul is distinct from the other and after Release enjoys its own degree of Bliss. He believes in eternal Hell for the Monists.

Both believe that the Soul's size is atomic, and agree in most respects.

Criticism

1 Rāmānuja relies for his Realism on commonsense. "Every act of perception is real and involves a real object. There is no illusion that cannot be explained as caused by the peculiar conditions of perception." But, one might say, an illusion is an illusion and its entry into the real world must be inexplicable. Besides, the senses are only instruments of perception and cannot vouch for their own and their object's reality.

2 The individuality of objects is determined by their "where" and "when," not by any peculiar virtue of their own. Their qualities, being "Universals," are communal in character and cannot uphold the idea of *absolute* distinction between one thing and another.

(3) Similarly, multiplicity implies number which in its turn implies a class.

Hence distinctions etc. can be real only for practical life. If the World, God, and the Souls were of one grade of reality, they would be interdependent and relative; and God's reality would cease to be absolute.

His analogy of the soul and the body on which he bases the Relation of God to the Soul, is unacceptable, as

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Social Changes And The Brahmasutras.

By

RAI BAHADUR AMARNATH RAY, B. A.

Belvalkar¹ has greatly helped n proper appreciation of the true import of the Brahmasūtras by establishing that the Sūtras, as they stand, are not the work of a single author, but represent a growth of several centuries. He postulates that the work was originally the result of an attempt to harmonise the teachings of the Sāmaveda upaniṣads, particularly of the Chāndogya, that at a later period Sūtras were added to make it Sarvasākhya, that is, a Synthesis of the principal Upaniṣads of all the Vedic Sākhās; and that the Tarka-pāda, consisting of refutation of the doctrines of other schools of thought, was added still later. He thinks that the original stratum of the work is anterior to the Bhagavadgītā, the second elaboration as old as 300 B. C., and that the work took the present shape about the beginning of the Christian Era. So far the learned Professor seems to stand on sure ground.

A student of the Sūtras, however, comes across a few groups of Sūtras, which are irrelevant to the main purpose of the work, viz., the inquiry into Brahman, and could not have found a place in the original Brahmasūtras, or been added during the two subsequent rescensions postulated by Belvalkar. These sūtras appear to abruptly interpose two connected sūtras, and they appear to have no manner of relevance to the context, and were evidently meant simply to register the social changes of the age.

(1) See Basu Mallik Lectures, Pt. I. Lecture IV.

A The first group of such sutras constitutes what Sankara calls the 'Apsudradhikaranam', which denies Sudras the rights to attain Brahma knowledge (Sutras 13 34-38) This adhikarana and the one preceding it cut off Sutra 39 from Sutra 25 Sutra 24 lays down that the 'Purusa' of the size of an angustha spoken of in the Katha Upanisad, is the Paramatman Sutra 25 meets the objection why the all pervading universal Soul should be represented as of the size of a thumb finger by saying that as human beings alone are entitled to Brahma knowledge there could be no harm in contemplating the Paramatman as of the size of a human thumb Here a view attributed to Badarayana has been interpolated which holds that Devatas too, were adhikarins of Brahma vidya, a view which practically stultifies Sutra 25 But to make matters worse, this discussion is followed by certain sutras which, all on a sudden, deny the sudra the right to Brahma vidya The discussion is not only abrupt but wholly irrelevant In the upanishadic age, Sudras (eg Raikva and Janasruti) and even men of doubtful lineage (eg Satyakama Jabala) if otherwise fit, were admitted to Brahma vidya At a later age, it was thought fit to exclude the Sudras, but sruti passages stood in the way and the fiction of interpretation was resorted to and the episodes about Janasruti and Satyakama were misinterpreted so as to yield the meaning desired by the interpolator The story of Janasruti is to be found in the Chandogya upanishad 41 and that of the Satyakama in 44 of the same work, and no impartial reader will fail to observe that neither Janasruti was a Ksatriya nor Satyakama a Brahman Sutra 39 clearly continues the discussion in Sutra 25, and the intervening sutras at least sutras 34-38 must have been added at a later period

B The next group of Sutras is III 3 4 18-24 This

group cuts off sūtra 25 from sūtra 17, and was, according to Belvalkar², added subsequently by a champion of the no-action theory, the original theory having apparently been opposed to it, as will appear from the conflict of these sūtras with the Jābāla Śruti quoted by Śaṅkara towards the end of the commentary on sūtra 18.

C. A similar group of sūtras, also added possibly by this very champion of no-action, is III 4. 47-50. In this case, this champion is evidently frightened by the expression 'hālyena tiṣṭhāset' in the Kahola Brāhmaṇa (Br.up. III. 5). There is a silly discussion seeking to make out that the Śruti did not intend that merely 'bālya' was mandatory but that 'pāṇḍitya' and 'mauna' were mandatory as well. The main object of these sūtras is to obscure the meaning of the word 'hālya'. The writer argues in this fashion:—"don't suppose that 'bālya' alone is mandatory, 'mauna' and 'pāṇḍitya' are equally so, and what, after all, do you understand by 'bālya'? Well, it means nothing more than childlike simplicity and absence of arrogance". All commentators have explained 'hālya' as desired by the author of these Sūtras, and in the Subāla Up. the word is similarly used.

But if an unbiassed reader goes through the Kahola Brāhmaṇa he will be at a loss to understand why the author of this group of Sūtras should have taken so much pains in explaining away the stress in the expression 'hālyena tiṣṭhāset' if 'bālya' in this context meant nothing more than 'childlike meekness and simplicity.' Śaṅkara in his commentary on Br. Up. III. 5. explains 'hālya' as meaning 'strength begotten of self-knowledge', and not after the manner of Sūtrakāra, though in his commentary on sūtra 50 he follows him. Even so great a man was not clear what the word 'bālya' in the context meant. I am inclined to think that B. Barua is perfectly right when he says that by

(2) Basu Mallick Lectures, Pt. I. P. 170, footnote.

the word 'bālya' the sage Yājñavalkya means nothing but the householder's life and its attendant duties³. The champions of Sannyāsa used to ridicule the champions of the 'Grhastha āśrama' by calling them 'bālāḥ,' 'mūḍhāḥ' and so on, and in the passage under discussion, Yājñavalkya proposes a compromise between the two schools of thought by suggesting that, in order to attain knowledge, a man must pass through all the āśramas. He indulges in a little humour when he gives to the householder's life the name given to it by its detractors, viz. 'bālya' or puerility.⁴ To this interpretation of the word 'bālya' the objection might be urged that the Katha and the Muṇḍaka śrutis, which dub householders as 'bālāḥ' or mūḍhāḥ, are later works than the Brhadāraṇyaka, and Yājñavalkya could not have anticipated this derision and replied to it in advance. To this it might be said that the dates of the upanishads have not been fixed beyond doubt and that, even though the Katha and the Muṇḍaka might be later compilations than the Brhadāraṇyaka, there is nothing to show that the mantras referred to could not have existed earlier, or that champions of no-action, who derided the householder's life in similar words, could not have existed before or during Yājñavalkya's time. Sūtra 50 mystifies the meaning of the 'bālya' in order to explain away the stress implied in the verbal form 'tisthaset'. There can be no doubt that 'pīṇḍitya' in the passage means acquiring knowledge of the vedas as a brahmachārin, and 'mauna' the life of contemplation in the forest, while the word 'brāhmaṇa' which follows means a man who has attained Brahma-knowledge. It might be pointed out that the 'Īśopaniṣad,' which is found at the very end of the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* of the White Yajurveda, of which

(3) Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy P. 160.

(4) Katha up. I. 2. 5-6, II. I. 2; Muṇḍaka up. II. I. 7-10

Yājñavalkya was the reputed compiler, inculcates that a man must perform the āśrama duties all his life and that knowledge and works jointly led to liberation.⁵

D. The last group of sūtras, apparently added as result of social changes, is III.4. 28-31, which cut off sūtra 32 from sūtras 26-7. This discussion about 'āhāraśuddhi' and untouchability is quite irrelevant to the context, and it must have been added with a view to make so important a work as the Brahma-sūtras a supporter of the new doctrines of untouchability which were being introduced into society. The whole discussion is unconvincing and the interpretation put upon the 'āhāra-śuddhi' śruti⁶ by the writer is possibly wrong. Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the Chāndogya, interprets the expression 'āhāra-śuddhi' in a different, and possibly, the correct way, but in the present instance he gives way to the *Sutrakāra*.

These four groups of Sūtras were probably added at the same time. When this was done it is not easy to say. It seems likely, however, that the addition synchronises with the revival of Brahmanism, under the Imperial Guptas as Buddhism was on the wane, the Buddhistic partiality for 'No-action' having found favour with the section of Brahmanical teachers to which the interpolator belonged. If chance placed us in possession of a manuscript of Upaśāstra's vṛtti on the Brahma-sūtras, the dates of the later strata of the work would be easy to ascertain.

(5) Śaṅkara, a champion of no-action, attempts to explain away these passages with little success.

(6) Chāndogya Up. VII.16.2

Brahmasutra and Adhyasa-vada.

By

AKSHYA KUMAR BANERJEE M. A.

In this short paper it is not my intention to examine the merits of Sankara's *adhyāsa-vāda*, which is evidently the cornerstone of the whole edifice of his philosophy. I mean merely to examine whether this theory can be traced to any unequivocal statement in the *sūtras* of Bādārāyana and whether the illustrious *Bhāṣyakāra* is justified in passing it as the true view of the revered founder of the Vedānta system of philosophy. In this attempt, I propose, however to accept in the main the constructions put upon the *sūtras* by Acharya Sankara himself.

In his introduction to the great commentary, Sankara gives a clear exposition of his theory of *adhyāsa*, and promises to demonstrate by a detailed interpretation of the *sūtras* that this doctrine forms the purport of all the teachings of the Vedānta. The fundamental postulate with which he begins his introduction is that the subject and the object—the self and the not-self—the spirit and matter—are obviously distinct from and opposed to each other in their essential characteristics, and neither can *really* be in communion with the other, or participate in the nature and the attributes of the other. The only relation that can possibly exist between them is that of *adhyāsa*, i.e. the false attribution of one or of one's characteristics to the other. This *adhyāsa* gives birth to a relative or phenomenal or apparent reality, which may be described as a combination of the real and the unreal, the true and the false,—the real in respect of the *adhīsthāna* or the substance to which what it is not is attributed and consequently the true character of which remains bidden or unmanifested, and the unreal in respect of that which is

attributed to it and which falsely appears as real and pretends to present the real character of the substance.

[Acharya Sankara asserts that the whole phenomenal world with which we are acquainted—the world of subjects and objects, egos and non-egos, in intercourse with one another,—the world of finite spirits and minds and matters—the world of substances and attributes, causes and effects, spatial and temporal externalities—is the product of a general *adhyāsa*, the natural causeless beginningless attribution, to the one timeless, spaceless, differenceless, absolute Spirit or Self, called Brahman or Atman, of a plurality of names and forms, which by themselves possess no reality, and likewise the attribution of the reality and spiritual characteristics of Brahman to these names and forms. All knowledge, emotion and activity,—all consciousness of Me and mine, Thee and Thine, the actual and the ideal, happiness and misery, ought and ought-not,—are the creations of this *adhyāsa*.]

[*Adhyāsa* evidently involves two elements,—the concealment of the true nature of the substratum (*ādhīsthāna*) and its appearance as what it is not. This again refers to an observer from whom the true character of the substance is hidden and to whom it appears with false names and forms. With reference to such an implied observer, it is to be conceived as due to *avidyā* or ignorance. This *avidyā* is destroyed by *Vidyā* or true knowledge. When the observer, by suitable spiritual discipline, attains *Vidyā* or true knowledge of the real character of the Substance, viz. Brahman, *adhyāsa* vanishes the world of names and forms, falsely attributed to Brahman disappears or no longer appears as real, and Brahman alone shines in His absolute infinite differenceless attributeless character. The observer himself also, as a separate entity, vanishes, or rather, having realised his absolute identity with Brahman, is completely merged in His differenceless unity.]

of the universe, viz. Brahman, is described as *ánandamaya* i.e. perfectly blissful or self-enjoying. This means that He is eternally and absolutely self-fulfilled and self-complete, His knowledge and activity and enjoyment are eternally and absolutely perfect. There is no kind or form of imperfection in Him. But this is not the case with individual spirits. The spiritual nature of Brahman is only partially manifested in them, and progressively realised through their *Sádhaná* or spiritual culture. They have limitations of knowledge, will and bliss, which they have the capacity to transcend, and by transcending which they identify themselves with Brahman.

Again, Brahman has the unique power to create, sustain, govern and destroy the universe, which no *Jeeva*, even at its highest state of perfection, can, in the view of *Sutrakúra*, ever aspire after (*Jagat-byápara-barjan*). Moreover, He alone has the unique power of manifesting Himself by the mere act of His will as this boundless world of plurality without the least prejudice to the perfect unity of His nature. The all-round perfection of His character is in no way touched or affected by the diversities and limitations of this phenomenal world.

The reality of the distinction of Brahman, Supreme Spirit from the *Jeevas*, the finite spirits and from *Prakṛiti*, which is established in the first *páda* of the first chapter, is maintained throughout the rest of the book. In the second *páda*, it is pointed out that the *Sruti* declares Brahman as dwelling in the cave of the heart of every living being along with the individual self. They are sometimes described as two birds dwelling in the same tree. Both are distinguished from the material body and the objective world. But the individual spirit is primarily related to one body at a time. Through ignorance born of the will of Brahman, it identifies itself with the body for the time being and attributes its movements and sufferings and enjoyments to itself. It passes from one body to another according to

its *karma* horn of ignorance. But Brahman is at all times related to all hodies and is the self of all selves. The individual self, being related to the body, loses partially the consciousness of its supra-physical supra-mental and supra-human character (*swarupa*), and becomes a victim to *karma* and its fruits, bondage and liberation. The indwelling universal spirit is not at all touched by the imperfections and limitations of the bodily existence, never loses even in the smallest measure the consciousness of His blissful perfect transcendent character, never attributes any action to Himself or suffers any consequences, never comes under any form of bondage and therefore requires no liberation. Nevertheless, all activities of the individual spirits and their consequent enjoyments and sufferings, the courses of their destinies and their bondage and liberation, are controlled and managed and regulated by His eternally perfect will. He is unconditionally the supreme object of their worship, the ultimate object of their quest, and the final goal of their progress. When they attain *Vidyā* and realise their unity with Him, when they feel themselves in Him, by Him, from Him and for Him, when they see Him and Him alone within and without, when they experience nothing,—not even themselves —apart from Him, they are emancipated from all bondage and limitation and enjoy the blessedness of His perfect existence, being one with Him. This of course does not imply that the *Jeevas* have really no individual existence, and no bondage and liberation, and their varieties of experiences are all illusory. At least Badarayana in his *sutras* does not appear to draw such an inference. He carries the emphasis on the points of distinction to the third *pāda*. Then in the rest of this chapter he explains many apparently ambiguous texts of the upanishads to avoid misunderstanding. The conclusion of the whole chapter is that the one omniscient and omnipotent, infinite and eternal, all-pervading and

transcendent, changeless and absolute, blissful and perfect Supreme Spirit or Brahman, as distinguished from the individual spirits, the Prakriti and even the *Iswara* of the *Naiyāyikas*, is the efficient (*nimitta*) as well as the material (*upādāna*) cause of the real phenomenal objective world.

There are, however, a few *sūtras* (such as 1.1.30, 1.3.19,) which refer to scriptural texts, that admit of being interpreted to mean the absolute identity of *Jeeva* and Brahman from the metaphysical point of view. The *Sūtraktra*, however, interprets them as implying what may be called identity-in-difference (*Bhedābheda*), so that the consistency between them and other texts on the subject may not be broken.

As in a state of bondage the *Jeeva* identifies itself with the body and mind, so in a state of *Mukti* it identifies itself with Brahman. In reality the finite spirits are, as it were, sparks of the fire of Brahman, the spiritual parts (*angsha*) or partial self-manifestations (*ābhāsa*) of the Supremo Spirit, in whom they always 'live and move and have their being',—unknowingly in the state of bondage and knowingly in the state of *mukti*. The relation between the Spiritual Whole and the Spiritual Parts, the Absolute Spirit and His spiritual self-manifestations, is one of identity as well as difference. The parts, though having no existence and essential characteristics apart from those of the whole, cannot be regarded as absolutely identical with the whole. The parts have limitations and changes of states and embodiments and environments; but the whole is absolutely free from them. The life of the whole pervades the lives of the parts, the self of the whole is the ultimate self of the selves of the parts, the whole governs the parts; but still the parts are parts, and they are not completely identical with the whole. When these parts become perfectly self-conscious, when their essential character, freed from the veil of ignorance and the consequent limitations, is perfectly unveiled

(*ābirbhūta-svarūpa*), when their pure non-material supra-mental spiritual nature is perfectly realised they experience the whole—the supreme spirit—as their true self, their egoism which apparently divided them from the whole and the other parts is gone, and they identify themselves with the whole. There being no spatial externality between the Spiritual whole and the Spiritual part, the part in the state of perfect self-consciousness is in experience identical with the whole. But the difference of states of existence, the liability to ignorance and error, etc. imply the individualised existence of the parts. The reality of this individualised existence is presupposed by the very possibility of *adhyāsa* and its destruction,—*avidyā* and *vidyā*. *Badarayana* is nowhere in the sutras found to deny the reality.

In the second chapter *Badarayana* adduces rational arguments to demonstrate that the conclusions he has arrived at in the first chapter are free from the charges brought against them by rival schools of philosophy and that all other hypotheses suggested by those schools are vitiated by various kinds of fallacies.

One objection against his doctrine is that to regard the Spirit as the sole cause of the material world means a virtual denial of the universally acknowledged fundamental distinction between spirit and matter, (subject and object.) To this the *sutrakāra* simply answers—"But it is seen". It obviously means that our experience supplies us with numerous instances in which an object becomes the cause of another different from it in essential characteristics. What we find is that everything cannot be the cause of everything else. The fundamental condition is that the possibility or the capacity for the production of the effect must be present in the cause. What object has the possibility or the capacity for the production of what effect can be rightly ascertained only by the observation of the actual effect produced from it. The

Sruti, which is the ultimate source of evidence as to the cause of the universe, gives us the knowledge that Brahman is the sole cause of the universe and that He possesses eternally the power (*Sakti*) necessary for the purpose. His power is unique, and nothing parallel to it can be found in any created object of our experience. There is, however, no logical inconsistency in holding that the Supreme Spirit who is regarded as omnipotent and omniscient, infinite and eternal, is by nature endowed with the power and wisdom necessary for creating from within Himself such a boundless well-ordered world of diverse mental and material realities. As a consistent *Satkaryabadin*, Badarayana maintains that before creation and after dissolution the world of spiritual and material plurality remains in an unmanifested undifferentiated unified state, i.e. in the form of *Sakti* (power or potency), in the cause, from which it is then non-distinguishable. Since it is then one with Brahman, the question of the nature of the cause being polluted by the limitations, relativities and special features of the phenomenal realities of the manifested and differentiated effect does not arise at all.

A question arises: how can Brahman, who is conceived as one without a second, without physical organs, mental faculties, material stuff and suitable instruments, be reasonably regarded as originating and sustaining and governing a plurality of beings, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, with bewilderingly diverse characteristics, and if He does so, how can He be regarded as absolutely unaffected by these actions, absolutely free from all sorts of modifications of His nature, preserving the perfect unity and purity, the supreme unconcernedness and beatitude, of His transcendent self? Badarayana's answer to this also is very simple, but of supreme philosophical importance. He simply says—'It is known from the *Sruti*, which is the primary source of knowledge with unquestionable authority in the matter.' Whether or not

our finite and relative understanding can reconcile the presence of such an extraordinary capacity in any Being with its phenomenal experience and logic, Brahman has in Him this unique and incomprehensible capacity, and this is known for certain from the *Sruti*, whose authority on the subject cannot be challenged. Every object has got its specific nature and power, which so long as it is unmanifested in action, remains absolutely identical with and indistinguishable from its pure existence, but becomes cognisable and distinguishable, when manifested in action. Brahman also can similarly be regarded, without any violence to reason, as possessing this specific nature and power of manifesting Himself as a diversified plurality by mere act of His will without in the least producing any form of modification in His transcendent nature. The power in its unmanifested state is identical with and indistinguishable from His absolute differenceless character, but may be reasonably inferred from the work of creation, regulation and destruction of the phenomenal universe. The manifestation of His power does not make Him changed or transformed or other than what He is by Himself.

The power, activity, knowledge and enjoyment of Brahman cannot be compared to those of any created being, however great. His knowledge being eternally perfect involves no process; His activity being perfect involves no change in Himself; His will being perfect involves no effort; His power having no rival or obstructing force involves no self-modification; His enjoyment involves no difference between the enjoyer and the enjoyed. This truth we get from *Sruti* or from the deepest spiritual experience. In order to give a vague idea of His inconceivable power, Bādarāyana compares it to the creative power of man in dream-consciousness and to that of the yogins and gods to create by will, in which cases the work of creation is accomplished without the help of any materials and instruments, and

without any movement of limbs and senses. He describes this work of Divine creation as a pure play (*Leela Kaivalyam*) of Brahman in as much as it is something like a spontaneous expression of his infinite *ananda*, which is a super conscious state in which the knower, knowing and the known the will act and its fulfilment the enjoyer, enjoying and the enjoyed, the subject the object and their relation are all completely unified. All through His work or play He remains within Himself.

In *Sutras* like 2.1.14 *Badarayana* raises the question whether the effect viz the world of plurality is different or non different from the cause, viz Brahman. His doctrine is that the effect is non different from the cause (*tadananya tuam*). *Sankara* lays the greatest stress upon this doctrine of the *Sutra* *ara*. But neither the *Sutras* nor the scriptural texts they refer to anywhere suggest that the world is non different from Brahman in the same sense in which the illusory serpent and silver are non different from the real rope and oyster to which respectively they are falsely attributed. The relation between Brahman and the world is, according to *Śruti* analogous to that between earth and earthenware gold and golden ornaments iron and ironware. It implies that Brahman is the ultimate substances of the universe. As substances like earth gold iron etc., without any change in their essential characteristics produce those various kinds of articles, which are not substantially different from them so Brahman also without any modification whatsoever of His essential nature creates from within Himself the world of multiplicity, which is not substantially different from him. The analogy should not of course be drawn too far, for the power or potentiality of any created conditional material cause cannot be compared to that of the self existent, absolute, sole spiritual ground of the whole universe. Brahman is the substance

the self, the ruler and the final end of all that was and is and will be. (The text explicitly states that it is from His undifferentiated self-luminous spiritual existence that all differentiated existences are manifested by His will ; that He enters into them as their indwelling self or spirit ; that all particular existences with particular names and forms are sustained and regulated by His immanent existence. In this sense the whole universe of finite spirits and matters is non-different from him (*tadananya*) and has Him for its true self (*aitadātmyam*) and may be said to be identical with Him. This doctrine does not imply the unreality of the world (*Jagat-mithyātva*) or any sort of *adhyāsa* of the world upon His otherwise differenceless self-existence.

The *Sūtralāra* explains the above doctrine of the *Sruti* by logically establishing the non-otherness of the effect from the cause (and not unreality of the effect) on the ground that the existence of the effect is completely dependent upon that of the cause. He concludes the topic with a peremptory general assertion that reason (*Yukti*) as well as all revealed words (*Shabda*) are in support of the conclusion that the effect is essentially non-other or non-different from the cause. It should be noted that nowhere in the *Sūtras* do we find a statement suggesting that the cause also is non-other or non-different from the effect. On the contrary the cause Brahman is repeatedly proclaimed to be superior to (*adhika*) distinct from (*bhinna*) and transcendent above the effect, viz. the world of plurality. There is, however, nowhere even any suggestion of the unreality of the causal relation—of the causality of the Supreme Spirit. Nowhere does the *Sūtralāra* characterise the cause as true and the effect as false, Brahman as real and the world as illusory.

The objective reality of the world is most emphatically and unequivocally affirmed by him in connection with the refutation of Buddhist Subjective Idealism, where he gives

a solemn warning against the identification of perception and its object, and the interpretation of the waking experience on the analogy of the dream experience. The expressions like '*neti neti*' of *Sruti*, he interprets as implying the denial of the limitedness (*etabattvam*) of Brahman within the range of His self manifestations, and not the denial of the existence of the world. Brahman is not exhausted or exhaustible in His effect, but eternally unmanifested (*avyakta*) as well. By expressions like '*Neha nānāsti līnchana*' he means that there is no plurality other than and independent of the one absolute Supreme Spirit. According to the *Sutakāra*, Brahman is everywhere in *Sruti* described as having an apparently dual character (*ubhayalingam Sarbatra hi*)—viz. manifested and unmanifested, immanent and transcendent, differentiated and differenceless, active and inactive, *saguna* and *nirguna* etc. But the *Sutraśāra* does not, like the *Bhāṣyakāra*, think it necessary to harmonise the two aspects by saying that the one is real and the other is unreal; the one represents His true nature and the other is falsely ascribed to Him under the influence of beginningless *āvidyā* or ignorance. Thus from a comparative study of the *Sutras* and *Bhāṣya* Sankara's theory of *adhyāsa* appears to be *adhyāsta* (somehow attributed) upon the philosophy of Badarayana.

The "Cathartic" Theory of Morals.

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

In my previous papers on Ethics read before this Congress, I have tried to prove that modern Ethics is really at the cross-ways. It has confused itself by identifying moral science with the science of *values*, the principles of character and conduct with the principles of human welfare, the problem of righteousness with the problem of goodness. Perfection, self-development, social salvation—in short all kinds of world-comprehensive ideals are proposed as the ends or standards of conduct, and the simple humble question of 'what ought I to do?' has been forgotten in the maze of ambitious programmes of the Absolute Good, the best and the most blessed life etc. And yet modern Ethics is janus-faced, so to say, with one face turned upon the world, the world of matter and material goods, of acquisition and possession, of creation and conservation of 'values'; the other, more or less turned upon itself, and engaged in the eternal task of self-creation, of creation of character, of moral self-purification. This latter is moral science proper, while the former is what I have called the science of Human well-being or the General Theory of Value. This Theory of Value is empirical, utilitarian, based on expediency¹ while moral science is intuitional, idealistic, even metaphysical. This is the real significance of the distinction, as I understand it, which McDougall draws between Universalistic and Nationalistic ethics in his thought-provoking work, "Ethics and some world-

1. See my "The Methods of Ethics" published in the Philosophical Quarterly for January 1932.

problems." This is also the explanation of the double standard of ethics advocated in Hindu thought represented by the universal, non-sectarian teachings of the philosophical systems (o.g., the Vedanta) on the one side, and by the racial, sectarian, caste-codes (e.g., the *Dharma-Sutras*) on the other. A proper harmonisation of these two aspects is, I conceive, the most urgent and fundamental problem of ethics at the present day. On the one side moral purity and integrity of the highest sort must be capable of being attained. To lose it or to sacrifice it in any measure whatsoever for the sake of consequences would be like giving up the soul of morality. Yet on the other we cannot afford to neglect the values of life—the concrete goods which alone could give a content to moral life. A synthesis of these two aspects so as to render moral life both subjectively pure and objectively fruitful is what I have attempted in my own humble way in this 'Cathartic' theory of morals.

The fundamental principle of this theory is that moral life is a process of self-purification, a discipline that purges, cleanses the affective-volitional nature of man (which alone is the real spring of action, ordinarily speaking), a process of 'catharsis' of desires. It is assumed that desire in the sense of attachment either to object or self vitiates the morality of an action and brings about misery to the agent in various ways. And so the rule of conduct must be such as to eliminate *this sense of attachment* from the agent's mind as far as possible. Moral purity consists in non-attachment, inner renunciation of all *sense* of possession or enjoyment or attachment. And yet through this very process of catharsis, objective or social good should naturally result. With these ends in view, the cathartic theory may be stated as follows: "Act so that the line of your action may leech your desires". The psychological distinction between impulse, desire, appetite, interest etc., is important in this connection but cannot be

undertaken here Suffice it to say that every element of the affective volitional life requires to be leechcd. Using the term 'impulse' broadly so as to cover every such element, we may classify impulses as positive—those which in their very nature are catharsising (e.g., love, benevolence, self sacrifice etc) and negative, i.e., those which contrariwise strengthen the bonds of attachment to and identification with themselves, e.g., greed selfishness, cruelty, lust etc Very often the best means of leeching a negative impulse would be to cultivate its opposite, and then catharsising the latter in the manner prescribed below (which means that even positive impulses require to be leechcd) Again impulses may be classified on the basis of the *reactions* of the individual regarded either as positive when he identifies himself with the impulse or as negative when he flies away from it, e.g., neglect of family duties, indifference to personal development etc In either case the individual betrays the mastery or superiority of the impulse over himself and so the latter requires to be leechcd Most cases of moral conflict can be resolved by asking these two questions, (1) To which impulse is the agent positively attracted most? (2) To which is he reacting negatively always? We will however now discuss some of the different lines of action which are thus calculated to leech one's desires and secure moral purity and which at the same time represent different levels of moral freedom

(1) *Empirical Subjectivity Freedom as distinction of empirical ego from object*

A desire is leechcd (i.e. the act proceeding from it becomes pure) in so far as it is not complicated or intensified by the object being treated as part of the subject himself This is a stage where, to begin with, there is no distinction between subject and object All is one vast whirl pool of subjectivity in which objects are looked upon as only an extension of the subject—as an external concretisation

o to say, of the subject's needs and desires and where the individual is not aware of the difference between being 'pulled by seductions from without' and being "pushed by impulses from within". Into such a state of empirical subjectivity must first be introduced the distinction between 'the psychological me' and the object which acts as stimulus. The 'psychological me'—the complexus of desires and feelings and impulses—though the condition of there being objective experience, must still be felt to be different from the objects which attract it.

(2) *Empirical Objectivity : Freedom as Empirical Determinism of Society.*

A desire becomes pure when after the "psychological me" has contemplated itself as different from the object, it comes to identify itself with the 'social me' (collection of "psychological me's"), so that if an impulse conforms to the demands of the 'social me', it is so far pure. Here the aim is to substitute the rule of an impersonal social law or custom for the vagaries of psychological individualism. The 'psychological me', however, continues in the 'social me', for there is no differentiation in this stage between the impulse and the rational ego. It may be called the customary stage of morality where a clash is possible between the 'psychological me' and the 'social me'.

(3) *Rational Subject-objectivity : Freedom as the Rational self-Determinism of Personality.*

A desire becomes pure in so far as, while still pursuing social ends, there appears in the subject's mind a distinction between the "personal me" and the 'psychological me'. Within the life of the subject himself there now arises a subject-object relation, the 'personal me,' or the rational ego being the subject which while distinguishing itself from the impulse, instinct or appetite (which is the object) yet feels that they

belong to it, possesses them, and controls and develops them as it likes. And thus results what may be called 'the personal me' or simply, personality. The essence of personality lies in the integration of desires into a unitary whole so that every desire, thus correlated and organised, becomes instrumental to the truer life of the self. The self breathes its spirit into the impulses and instincts and objectifies them by giving them concrete form either in canvas or plaster, song or verse. This leads to the development of one's capacities and the stage in *general* corresponds to the western theory of self-realisation. But what distinguishes it from the latter is the fact that instead of such development being looked upon as the end or standard of conduct, it is treated in this theory as the natural result of the progress of moral purity having no ethical significance in itself, the ethical value of the stage consisting in the accentuation of that distinction between the 'rational' I and the impulses whereby the self freely expresses itself indeed (in the direction best suited to its capacities) in the creation of external goods but is not troubled with the success or failure of its enterprises. The endeavour after self-expression is a *natural consequence* of the integration of personality involved here; but since the integration also involves a corresponding differentiation referred to above, the self conceives that to action only it has a right, but not to the fruits thereof. It will thus be observed that disinterested action comprises not only the so-called duties proper but all action whatever, whether self-regarding or other-regarding. The treatment of disinterested action requires an essay by itself but suffice it to say here that it means 'neither motiveless action' nor disregard of or indifference to the kind of consequences envisaged, but only a refusal to get *worried or upset* by the consequences that do actually happen sometimes contrary to expectations, for Nature's processes are mysterious and there are such things as counteraction of causes and intermixture of effects. Perfect

tion. (v) Thus the theory harmonises the demands of the world with the demands of the spirit. It does not inculcate on the individual to turn the other cheek also and to give away one's cloak also. For in such cases too the standard is the catharsis of motives. If an individual persistently refuses to look to his own personal comfort or to look after the needs of the family etc., he thereby betrays strong negative reactions to certain impulses which he admits are more powerful than he. It is then his duty to leech such impulses by asserting his mastery over them. Even Buddha and Vivekananda had finally to return to the world and leech the impulses to which they first negatively reacted. (vi) It has already been shown how the theory reconciles utilitarianism and perfectionism etc. It must now be pointed out that it harmonises rationalism and hedonism also inasmuch as while on the one hand the agent does not go seeking after pleasures, on the other he is not to shun pleasures either when they come in his way, for that shows he is negatively reacting to certain impulses—betrays his concern for objectivity—which therefore must be leeches. For obligation, it will be seen, is the sense of negative reaction* to a feeling or impulse, and so long as this reaction persists, the catharsis has not taken place. In every such case the object should be to rise superior to the craving, cribbing restraining influence of the impulse to which one is attached. (viii) The greatest virtue of the theory, however, consists in stages (4), (5) and (6). For it is not possible in the previous stages to control all the processes of nature and to perform action in such

* A negative reaction is permissible only where the impulse itself is negative i. e., opposed in nature to catharsis—e. g., addiction to bad habits, lust, etc. A negative reaction in such a case means catharsising the impulses, though the best way of doing so would be as already pointed out, to develop the opposite impulse and then to leech it as directed in stage (4.)

a way as to realise the desired result. And intellectual and ethical perplexities will always remain on the human level. Hence the call to rise to another consciousness with another law of being and another stand-point for our action where no personal desires and emotions play ; where being no longer in our lower nature, we have no works of our own to do but only divine works to the doing of which our outward nature is only an instrument. For the motive-power of work is entirely in the will of the Master of all works and *He* guides and directs all action. This is action done in yoga—and yoga is skill in works—by the *mukta* who has synthesised his reason and will with the divine, who has established himself in the freedom of self-knowledge and who has therefore risen above good-doing and evil-doing alike. And such action is the wisest, the most efficient even for the affairs of the world for it is informed by the knowledge and will of the Master of works—the *Puruṣottama*—whose will the active mutable *prakṛiti* implicitly carries out for the good of all creatures, *sarvabhūtāni*. Thus life according to nature becomes one with living in God, for the former becomes an inevitable condition and outward result of the latter.

Value and Obligation.

By

A. F. MARKHAM.

Moralists are at present engaged in an attempt to determine the ground of moral obligation. Professor Laird considers that the justification of duty must be in terms of the value it sustains and conserves. (*A Study in Moral Theory*, page XII). According to Professor Moore the assertion "I am morally bound to perform this action" is identical with the assertion "This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe." (*Principia Ethica*, page 147). To do no murder is a duty, because no such action will in any circumstances cause so much good to exist in the Universe as its avoidance. An ethical law has the nature of a scientific prediction and is merely probable.

Right, we are told, means conducive to good. Intrinsic value or goodness is a unique, simple, unanalysable, indefinable property or quality. It is the business of the moralist to determine what things are good in themselves and what things are causally related to something else which is itself good. In order to find out what is good in itself we should consider what value things would have if they existed absolutely by themselves. It seems obvious to Professor Moore that far the most valuable things known or imagined by us are the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. "That it is only for the sake of these things—in order that as much of them as possible may at some time exist—that any one can be justified in performing any public or private duty; that they are the *raison d'être* of virtue; that it is they—these complex wholes themselves, and not any constituent or characteristic of them—that form the rational ultimate end of

human action and the sole criterion of human progress: these appear to be truths which have been generally overlooked." (op. cit. page 189).

Value or goodness is not I think, as Professor Moore supposes, a property which things possess—or do not possess—in a greater or less degree. Value, as pointed out by Von Ehrenfels, is essentially a relation between some object and some subject. What is of value in relation to one subject need not be such in relation to another subject, and what is of value to a subject at one time need not be of any actual value at another time. If there are two enemies A and B, what is good for A may be bad for B. The medicine which is of value to me when I am ill may be worthless to me when I no longer require it.

[What is the value or good which is the ground of moral obligation? It surely cannot be a relation between an object and any individual such that the individual actually desires the object. This implies that it is right for me to do what I desire to do.] We might argue that the value required to justify an action is a relation between the intention of the agent and all conscious subjects such that they all desire the object or would desire the object if aware of it, in preference to any other object that could be intended by the agent. Mr H. J. Paton has recently tried to show that goodness belongs to the coherent will and that moral goodness belongs to a will which is coherent as a member of an all-inclusive society of coherent wills. Such a goodness as Mr. Paton describes is an ideal which cannot be realised here and now amid the clash of human wills. We have got to live in the world as we find it. "But," writes Mr Carrington, "if we take seriously the contention that it is coherence that makes acts right, surely it must be actual coherence with actual desires and wills of actual people, every one to count for one, and not

with ideal desires and wills or with some selected by what the upholders of this view call "an arbitrary intuitive standard." No doubt, so far as I and others act rightly our acts do not conflict. But to say that what makes acts right is their coherence with right acts is nugatory. Yet unless they say that, they reduce right conduct to a conformity with the ways of mankind, including among mankind the most barbarous times and races." (*The Theory of Morals*, page 67).

Value or goodness is too vague a conception on which to ground moral obligation. Charles D'Arcy attempted to base ethics on metaphysics. He tried to show that man is a spirit or person, that God is personal and that therefore Nature is relative to an end. The end of Nature is the Absolute Good which is the true good for every person. Even if such a metaphysical view could be established there still remains the question as to why a man ought to pursue his true good. Moreover the fact of moral obligation seems to most men far more certain and indubitable than any metaphysical theory.

It sometimes happens that we know that an action is right and are distinctly conscious of an obligation to perform it when we are quite ignorant as to whether the consequences of our action will be good or bad. "No man," wrote Ruskin, "ever knows, or can know, what will be the ultimate result to himself, or to others, of any given line of conduct. But every man may know, and most of us do know, what is a just and unjust act. And all of us may know also, that the consequences of justice will be ultimately the best possible, both to others and ourselves, though we neither can say what is best, or how it is likely to come to pass." (*Unto This Last*, quoted by Carritt op. cit. page 74).

Professor de Burgh reminds us that to appeal to good as the ground of obligation is contrary to moral experience. A man's obligation to pay his rent is unaffected by any consideration

of the bad uses to which his landlord may put the money. (*Journal of Philosophical Studies*, July, 1930). Moreover Professor Prichard has rightly pointed out that an "ought", if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." If derived from "good", it can only be because what is good is what ought to be. But "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone. To say that beauty ought to be could only mean that some one ought to produce what is beautiful. Mr. Prichard concludes that "the sense of obligation to do, or the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate." (*Mind*, January, 1912 quoted by Laird, *A study in Moral Theory* page 25.)

Dean Rashdall held that the fundamental idea in Morality is the idea of Value, in which the idea of "ought" is implicitly contained. The ideas of good and right are correlative terms. "It is implied in the idea of 'good' that it ought to be promoted; the idea of 'right' is meaningless apart from a 'good' which right actions tend to promote. If, finally, we ask what is the relation of the idea of value to the idea of 'moral' value, I should answer that all that has value has moral value, in the sense that it must be moral, in due proportion to the amount of that value, to promote it, but by moral value we generally mean the particular kind of value which we assign to a good character." (*The Theory of Good and Evil*; Volume I page 138).

I cannot agree with Rashdall that 'good', 'value' and 'ought' (when applied to ends) are synonymous terms. The proposition "The good is that which ought to be" is not analytical, the predicate is not contained in the conception of the subject. If there is no God whose duty is to promote the good it would only be true to say "Whatever good can be brought about by the voluntary actions of such persons as exist in this universe is that which ought to be."

[Plato held that we can only understand reality by rising to the conception of the idea of the good: the world of reality is rational and good. Leibniz believed in the principle of sufficient reason, the *lex optimi* which he sometimes calls God. In Lotze's philosophy the world principle is absolute personality, since in personality alone can we find inner independence and originality. If we follow these great thinkers we are led to the conclusion that reality possesses value and is good, not to the belief which seems to me false that value or the good is something which does not now exist in its perfection but which ought to be made real and actual by the performance of right actions. Value may be thought of as the eternally existing relation between the spirit of God and the sum total of reality. It is eternal truth even though we cannot with our finite minds apprehend it as present fact. Plato rightly regarded the idea of the good as an *ens realissimum*.]

[Butler maintained that we possess a principle of reflection which approves and disapproves acts independently of their consequences: that this principle has a natural supremacy of authority in itself and that actions in obedience thereto are in the highest sense natural. The consciousness of moral obligation is a sufficient motive for action. If we are not satisfied to do our duty for duty's sake and have no faith in the authority of conscience we must needs have recourse to religion which Kant called "a knowledge of all our duties as divine commands."]

[The task of the moral philosopher is to delineate the ideal form of life, the life of persons living together in an ideal community. The particular duties of individuals will depend upon the stations which they occupy in society. Their actions are done as elements which constitute the stuff which is the content of the form of the ideal life. Such actions in their context are good and have value. But they have value because

they are right, because they are done for duty's sake and therefore are the living matter without which the concept of duty is an empty form. We should not think of right actions as means conducive to a good end which is something different from the means. The end is the good life of which all right actions are parts.

[Walter Lippmann contends that in the past moral commandments were based on divine authority. Now, however, as men have lost their belief in a heavenly king they must look for some other ground for their moral choices than the revelation of His will. Since virtue cannot be any longer commanded, it must be willed out of personal conviction and desire.] "When men can no longer be theists, they must, if they are civilized, become humanists. They must live by the premise that whatever is righteous is inherently desirable because experience will demonstrate its desirability. They must live, therefore, in the belief that the duty of man is not to make his will conform to the will of God but to the surest knowledge of the conditions of human happiness." (*A Preface to Morals*, page 137.)

[Whether or not we continue to believe in a heavenly king it will be disastrous to base our conception of what is right solely on our conception of what is possible and desirable for mature human beings. "Morality," writes Professor Sorley, "has often been presented as a system of rules for conduct, or duties: the conception of moral law has been taken as fundamental. Nor need objection be taken to this course, provided we bear in mind that the moral law is not imposed by an external authority, and does not depend for its validity on sanctions or penalties.....Duty is the law of the moral life but the moral life itself is realised in character."] (*The Moral Life*, page 9.)

[Man is conscious of an obligation to obey the law of the]

moral life To ask why one should obey that law is to be a rebel and to repudiate duty altogether There is no more ultimate principle from which the idea of duty can be derived Duty is to ethics what the laws of thought are to logic, it is the *sine qua non* condition of morality.

The Idea of Duty

By

DHIRENDRALAL DE, M. A. (Cal). Ph.D. (Lond).

The notion of duty and its correlate, the idea of freedom, lie at the very root of moral consciousness. Divested of the consciousness of duty, morality has no meaning. We are continually passing upon our actions or upon the actions of others such judgments as "This ought to be done," "This ought not to be done." In pronouncing such judgments we assume two things: (1) That there is right and wrong conduct; and (2) that action, right or wrong, is attributed to an agent.

Among the Greek thinkers the idea of the good was more prominent than that of duty. This was mostly due to the character of their national life and pursuit which helped to develop a common desirable end. It was the Stoics who first brought the notion of duty into prominence. Zeno first employed the word duty and composed a treatise on the subject. The notion of duty gradually developed under the Jewish and Christian influence, involving an explicit reference to Divine commands. The outward and mechanical conception of duty entertained by the Jews was gradually replaced by the inward and spiritual conception advocated by some of the Christian thinkers. In modern times it was Kant who laid particular emphasis upon duty as the cardinal fact of our moral life. From the time of Kant the whole of morality centres, more or less, round the fundamental notion of duty.

(The notion of ought or duty involved in all moral judgments is, as Sidgwick rightly observes, essentially different from all notions representing the facts of physical and psychological experience. It is, as he says, ultimate and unanalysable. Our experience cannot prove an act to be right. Experience of the past may tell us what has been and what will be but can never

tell us what ought to be. No amount of knowledge as to what is can possibly give us an ought. Our moral judgments are undoubtedly *a priori* or independent of experience. Rightly understood, we may regard the consciousness of duty as the compass of life. It is impossible for us to deny the deliverances of our own Reason. To do so is to deprive ourselves of any ground for believing in anything whatsoever. To question the validity of the assurances of reason is to ask why we should believe what we see to be true.

From what has been stated above we can come to the following positions —

(1) The notion of duty is ultimate and unanalysable.

(2) It is *apriori* or independent of experience.

(3) Rational beings have the sense of ought or obligation.

(4) The notion of ought is capable of becoming a motive to the Will, i. e., the recognition that something is our duty supplies us with what we recognise upon reflection as a sufficient motive for doing it—a motive on which it is psychologically possible to act.

After having shown the existence as well as the validity of the notion of duty, let us now proceed to consider the problem of duty in all its aspects.

The idea of duty involves or implies an opposition between the ideal or intelligible world, i. e. the form of existence which the individual is to realise, and the actual world or form of existence which the individual has realised ; We should say that this intelligible world is not an achievement but a prophecy, not something that a man is but something that he ought to be. If the individual were complete man, he would no longer find any discrepancy between what he ought to be and what he is. We have an idea of ourselves as realising what we ought to realise, but it presents itself to us as an ideal, because we have not realised it. It is only in contrast

to this ideal that we can become conscious of the imperfections of our actual self. If we were altogether heretofore of the idea of this ideal, we would never be aware that in all things we offend and come short of the ideal.

To put the above matter differently, we may say that the idea of duty implies an antagonism between the law of reason and the law of natural inclination—I mean the conflict between the life of spirit and the life of nature. There is in man an opposition between the desire for the realisation of his ideal self and the desire for the gratification of his lower or sentient self.

The apprehension of the true relation of the ideal and the actual self is an essential pre-requisite to the determination of any ethical theory.

The first view which naturally suggests itself to us is that nature and spirit are two poles asunder. I have in me, it may be said, certain natural impulses which incite me to live a life that is entirely antagonistic to the life of reason. Before we can accept such a diametrical opposition between reason and desire, we must be sure that the opposition exists.

Now the question is: what has led to the view that man may act purely from impulse as distinguished from reason? This view seems to be favoured by the actual facts of human life. Each of us seems to be an object among other objects, possessing by nature certain properties which are revealed in consciousness, but which are not determined as to their nature by our consciousness. Thus the immediate appetites of hunger and thirst seem to belong to our animal nature; and they take the form of the feeling of a want, and this feeling leads to the impulse to satisfy the want. It is not reason but an impulse of nature that supplies the motive to action. It may further be contended that it is not different in the case of altruistic desires. Thus man has an impulse to do actions that bring

pleasure to others. That impulse grows in man because he is by nature endowed with a susceptibility which makes him avoid pain, and causes him to act so as to prevent others from feeling it. The naturalists would further strengthen the hypothesis by adducing that altruistic desires are as natural as the appetites of hunger and thirst, because they have come to men by inheritance from animal progenitors.

However plausible this view of natural desire is, it does not stand close examination. The account of consciousness given by the above theory leaves out all that is characteristic of it. The theory proceeds upon two assumptions, both of which are unacceptable. In the first place, it assumes that the subject is conscious of himself only in the individual states which in succession occur to him. In the second place, the subject is aware of himself as particular without being aware of himself as universal. If self-consciousness is merely the awareness of the subject in a particular state of desire, the subject should never be able to think of himself as capable of many desires. Tied down to each desire as it arose, the subject should be continually varying in his desires as from time to time they arose in him, but he should not be aware of this variable character of himself. To be aware of hunger as a desire to which he is subject, he must therefore be able to compare it with the other desires of which he is susceptible. But this amounts to an admission of the fact that the subject is conscious of himself as a being in whom the conflict of desires may take place. The consciousness of desire thus implies that the subject appears to himself as an object capable of experiencing various desires. (Now the subject cannot be conscious of himself as capable of having a variety of desires without conceiving of himself as not identical with any of them, or the whole of them taken together. So arises the consciousness of self as a subject that is opposed to the self as an object with its varying desires. Hence arises the opposition between the subject as a being

striving after complete satisfaction and the subject as a being experiencing from time to time the satisfaction of particular desires

Self-consciousness thus involves a primary opposition between an ideal and actual self. But this opposition is not absolute. When I have become conscious that I have many desires all of which seek for satisfaction, my action is not determined by any desire as such. I am not the passive subject of this or that desire, but it is I who compares various desires with one another and select among them that which seems to have the strongest claim to satisfaction.

Self-consciousness implies more than this. My consciousness of myself is the consciousness of a self that strives after abiding or complete satisfaction. But no particular satisfaction can yield that complete satisfaction. Hence arises a division in consciousness between the particular self—the self that seeks for satisfaction in willing a particular object—and the ideal self—the self that seeks to realise itself completely. Thus our self conscious life seems to be in irreconcilable conflict with itself.

This conflict seems to persist. Is it at all possible to reconcile the conflict? Let us first consider the attitude of those moralists who advocate the method of asceticism. This method was held in ancient times by the Cynics and the Stoics, and in modern times by Kant. True morality, according to the ascetics, consists in acting purely from the law of Reason. Reason is the true nature of man, and passion as foreign to the true self must be destroyed. Accordingly, the morality taught by the advocates of asceticism is negative in its character.

The chief merit of this conception of morality consists in the fact, that man in his ideal nature is something higher than the particular forms in which he seeks to realise himself. He

who makes the object of particular desires the end of his life will learn by the stern logic of experience that he has been seeking to allay his hunger for the infinite by feeding himself on the husks of the finite

The perfectionists now step in and point out the difficulties of the above position. If we must they say, exclude all influence of desires the motive for all actions seems to be taken away, but if we exclude all forms of action nothing remains but the general capacity of acting, and so long as there is nothing but capacity there is no realisation of the self. Thus the ideal self and the actual self fall asunder and the idea of the ideal or perfect self remains a mere idea.

Now if we properly understand desire as such it is quite possible the perfectionists hold, to get beyond the abstract *idea of duty to the consciousness of particular duties*. The real motive operative in the desire is the desire for permanent self satisfaction. The individual who seeks satisfaction in the attainment of wealth may have no clear consciousness that the motive of his action is not the attainment of wealth but the attainment of self satisfaction by means of wealth. The question may be asked why is not self satisfaction found in this way? This is not found because the individual has wrongly identified his ultimate good with what is not ultimate good. When he experiences the disharmony between the actual self and the ideal self, he awakens to the consciousness of what he ought to be as distinguished from what he is.

In the first consciousness of a higher life the individual is apt to condemn his past life as unspiritual and may even carry out to its logical issue the principle of renunciation. This path of renunciation the perfectionists contend is not the path that leads to the highest spiritual life.

{ All desires as the perfectionists point out are desires for complete self realisation. So long as we seek for self satisfaction in a particular object we are laying up for ours lives

natural desires, but the difference between willing the object for itself and willing it for a higher end is spiritually an infinite difference. We can attain higher spiritual life only by transforming desires.

From an examination of the two positions stated above, we are inclined to believe that the difference between them does not lie so much in the particular method adopted by each, as in the implied recognition of divergent ideals. If the ascetics believe that the perfection consists in cessation from all activities, because the activities are the expressions of wants, then their method of renunciation may be appropriate to the realisation of the end. Here an opponent may urge that true perfection comes through satiety,—not through abstinence. But, the ascetics may rejoin by pointing out that the principle of renunciation is based upon direct personal experience of the imperfections of all mundane things. No object or summation of objects can yield abiding satisfaction after which we have been striving. Therefore the perfect state, if there be any, must transcend all determinations, and that is possible of attainment only by renunciation of all desires.

Perfectionists on the other hand, spiritualise all actions, or, in other words, they believe in a life of ceaseless activities. Their ideal therefore recedes as they advance towards it; because there can be no limit to desires and correspondingly no limit to actions. Hence, their ideal, instead of being capable of realisation, becomes an endless process, no matter whether they look at it from the point of view of individual perfection or the perfection of humanity. If the perfectionists try to maintain that they strive after a life of complete harmony between reason and sensibility or the subsidence of conflict between higher and lower self, our reply is that such a subsidence of conflict is either illusory or at the most a mere ideal or idea, but never an achievement. Even in the case of a highly virtuous man, the moral problem is presented in the

inevitable disappointment. From this it does not follow that we are to seek for self-satisfaction by abstracting ourselves from all desires. To accept this is to assume that reason and desire are hostile to each other.

Desires, according to the perfectionists, are not the opposite of reason but simply reason in the form of unreason. Desire in its immediate form appears as appetite. Be it noted, however, that appetites are not simply animal impulses. If they were merely animal impulses, they would never enter into conscious life. Desires may take the direct form of a desire for food or drink, or they may take the complicated form of a desire for the satisfaction of immediate appetite, together with a repetition of the pleasure that one has experienced in the satisfaction.

Ascetic moralists not only condemn the artificial stimulation of the appetites but also prescribe the wholesale negation of all natural desires.

The negative method of asceticism, as the perfectionists point out, leads to a practical contradiction. Desires constitute the material basis of human life. They are, so to speak, the weights which keep the clock-work of life in motion. The only way, therefore, in which a living being can completely get rid of the particular desires is by ceasing to live.

The perfectionists point out that there is no necessary conflict between appetite and reason. The conflict, according to them, really obtains between a higher and a lower conception of the self. We condemn the action of an individual as irrational only when he is prepared to sacrifice his higher interests to the gratification of his appetites, because he substitutes a particular end for a universal. Duty does not consist in the extirpation of natural impulses, but in subordinating it to the realisation of the complete nature of the self. To realise ourselves at all, we must will the object indicated by our

form of conflict, though its intensity is weakened by the strengthening of virtuous dispositions. If our mental constitution is such that cognitive, affective and conative factors always go together, then whenever an alternative course is suggested to the mind it becomes charged with feeling, and becomes an incipient impulse, however faint, to action. The conflict is present throughout, more or less prominently. The lower impulse may be weaker and the higher impulse stronger; but still there is a weight to lift, however slight, in order to conform one's conduct to the calls of duty.

beginning of most *Upanishads*). The Vedānta Philosophy grows out of such 'discussions', often between the performer of the Yajna and the priests, as to why one should light the fire in a particular manner, or who was the God to be pleased by a particular oblation.

The philosopher in India is one who is not prepared to accept Religion as it has been handed down to him ; or take life as he finds it regulated for him. If he did it, he would not be a philosopher, but one of the common herd. It is because he is thoroughly discontented with life as it is ordinarily lived, that he applies himself to probe into the mysteries of life, and lay bare the teachings of Religion.

II. Philosophy to seek the *Summum Bonum* :—

It is more or less a postulate with all schools of Indian thinkers that worldly life is full of misery and evil, that its goods are not real goods ; and that one can't find one's permanent happiness by simply drifting in it. Therefore, a general form that almost all types of Indian speculation assume is to find an unmistakable and effective remedy to the ills that are incidental to all life on earth (*samsāra*), and to make man supremely or everlastingly happy. This is the *Summum Bonum*, the chief of *purusharthas* ; often conceived as '*multi*' or '*moksha*' i. e. a final separation, liberation, or release, from all the shackles, limitations, and evils, involved in all forms of worldly endeavour, successes, failures, ambitions, desires and satisfactions. None of these is final or permanent ; and the world-process, and the consequent evil and unhappiness go on for ever, if we do not try and find a means to check them. This can be done only by *solving the riddles of life*—in short, only by Philosophy ; which must find an answer to questions like—What is Real ? What is Unreal ? Who are we ? Why are we here ?—and so on.

Every school of Philosophy in India sets out to find an answer to these questions, claims that it has answered them

successfully, and that its answers constitute the sole *panacea* for the evils of life and an *unerring* path to final beatitude. The *Great Buddha* renounced the World and left a happy home behind him, in order to find an answer to these questions. The *atheistic Sāṅkhya* and the *materialistic Vaiśeṣika*, nay, even the *sciences of Grammar (Vyākaraṇa—'śabda Brahman'),* and *Music (śāstra Brahman)* claim that their respective philosophies offer the *correctest* solution to the riddle of the World and the *safest* remedy for the ills of Life (*Ātyantika duḥkha nivṛttiḥ—Sāṅkhya*)

III *The problem for the Vedānta Philosophy —*

The *Vedānta* is no exception to this—It not only says that *atman* or *Brahman* is the *sole ultimate Reality*, but that a knowledge of this truth (*Brahma vidyā*) is the *only means* of final release from all evil (*muṛti*). The whole of the *Bhagavad Gītā* is devoted to an exposition of the Vedāntic doctrines, as having a bearing on practical life (hence the context, the beginning of a great war, and battle scene, the teacher, the most active agent in the drama of the *Mahā Bharata*, and the pupil, the greatest of the heroes and fighters of the age). The conclusions reached (and urged repeatedly on the hearer) there are, *1st*, that a knowledge of *Reality*, of *one self*, as well as of the *World*, is *essential* to every rational being, *2nd*, that this knowledge need not necessarily lead to a cessation of all action and effort (one's *karma—duty*, etc.) and *3rd* that what is most important in the life of the enlightened man (*gnani—*the 'philosopher, one who has really benefited by the teachings of the Vedānta) is, not so much to lead a *life of renunciation and inaction* (*vairāgya sanyāsa, nivṛtti marga* etc.,—so incessantly preached by *Saṅkara*)—but a *life of unattached effort and activity—niḥkāma karma* and the *disinterested and unfailing performance of all one's duties*, and the *discharge of all one's obligations*. To run away from one's duty, or to forget

one's obligations, would be as much opposed to genuine wisdom, and as mischievous, in the case of an enlightened man, in spite of all his philosophy and erudition, as in the case of any poor or ignorant person. *The example of Janaka* is quoted—the king who continued to attend to his high office, in spite of the great truth and wisdom he learnt from the sage Yājñavalkya—(*Karmanāiva hi sarvasidhamāsthita janakādayaḥ*.)

In Ch., II (54), Arjuna asks Krishna to tell him the consequences to one of accepting his philosophy of the Self; and the latter goes on to describe the enlightened individual as *Sthitha-prājña*—"one with a steady mind"; and to enumerate the characteristics that distinguish him (55ff)—and the whole passage ought to be carefully studied by one who wants to know the bearing of the Vedānta on practical life. It is an *equability of temper, perfect control over senses and the passions; an inward peace, contentment, and joy; complete unattachment to bodily wants and desires, and freedom from egoism and the self-regarding sentiments*, that mark the life of one who has realised the true Self.

The Vedānta teaches one not to locate all one's experiences in Space-time, but refer them to the Subject within. This leads to a *realisation of the Self, which is the same in all*. This is the meaning of saying that *one's salvation is attained through Jñāna, or that knowledge leads to liberation*. There is a good deal of discussion in Vedāntic treatises on the question *whether one's salvation depends on action or knowledge* (cf., similar controversy as to Grace vs., desert, in Christian theology and Saivite philosophy). This is due to the great importance attached to Vedic ritual by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, and to the sway of external religious observances and the doctrine of *Karma* (desert) in Indian life. The conclusion reached in the Vedānta is that *Salvation is by knowledge alone*.

The correct performance of religious duties, meritorious

actions in one's life, like charity and virtue, the worship and devotion to a personal God, prayers, meditation, and the like, may elevate the individual in the worldly plane, help to purify his mind, and so prepare him for that enlightenment and knowledge of the Self, which alone, and not the former, is the straight and narrow path to *Moksha*. But this saving knowledge should be distinguished from all ordinary knowledge, both speculative and practical. *Liberation is not a state or condition to be reached by any process, mental or physical. Since absolute Idealism is a denial of all causation, there can be no becoming or change for the Self. The Self is always free, and was never under bondage.* What appears as bondage, misery, and evil, (*Samsāra*) is entirely due to the erroneous tendency to regard mere thought-forms as objective and real (*adhyāsa*). One has only to unlearn this habit of one's mind (due to *avidyā*), in order to gain true knowledge of one's Self. The latter does away with the obstacle (unreal) that stands in the way of one's Freedom. *Jñāna is a hindrance of hindrances* (illusions)—knowledge, in revealing one's true Self, reveals, at the same time, that one is absolutely and eternally free. Sankara, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Mand., Up.*, says, "as a sick man recovers his health on the removal of the cause of his illness, so the Self, when freed from the (supposed) cause of his misery—the illusion of duality, realises its unity. The illusion, being due to ignorance, is dispelled by proper knowledge."

Besides cultivating *mental equanimity*, the enlightened individual should try to be *an example to the less enlightened* by his conduct and expressions (*yad yad ācharati sresth* etc). He must set the standard of virtue and upright behaviour; and never think his wisdom would absolve him from crookedness and vice (*nāvīrato dūṣharitāt*). Nor can the Self be attained by one who is weak in mind or morals. *Bravery and heroism,*

as well as *right conduct*, are desiderata in one qualified for a knowledge of the Self (*na esa atmā valahinena lavyah*)

Above all, the acceptance of *advaita* philosophy leads to *abheda*—the unity of everything in Brahman. One who has realised this forgets all distinction, and perceives everything as Brahman. The same Self is in all. This truth can be recognised and acted upon even in the midst of active (worldly) experience. Therefore, the enlightened man feels himself one with the whole Universe, (hence humanitarianism, the rising superior to all distinctions of race, nation, colour, casts, etc., *Karuna*, pity and sympathy for all kinds of suffering and trouble, *ahimsa* love for all sentient creation, and so on) (*suni chana svapāke cha etc*)

VI. The Positivism of Indian Philosophy —

It is a commonly accepted belief that life in the West is eager and intense, seeking and achieving, struggling towards the best, and trying to win joy and success to one self, and to make the most of the opportunities afforded to one on this earth. Whereas in the East, it is quietism or asceticism, denying or restraining oneself, giving up what is best, with one's vision directed to what is far and beyond one's reach. These contrasted attitudes to life are attributed to the respective influences of Science and Philosophy. Modern Science by unravelling the mysteries and mechanism of Nature, lays bare an orderly sequence of things and forces, by mastering which one gets Power and a mastery over one's destiny, and a sure means of winning success and happiness in life and in surmounting its evils and pitfalls. Indian Philosophy, on the other hand, being based largely on a negative view of Life, discourages human endeavour, directs man's mind inward, discourages active seeking, and makes the sources of one's effort and motive power dry and feeble.

Modern Science is based on Observation and Experiment on things that are real and of every day importance, is defi-

nately positive in its outlook ; and is therefore fit to guide Life in its manifold activities. But Indian Philosophy is almost nihilistic in spirit, and tends to cool men's passions and springs of action.

But this is an erroneous picture. Indian Philosophy is emphatically positive in spirit, and encourages action as much as experimental Science—only the nature of the action in the two cases is different, since the values they respectively embody are entirely different. It is spiritualistic in one case and materialistic in the other. The ancient seers of India had a true and insight into the nature of Spirit as modern scientists claim to have into the nature of matter. According to the latter, *matter, with its inner essence of Force or energy*, is the sole reality behind all the phenomena of the material world, and all moral and spiritual experiences, soul, consciousness, etc., are mere *epi-phenomena*, meaningless and redundant excrescences, that appear in connection with certain physical and chemical processes, like cortical excitements ; which can't be brought into the scheme of real entities like electrons and vibrations ; and which are only effects and never causes. They do not in any way influence or interfere with the orderly sequence of physical events, or affect the smooth running of the chain of physical causation, of matter, motion, action, reaction, etc. Therefore, they can be wholly ignored in our account of reality, and left out of all scientific explanation. It is on this basis that Behaviourism, New Psychology etc., explain even human conduct, motives, passions, love, joy, beauty, and all other human values. The existence or non-existence of consciousness, feelings, ideas, etc., behind our actions, makes no difference to the latter. Life on earth would have gone on—Christ would have died on the Cross, and Shakespeare would have written his "Hamlet" and life would go on in the same way—and we will win our Swaraj—if we had been unconscious, instead of being conscious automata.

Compare with this the epiritnal positivism of Indian Philosophy—even the Great Bnddba, whose philosophy is said to be entirely negative, pitched his faith on a *Moral Positivism* on the eternal and immutahle nature of the *Law of Dharma*; that all life here and hereafter depends on it; and ought to be regulated by it, and this is a cardinally accepted principle of all schools of Indian thinkers.

In addition, the *Vedanta* maintains that the only thing about which we can be positive and certain is *the Self, with its inner essence of Thought*; and all the so-called facts and things of the external world, including the causal formulae of science, the Laws of motion and of Evolution; the perceptions, feelings, and other changes taking place in the mind are all phenomena and appearances only—a huge and variegated show put forth by the inner spirit for its own delectation and edification; and no more real in themselves than dreams and mirages that appear on the mental and material planes. All causation, with its relativities of space, time, motion, etc., are equally phenomenal—mere phantasmagoria that issue out of, and depend entirely on, the one true Reality—*the Atman*.

It follows from this that according to Vedanta Philosophy, one is not to run away from Life and its obligations, but one must live it so as to insure one's best epiritual welfare. The needs of the flesh are there, hut of secondary importance. "Man does not live by bread alone"—the needs of the inner spirit are of paramonnt and vital importance.

Proofs of the Soul in Tamil Saiva Siddhanta,

By

VIOLET PARANJOTI, M. A.

The Siva-jñāna-bodham of Meikāṇḍa Devar is the chief among the philosophical works of the Tamil Siddhānta school of philosophy. A study of this work reveals to us the fact that the Siddhāntin is convinced of the existence of God, of the soul and of whatever else goes to make up a spiritualistic view of the universe. The Siddhāntin is led to this position of a happy conviction in the eternal realities which sanctify human life as much by revelation as by reason. There is no dogmatic assertion of the realities which we in all meekness are expected to recognise as true. By the full exercise of our reason, we are led step by step to the facts of the system. And there is an implicit challenge to us to examine the system by the exercise of reason before accepting it. Since the thirteenth century when these arguments were formulated in Tamil, there has been much development in philosophic thought. And we at this date, may now examine these arguments for the existence of the soul in the light of metaphysics to see what has to be rejected as unable to stand the light of criticism and what can be accepted as valid.

The third sūtra of the "Siva-jñāna-bodham" gives seven arguments for the existence of the soul. The first of these arguments states that there is in us something which says, "I am not the body; I am not any of the sense-organs," there is something remaining after every part of the body is eliminated as not being itself, and that which thus intelligently differentiates itself from the body and its organs is the soul. This argument establishes that "an intelligent soul exists as its intelligence is exercised when it says—'This is not the soul: this is not the soul'."

This first argument refutes the *Sūnyavādin* who says the soul is non-existent. If the *Sūnyavādin* persists in saying that even the intelligence which refuses to be identified with any part of the body is non-existent, then his statement is equivalent to his asserting that his mother is childless.

We cannot here fail to be reminded of the similar way in which Descartes proceeds to establish the existence of the soul. He too, adopting the method of elimination, realises that even after ruling out his body and sense-organs, there must be something which constitutes his self. The very fact of doubt implies the existence of a doubter.

The second argument refutes one section of the *Lokāyatas* who say that the soul is no other than the body. The body cannot be the soul. As the phrase, 'my body,' is used in a separate possessive sense, there is a soul different from the body. As a man clearly realises that his city and his wife are not himself but different from him, so with careful consideration one can see that the soul is other than the body. The soul is that which with a possessive sense speaks of the body as its body.

The body certainly cannot be regarded as the soul, for as was made clear in the last argument, there is in us some residue even after eliminations of every part of the body, and it is this factor which stands over against the body, and with a possessive sense speaks of the body as belonging to it. The soul is this residual factor which exercises the ownership. The body then cannot be the soul. "I am not this collection of members which is called the human body," says Descartes, and Bradley gives expression to the same fact, saying "Few of us would venture to maintain that the self is the body."

Another sect of the *Lokāyatas* says that since it is admitted by all that the five sense-organs perceive the five different sensations, these organs constitute the soul. This is refuted by the third argument which says that each sense-organ has

its own particular function only, so that the eye, for example, cannot perceive sound sensations, just as the ear, cannot sense the appearance of any object. But there is some one who experiences all the five different sensations, a feat impossible for any or all of the sense-organs. This is the soul which, for gaining knowledge of the world, has the sense-organs as the avenues of sense knowledge. The sense organs merely function, but are not capable of thinking 'We function thus.' They have the objective consciousness, but not the subjective consciousness. That which has the subjective consciousness is the soul. The sense-organs cannot be the soul because they are deficient in two respects. Not one of them can rise to performing any function but its own, nor is any of them capable of self-consciousness. There is in us, however, a factor which has neither of the deficiencies, but on the other hand is able to perceive all the five different sensations and is also characterised by self-consciousness. This is the soul.

The above arguments have proved that the soul is not the body and not the sense-organs. The fourth argument attempts to prove that the soul is not the subtle body or body of the dream condition. The argument states that in sleep, when the senses lose their action, the soul enters another body, the subtle body, and has dreams and when waking comes back to the gross body. The soul is therefore different from the subtle body. The subtle body and the soul cannot both remember the dream-experiences in the same way. The dream-body is of one nature only—dreamy—and what it sees in dreams is quite vivid to it. If it be this body that remembers the dreams, it should remember them not as dim recollections, but as actual vivid experiences just as in the dream condition. In our actual experience we find that on waking there is a factor which remembers these dream-experiences and says, 'I dreamt thus and thus.' This factor not only remembers the dream experiences, but is of two-fold nature, capable of perceiving things

in the waking state and in the dream state. When it says 'I dreamt so,' it differentiates these experiences from waking experiences, for the former compared with the latter are now very faint. Thus, to sum up what has been explained, the subtle body should be able to have vivid recollections of dream experiences, but in our actual experience we find that there is a factor able to contrast the dream experiences with waking experiences, and the former compared with the latter are dim. The subtle body theorist maintains that the subtle body is the soul. Against this the Śaiva Siddhāntin maintains that the recollection of dream experiences belongs not to the subtle body, but to another factor which is the soul. The subtle body therefore cannot be the soul.

This argument is open to criticism in some respects. The assumptions of the argument are first that there is a subtle body functioning only in sleep, and secondly that if in the waking state it remembered the dream experiences, it would have a very vivid recollection of them. The first assumption that the subtle body is different from the gross body cannot be accepted for the two bodies are not radically distinct; there is only one body which in the waking state has all its organs functioning and in sleep has fewer *tattvas* at work: there is then one body which is co-present with the soul. If so, how can it be so easily proved that it is the one rather than the other which recollects these dream experiences? With regard to the second assumption that if in the waking state the recollection of dream experiences belong to the subtle body it would have vivid memories, we have to reply that this does not follow; for what can otherwise be vivid may be distorted by the grosser *tattvas* co-existing with that body in the waking condition.

A plausible argument on some such lines as these put forward by others is that in dreams, there comes into being a dream body which is entirely different from the gross body.

In the waking state, there is in us something which owns the dreams as well and this is the soul

In the Sanskrit commentary the third and fourth arguments are treated as one for the purpose of proving the existence of the soul as distinct from the sense organs on the ground of the existence of consciousness in dreams when the sense organs are at rest. The Tamil author in splitting up the argument into two has introduced some confusion here.

Another sect of the Lok-*yātas*, the vital air theorist says that unlike the dream body which is present only in the dream condition, the vital air which is present always is the soul. This is refuted by the fifth argument which points out that this body is given to us in order that we may have cognition of the world and the experiences of pleasure and pain. If the vital air be the soul, then, as it functions as well in sleep as it does in the waking state, it should have cognition of the world as well as the experiences of pleasure and pain in sleep as in the waking condition. But these we see are in abeyance in sleep when the soul is resting, and resume their activities when the soul awakes. So these functions exist not for the benefit of the vital air but for something other than this and that is the soul. And it is the soul which seems to have the capacity to exercise these functions or to stop them. The vital air is not the soul. The soul is something other than this.

The sixth argument maintains that the changing psychical states cannot be the soul. There must be some underlying identity which is present through all the flow of psychic phenomena and which recognises its identity in spite of occasional lapses of consciousness as in sleep.

With regard to this argument the Tamil commentator has not strictly kept to the original. He has interpreted the argument to indicate that the soul is different from God. As he points out, our minds are subject to

various limitations. We can only learn in part, and bit by bit, and our consciousness is always in such an incessant flow that we have hardly grasped one thing, when thought moves on to another, and this present thought already seems to be giving way to another thought that will come anon only to speed away as soon. And we are subject to forgetfulness and we can never have comprehensive knowledge. One other distinction is that, "the human intelligence requires to be taught, improved and developed: it is imperfect and needs the support of a perfect intelligence." Our minds characterised by these and other limitations cannot compare with God's mind that is omniscient. The soul therefore cannot be identified with God.

As thus interpreted by the Tamil commentator, this is no argument for the proof of the existence of the soul. It is more a description of the nature of the soul.

The argument as in the original contending for the existence of the soul on the ground of personal identity is very common. Personal identity is of course an essential feature of the soul which is mostly conceived as a permanent entity that cannot be identified with the flowing psychical states, each one of which is different from the rest. But whether such identity is intelligible will be examined later.

The last argument contends that the aggregate of the *tattvas* cannot be the soul, for the *tattvas* are constituted of the perishable *māyā*. The soul is something other than the *tattvas*. This argument and the previous one are directed against the Buddhists who sought to dissolve the soul into an aggregate of *skandhas* or a series of cognitions.

From a general survey of these arguments it is evident that they are based mainly on elimination and

the sense of personal identity. The soul is not the body or the sense-organs or the dream-body or the aggregate of the *tattvas*. The soul is that which intelligently differentiates itself from all these factors, and speaks of the body as its body, and appropriates dreams as its experiences. It is that which through all the changing psychical states, and through occasional lapses of consciousness maintains its identity. The net result of these arguments is then that the soul exists, and is different from such gross factors as the body and the sense-organs and that it has a continuous existence.

Can the conclusions regarding the soul withstand critical examination? Descartes, after rigorously yielding up all that was doubtful, found that there was one indubitable fact, and that it was his self, and the existence of his self was manifest from the fact that he doubted his existence. If he doubted, there must be a doubter. The similar Siddhānta contention that, after eliminating every part of the body, there is still a factor left and that this is the soul would appear to be so far valid.

All the knowledge that we have gained about the soul till now is mainly negative. We have seen that it is not the body or the sense-organs etc. The question which now arises is "What then is the soul?" In what way can we conceive of it? And in what sense can it be said to exist? If it is not anything so gross as the body, then, perhaps it may be something psychical. Can the self be the psychical contents that are to be found at any moment in our experience? Introspection reveals that at any moment of one's existence, there is a mass of psychical contents, such as, for example, one's thoughts at the time, one's feelings, one's awareness of the environment, and in short all the felt experiences. Can these be

said to constitute the self? It is not once obvious that these fluctuating psychical states cannot constitute the self as they are in an incessant flow, and the self must be a permanent factor.

Perhaps, then, the self is constituted of what can be reckoned as one's average psychical experiences. We have noticed that one's psychical contents from moment to moment are too changing to constitute the self. Perhaps when we take these psychical contents and find out what is common to them, this average would constitute the self.

It will be objected that it is very absurd to identify the self with either the momentary or the average experiences of the self. The self we are told is an individual experiencer of these experiences. Therefore, over and above all this concrete filling is the self. But can we succeed in finding such a self that is a permanent factor and that is other than these experiences? Reflection unfolds to us the fact that what go to make up a man's self are his psychical experiences and his environment. Macbeth was a brave warrior and quite self-composed at all times, but the moment his hands were stained with blood, he had visions of a dagger and of the ghosts of his victims, and Lady Macbeth had to find excuses for his strange behaviour in the presence of the guests. We are in eager search of an essential self, but it seems well nigh impossible to meet with success. We find that the psychical experiences are too inconstant to be the self, and yet it is these happy or unhappy experiences that appear to constitute the self, so that if we remove these, we remove the self as well or even if any residue is left, it merely amounts to a non-entity not worth recognising. We here find ourselves up against a fatal dilemma which Bradley expresses thus—"If you can take an essence which can change, it is not an essence at all; while if you stand on anything more narrow, the self has disappeared." To quote Bradley again, 'Evidently any self

which we can find is some concrete form of unity of psychical existence and whoever wishes to introduce it as something apart or beyond clearly does not rest his case upon observation."

Closer investigation leads to an even more desperate situation where we can draw no hard and fast line of distinction between the self and not-self. At any moment of our existence, there seem to be present the self and the not-self. But from this, no hasty conclusion can be drawn that the self and the not-self are absolutely different one from the other. The self passes into the not-self and *vice-versa*, a circumstance by no means encouraging to those eager in pursuit of an essential self closed by a wall from all the changing psychical phenomena which with certainty are placed in the category of not-self. The sound that was so disturbing to a person gets to be less of a nuisance as the person concerned gets used to it, and though continuing with the same tonal intensity, it finally passes out of the focus of his attention, *gliding unobserved* from the not-self to the self. The self in the same way can pass over to the not-self. Thus the feeling of pain which forms part of our inmost self is felt as a disturbing factor that should be eradicated. Of course it may be that not all of the self can thus pass into the not-self, and not all of the not-self can pass into the self. Granting this, it still remains that when we abstract from the self all that does not seem essential to it, we seem to be left with what is best described in Bradley's terms as a "a wretched fraction" and "poor atom" and a "bare remnant" that is not worth having.

We meet with a similar difficulty when we approach the problem of personal identity and this needs careful consideration. We do not think of a man as made up of a number of momentary selves but as one individual that remains

the same through all the varying experiences of his lifetime. 'A' who is born now will be the same individual ten years hence or even in his old age. What we mean is that through the varying stages of life, we have one individual, when recollecting experiences of years ago, a man says, "I did this" On close examination, do we find that such personal identity is real? If so in what does it consist? We may speedily dismiss the idea that personal identity consists in having the same body, for apart from the objection that the body changes as time goes on, it is a very crude conception. Neither can memory serve as a satisfactory basis of personal identity. The events relating to long periods of our life are forgotten, so that memory being full of limitations at its best fails to serve the purpose. Continuity of psychical experiences cannot serve the purpose for the reason that in sleep this continuity is snapped. Moreover, besides continuity, there is need of qualitative sameness, and this too is not to be had in the stream of psychical experiences, each of which is different from the other. We may make another attempt and say that the various interests of a person go to build up his personal identity. It is very obvious that this suggestion must be rejected as our interests are never the same all through life. The suggestion that perhaps the self is encased in a monad rouses our hope, but there is only disappointment here as in the above instances. Granting that the self is a monad, then, this factor either changes or does not change. If it changes, then where is the permanence that is essential for personal identity. If the monad stands aloof from the flow of psychical states, and thus maintains its permanence, why then we may as well have the self dwelling in the stars or the hills for all its indifference to what is happening in the human organism.

We have met with failure both in our attempt to conceive of the sense in which the soul exists and in our effort to understand personal identity. And yet we know that the soul and

personal identity in some sense exist, and hence we must somehow have failed to arrive at the true conception. As Bradley says:—"That selves exist, and are identical in some sense is indubitable." But with all our diligence, we have failed to understand the self and its identity. Our attempts to conceive of them have turned out to be full of contradictions.

Our failure to conceive of the self and its identity makes us wonder whether we should not retrace our steps. Instead of regarding the self as an independent and self-subsisting factor, as we have done so far, we should rather consider it as a part of a bigger whole, which therefore should not be looked upon as independent and self-subsisting. Our attempt thus far to understand the self may be compared to the effort to understand the root of a plant without any relation whatever to the whole of the plant. The certainty as to the thinker may be based not on an atomic self but on an infinite consciousness of which thinker, thought and thinking are appearances. Our mistake thus far has been in attempting to conceive of the self as an independent factor out of all relation to the Infinite consciousness of which it is an aspect. Hence our conceptions of the self have resulted in contradictions.

For the Siddhānta the soul is not atomic, but infinite and all-pervasive. If, on the other hand, we find the soul confined within limits, it is because of *Āvaraṇa Māla*, and all human effort is to be directed to ridding the soul of this impurity which acts as a drag on the soul preventing it from being all-pervasive.

The Śaiva Siddhāntin, in giving convincing proofs of the existence of the soul, went much further than his rivals who denied the existence of the soul, and in differentiating the soul from other factors of the human organism, he outstripped all other alien schools who identified the soul with gross factors. While then he is free from the defects of materialism and of Spiritualism, yet he is only half

way to the truth that the Self is one and infinite. Not merely does he hold to the difficult and contradictory notion of a plurality of infinite souls, but he holds also to the notion of an objective world over against them. For Descartes who thus sundered the self from the not-self, Representationism and Occasionalism were necessary consequences. The epistemological consequences for the Siddhānta are not dissimilar, but will have to be noticed separately.

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Contents.

	PAGE
I.—The Concept of Value : K. C. Bhattacharyya	1
II.—Reality and Value : G R. Malkani	19
III.—Whitehead's view of Philosophy and its Method : Rasvihary Das	35
IV.—Knowing, Feeling and Willing as Functions of Consciousness : T. R. V. Murti	47
V.—Bossuquet on Religious Consciousness Benoy Gopal Ray	66
Reviews —	
VI.—Indian Philosophy · R. Das	78
VII.—Higher Criticism of Buddhism : Swami Jagadishwarananda	87
VIII.—The Life of Swami Vivekananda G. W. Kaveeshwar	93
IX.—The Metaphysics of Berkeley : T. R. V. Murti	96

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Owing to an oversight on our part the pagination of this issue of the Philosophical Quarterly instead of commencing serially from the preceding issue (i. e. from page 283) has begun on the basis of an independent Number. We very much regret the mistake.

THE ISOPHICAL QUARTERLY.

The Concept of Value.

By

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the value either of a known content or of a Value is itself a felt content and so the value is but a higher grade of the value of a known it.

I. Value of a known object.

ject is valued in the form of a judgment—this value'. The difficulty about the judgment is known and the value is felt and there be no relation between the incommensurable may evade the difficulty by saying that value ally spoken of as content, the real judgment is thus feel the object.' But this form also is erstand. What does *feel* as a transitive verb ce to the object? It cannot mean simply 'we we know the object'; and even if it does, her difficulty how one speaks of 'we' having spect of the object. Probably it is one and

the same circumstance that is expressed by 'feeling the object' and 'we thus feeling about the object'; and to speak of value as a content is apparently to symbolise the same mystery. It is as well therefore that we accepted the judgment-form—'The object has this value' and tried to find out its implications.

How is any relation spoken of between the known object and the felt value? The relation may be only symbolical but it is not obviously unintelligible. What is at least meant literally is that there is a single consciousness of the two terms—the object and the value. We cannot say however that the knowing and the feeling make up one consciousness. We are aware of what is known as completely distinct from the knowing and of what is felt as only imperfectly distinct from the feeling. We cannot speak of the object as content of the single consciousness for then it would be at once known and felt, at once completely and incompletely distinct from the consciousness.

The knowing and the feeling cannot make up one consciousness but it may be that there is a single reflective consciousness of both. Is such consciousness the consciousness of the contents of the knowing and the feeling making some sort of unity? It depends on what is meant by reflective consciousness. There are apparently two kinds of reflection on a conscious process: it is either the distinguishing of the conscious process from the content or the distinguishing of the content from the process. The former is what is usually called psychological introspection in which attention is withdrawn from the content of the conscious process and fixed on the process itself which is thereby sterilised and turned into a ghostly temporal event. In the latter, it is the content of the conscious process that is attended to as in the unreflective stage, though it is defined by being distinguished from the conscious process which we thus do not distinguish but only distinguish from. The reflective consciousness of knowing and feeling that we postulate to understand the so called value judgment is reflection in the latter sense. It is consciousness not directly of the knowing of the object and the feeling of the value but of the object and the value as known and felt respectively. Reflection in this sense is consciousness of the conscious process not as an

event but as a function implied in the content. It is not necessarily cognitive : reflection on the knowing or feeling or willing of a content may be but need not be the reflective knowing or reflective feeling or reflective willing of the content respectively. To understand the so called value-judgment then, the object and the value should be taken as the contents of a reflective consciousness of knowing and feeling. Is this consciousness reflective knowing or reflective feeling? The judgment-form would suggest that it is reflective knowing but we contend that the form is here only artificial, if not symbolio and that the so-called value-judgment is primarily reflective feeling. Value is here spoken of *as though* it were known but the object is not here spoken of *as though* it were felt. The known object infact is actually felt in the reflective feeling. Its known-ness is felt : there is a feeling of the object as in space and time being *merely known* in the sense of being *unfelt* or indifferent. In the reflective stage we may feel that something is only known but we do not know that something is only felt. To know is to know a definite content but to know that a content is only felt would be to be aware of it as indefinite. In other words, value cannot be said to be reflectively known though, like value, the object to which it is referred may be said to be reflectively felt.

The so-called value-judgment then is not reflective knowing but reflective feeling. The judgment-form or the form of knowing here is only an indirect if not symbolic expression of the reflective feeling of valuation. Valuation implies a feeling consciousness both of the felt content as such and of the known content as such. The known content does not cease to be known by being reflectively felt and the felt content, as will be shown presently, though *not known*, is endowed with a kind of objectivity by reflection. Both being

objective in a sense to the same reflective feeling they can be spoken of as though they were related in a judgment

How is the felt content objectivised in reflective feeling? When I am conscious of my own past feeling or of another's feeling, the consciousness is a feeling and not a spectator's consciousness though the feeling of which I am conscious is in some sense alien to me. The content of this alienated feeling is not however consciously distinguished from it in my reflective feeling of it. Now when I say that a person feels in a certain way towards an object, I say it on some evidence over and above the mere evidence of my feeling. But sometimes I am aware without any such evidence that one *must* or *should* feel in the way I feel. When I take something to be beautiful for example, I feel implicitly that any one will find it so, as I believe when I take it to be of the colour red. I do not say that it is red to me but only that it is red, and so I say it is beautiful. If asked how I know it is beautiful to others I would say it *must* or *should* be so and if it is falsified, as it well may be I would doubt as I would doubt my senses. I am in fact here implicitly aware in my feeling towards the object that it is not my feeling only, that the object would be so felt by any one or—what is the same thing—that the felt content is somehow in the object. To believe unquestioningly without evidence that we feel in a certain way in respect of an object and to believe that the felt content is in the object are one and the same belief neither being prior to the other. Here then the feeling that I reflectively feel is not taken as any one's feeling in particular it is unappropriated or impersonalised rather than universalised. The content of it also is consciously distinguished from it and taken to be on a level with the object to which it is referred. Thus the content of a reflective feeling as the feeling of the impersonal feeling of the same content is

definitely objectivised through the mediation of the impersonal feeling.

The felt content is thus objectivised but it is not therefore turned into a known object. Value is objective and is somehow referred to a known object but it is not known as a *character* of the object. The word *objective* here is wider than the word *known*. Whatever can be spoken of as information may be said to be objective. Now the objective may be either capable of being spoken of without reference to the consciousness of it or not so capable. It is only in the former case that it is said to be known. Value which is objective to reflective feeling is not speakable without reference to the feeling. It is unintelligible without reference to the impersonal feeling which is not speakable without reference to the reflective feeling. Value accordingly is not said to be a known content.

We can speak of the known content and this value together as both objective to the reflective feeling. To speak of their relation would be really to *speak* the reflective feeling and not to *speak of* it. In exclaiming, we speak our feeling and not speak of it; and when we command, we speak and do not speak of the command. What we thus speak may be however spoken of in a symbolical or periphrastic way. When we speak our feeling in the way of exclamation, we may also artificially speak of it or express it as information in the form 'this is my feeling about the object' or 'the object has this value'. When we speak of a value in an object then, we only indirectly express as information what we should speak exclamatorily in a form like 'how fine is this object'. Why do we thus express ourselves? It is to mark the objectivity of the feeling-content induced by the impersonalisation of the feeling, to indicate in fact that it is not arbitrarily that we thus value the object.

That the known-ness of the object is felt in reflective feeling, that the known object is thus in a manner 'subjectivised' is not however so obvious as that the felt content is objectivised.

As pointed out, we may feel that something is *only known* in the sense that we feel it as *unfelt*, neutral or indifferent. To the extent a known object appears flat and uninteresting is it felt as merely known. We speak of truth as beyond our likes and dislikes : the feeling of the truth of a content is the feeling of its being independent of our feeling (and of being no value at all). To be aware of a content being known is not necessarily to be aware of the content as unfelt but to be feelingly aware of the known as such is to be aware of it as unfelt. In valuation, we are feelingly aware of the known object as unfelt even when the object is being felt.

How is it possible, it may be asked, for the content to appear at once as *felt and unfelt*, as interesting and as neutral in the valuating reflective feeling? We may put it in some such formula : the known object is not felt as one with the value, though the value is felt as one with the object. In feeling at least if not in knowing, if a content A is one with a content B, B need not be one with A. Something, for example, may be felt to be pleasureable and painful at once : one may enjoy a tragedy with a breaking heart and one may grieve over the loss of one's beloved in the enjoying reminiscence of the love. The pleasure and the pain are not really mixed here, the feeling being either pleasure or pain, one of them with the other somehow *within* its content and not side by side with it. The enjoyment of the tragedy is undistinguished from the pain that is felt, the pain itself being enjoyed ; but the pain is distinguished from the enjoyment in the sense that it does not detract from the enjoyment. So in the other case, the pain is through the pleasure and not *vice versa*. Likewise we say about the valued object that its neutral or unfelt character is distinguished from its felt character or value which however is not distinguished from it. The known or unfelt character is not the felt value though the latter has the former involved in it. Value is thus referred to the object.

which is understood as not really *having* it and may in this sense be called a *floating or free* adjective of the object.

Unless the known object is appreciated as unfelt at the time we feel towards it, the felt content cannot be called value. The value of a known object is a content felt to be one with the object which is however felt as other than the content. The oneness of the content with the object or the objectivity of value is through its being felt as the content of an impersonalised feeling in respect of the object. The object is felt as other than the content through its being felt as unfelt. The reflective feeling of the value as felt and the object as known is the feeling of the objectivity of value and of the unfelt character of the object.

We have spoken of the value as a free adjective of the object. But is value an adjective at all? We say about a red flower that the flower is red flower but the red colour is not the flower, implying in this sense that the substantive is one with the adjective which however is distinct from it. Here however we have said that the value is not felt as other than the known object but the known object is felt as other than the value. So properly speaking, value is no adjective of the object.

We may elaborate the argument. A substantive need not be distinguished from its adjective to be known as a distinct. But *an adjective to be known as a distinct must be distinguished from or in the substantive*. When an adjective has been distinguished in a substantive, the substantive is not distinguished from the adjective at least in the sense of being taken to be *without it*. But when value is distinguished in an object, the object is distinguished from it in the sense that it is felt to be *intrinsically without value*, felt as unfelt or merely known. Value accordingly cannot be taken as an adjective of the object.

Apparently however we are still unable to deny that value is in some sense subordinate to the object, that while the object does not imply value, value has necessarily to be referred to the object. We have to get rid of this notion of subordination, of this necessary reference of value to the object. Value as such is not understood unless we clear our mind entirely of intellectualist prejudice. We speak of value indeed in connexion with the valuation of a known content, which though a feeling is necessarily symbolised as a judgment. But a critical examination of valuation shows not only that it is no judgment (amounting to knowledge) but also that value should be independent of valuation.

Value-judgment, we have seen, is primarily an exclamation somehow toned down into information. Exclamatory speech is like an impersonal proposition: the predicate is all and the subject seems to be nowhere. A person exclaims 'grand' and so he can say 'lightning' or 'rains'. There is a difference however, for when the exclamation 'grand' is completed into a sentence, we should say 'how grand is this scene' and not 'this scene is grand', the predicate still retaining the principal position. This indicates the relation between object and its value: the known content is here subordinate to the felt content. 'How grand is this scene' means that grandeur—the value—is expressed or embodied in the scene. In the Platonic way we may say the scene partakes of grandeur as the individual partakes of the Idea. Expression appears to be the least mystical description of the relation: value is expressed in the object as a feeling is expressed in the face. Both the terms here—object and value—are here substantive and both are interesting though we are interested in the object because of the feeling or value embodied in it and not in the latter because of the former. It may be the object *as expressive* is as interesting as the value expressed but the object *as merely known* is in any case subordinate in the so-called

value-judgment to the value expressed in it. Value, we said, is not appreciated as such till the object to which it is referred is felt as known or unfelt or neutral. When the known object is so felt, it is felt to be subordinate to the value, being so felt because of the value. The neutral character of the object is, as we pointed out, within the content of the feeling that is felt.

Value-judgment is an exclamation disguised as information. How do we realise it? It is not enough to understand that value is felt as objective but not known as such and that the known object that is said to have it is also felt in the valuation as unfelt. We said that we cannot primarily speak of value, that we really speak the value and then artificially speak of it. We have to appreciate that value is *absolute* and not merely objective or in other words, that the speakability of value as information is in the last resort a *necessary illusion* like the speakability of the unspeakable.

We spoke of feeling a possible (impersonal) feeling and feeling the want of a feeling. These are both on the reflective level but they indicate the possibility of a feeling on a higher level which would be the feeling of an *actual* feeling. The possibly (or impersonally) felt and the felt unfelt both appear as objective or as content to the reflective feeling of them. Valuation is a reflective feeling, feeling of this content which implies a distinguishing (though imperfect) between consciousness and content. Do we have a feeling of feeling in which there is not even this imperfect distinguishing?

A person says informatively 'It is a cool breeze'. He may exclaim 'How cool is the breeze'. He may go further and say 'How I enjoy the cool breeze'. The first statement expresses the felt character of the breeze and not the subjective feeling of it, the second statement expresses this feeling and the third expresses the further feeling of this feeling. To speak exclaimatorily of the cool breeze is to express

reflective feeling but to speak exclamatorily again of the reflective feeling is to express feeling of a higher grade. The value of an object gets freed as a substantive from the object of which it appears as an adjective and acquires the status of an absolute only in this feeling beyond reflective feeling.

To illustrate by a more complex example. '*Tat tasya kimapi dravyam yo hi yasya priyo janah*,' says the poet; 'What a treasure is one's beloved to oneself.' One may unreflectively discover a thousand excellences in a person or may reflectively speak of him as beloved but to speak of the value of the beloved to oneself implies a consciousness of the reflective content as such. This consciousness may be more intellectual than emotional, in which case it is what is called sentimentalism. Or it may be a genuine emotion, a mystic wonder at the *unspeakable* value of the loved character of the person, which is apparently what is voiced in the passage by the poet. The loved character of the known person is already a value. This wonder then is consciousness of the value of the value, feeling of reflectively feeling the value.

Such is the feeling of an actual feeling to which the feeling of a possible (impersonal) feeling and the feeling of the unfelt (merely known) alike point. It is a stage of feeling beyond reflective feeling, an absolute or transcendental feeling, the expression of which is not only no information but not even a speakable valuation. It is a pure exclamation in which we do not speak of anything or rather in which we symbolically speak of the *unspeakable* as such. It is the expression of what is undeniable yet unintelligible, of the absolutely unique or new, or of the absolutely contingent—what is *believed* as might-not-have-been while it is there or as might-have-been while it is not, what is perpetually being lost or wanted when attained and being attained when it is lost or wanted. What is spoken but not spoken of in the pure exclamation may as much be called value of value as feeling of (actual) feeling,

being in fact a form of the absolute. The term value should properly be confined to this absolute; value is nothing if not absolute. Loosely however we speak of absolute value and relative value, the former as the value of the latter.

II Value of a Willed Act.

Valuation of a willed content is not like the valuation of a known content a pure feeling but feeling with willing somehow involved in it. Both the valuations are expressed as information but while the latter is properly expressed as an exclamation, the natural formulation of the former is an exclamation that is at the same time an imperative. To say that an act willed is good is a periphrasis for 'how good is this act' which again means 'how we *should* all act thus'. To say simply 'we should act thus' is no valuation or exclamation, being only an imperative. But to say 'how we should act thus' is to wonder at this universal or impersonal obligatoriness, to *feel* the sacredness of the *ought*. Moral valuation is thus properly expressed as an exclamation of the 'practical feeling' of respect for the *ought*.

Æsthetic valuation is the type of valuation. Moral valuation is valuation as approximating to æsthetic valuation, there being intermediate valuations. There is the feeling, for example, of an object being clean or sacred, which may be called moral or spiritual valuation of the known object. Again we feel admiration for a willed act as noble or magnificent, this being a sort of æsthetic valuation of the *look* of the act. Moral valuation proper would be the valuation of the act—not as it looks but as the inner willing that is finished—as good or evil. This again may be distinguished from the consciousness of right or wrong willing in the willing itself, which is not the valuation of the willing as finished and therefore not valuation at all.

For valuation it is apparently necessary that what is

valued should be a content having the form of being. It may be a known object that is definitely distinct from the consciousness of it or it may be indefinitely distinct from it in different degrees, the minimum distinction being that of the willing as completed from the willing as process. Willing as simply the process without the form of being is no content of consciousness and cannot be valued. The rightness of willing in process as distinct from the goodness of willing as completed is not felt and is like truth no value at all.

To begin with the valuation of an object as clean or sacred. Cleanness is a simpler value than sacredness. Dirt may be matter in the wrong place but the wrongness is what is felt as such in a specific feeling and does not admit of objective definition. So the clean is what appears as such to a specific organic feeling which has a close affinity with the feeling of moral goodness. Cleanliness is next to godliness and the feeling of having sinned is the feeling of being polluted. The clean suggests purity as the beautiful suggests joy. The sacred object has a further mystic significance: it is not merely clean in itself—what one dares not pollute—but what will clean the soul by its touch or presentation. Cleanness or sacredness of an object then is the purity or holiness of an impersonal will felt to be embodied in the object just in the sense in which the beauty of an object may be taken to be an impersonal joy embodied in it. This valuation then is an aesthetic feeling of a moral or religious value, of a will-value or a soul-value.

A willed act is the content of willing only and is distinct from the willing through the willing itself, having indeed an empirical embodiment which however apart from the willing is not even a known content. By embodiment is here meant not an already distinct empirical 'body' into which the will somehow enters but what is made distinct by the willing alone. Taking for example the act at the lowest level—viz. the

bodily act as willed, the embodiment of the willing is not some objective attitude of the physical body but some internal motor experience which cannot be described even as a given internal sensation. It is doubtful whether the motor experience—experience of moving a limb or even of having it moved—should be called *muscular sensation*. There is no consciousness of its being *given* to willing i.e. of being other than willing when we are conscious of the willing. This applies even to the consciousness of having one's limb moved, for it is only imperfectly distinguished from the experience of moving and is only appreciated as a partial privation of the latter experience. This motor experience is apparently nothing but bodily willing that one is conscious of in reflective willing. Tactile and other sensations bound up with motor experiences are adjectival to it in the content of reflective willing and cannot be regarded as independent facts that are only mixed up with it. A similar consideration will apply to willing at higher stages of consciousness. The embodiment then of a willing is no content at all apart from the willing.

There is a distinction between the embodied willing at any stage and the next higher willing that constitutes it. Each may be morally judged but the judgment on the embodied willing will be more of an aesthetic valuation than the judgment on the higher willing. Mere bodily act e.g. an acrobatic feat is almost like an object and is valued almost wholly in the aesthetic way. Yet the fact that it is willed makes some difference. It is not merely the outward look of the act that is judged, the look as expressing the success of the willing is judged its value being the efficiency of the psychic effort put forth. To say that the acrobatic feat is splendid is to say that the will is wonderfully efficient though the will is judged because of its triumphant expression in the body. So at a higher stage we speak of a splendid act of bravery, the psychic act being here judged more or less aesthetically, though its

value consists in the measure of freedom of the willing behind it which however would not be judged as splendid but for its expression in the psychic act. Everywhere then the judgment on an embodied willing is aesthetic relatively to the judgment on the ideal willing that determines it though the value depends on or involves the moral value of the ideal willing.

When we speak of a splendid act of bravery, we judge the look of the act to have the aesthetic quality of splendour. What does *look* mean here? It is the empirical being of the free willing, meaning not only the bare being of the willing as a finished process but also an entire objective situation as conatively incorporated in it. The look of the act is judged aesthetically according to the moral value of the willing behind it. This willing too is judged as good or evil only as it is taken to have some kind of being. It has to be understood at least as *this* act in order to be valued even morally.

Valuation then ranges from the pure aesthetic valuation of an object to the moral valuation of an act considered simply as the finished being of free willing without any further empirical determination. All valuation is expressed in the form of an informatory sentence, though as feeling it should be primarily expressed as an exclamation. The informatory expression of aesthetic valuation, though not primary, cannot be said to be merely symbolical. Beauty has an objective though not known being, the objectivity being mediated through an impersonal feeling. Moral valuation is not only not judgment; its expression as information is symbolical and not literal. Moral value is indeed objective in the sense of being mediated through an impersonal willing, goodness, as will appear presently, consists in being eternally or impersonally willed. But it is not objective being but objective negation or freedom that is eternally willed. Negation is information when the subject of which a predicate is denied is not itself

denied at least as a possible existent. But when it is so denied, there is nothing about which the information is given and the expression of it as information is only symbolic. Now to say that an act is free—and that is, as will be explained, what is meant by saying that it is morally good—is to deny the being, the bare temporal being or other empirical being of the act. In the sphere of knowing, the subject of an apparent judgment which is denied absolutely in the judgment is just the unreal in some form. In the sphere of willing, the act of which the being is taken to be nought by being felt to be free is understood to be *real* beyond all being or empiricity. The statement therefore, that the act is free is no information and is only symbolically expressed as information.

Valuation whether aesthetic or moral is no judgment. Aesthetic valuation is not judgment because the subject here viz. the object valued, is subordinate to the predicate beauty which appears at best as a floating character and is really no adjective but a substantive that is *expressed* in the substantive subject. Moral valuation is not judgment because it is not even literal information.

Moral valuation of the form that is furthest from aesthetic valuation is that in which the subject is an act of willing considered as a being in the sense simply of being finished or of having a bare position in time. The value of it viz. goodness, we have suggested, means only felt freedom. This requires explanation. It is clearest best on the negative side: to say that an act of willing is evil is to imply that it was not willing at all, that there was an illusion of willing. An illusion of a particular subjectivity means no denial of subjectivity itself but only of its particularity or specification. The specification or naming of a subjectivity is however vital to introspection: one is said to be introspectively aware only of a subjectivity that is named or specified at least as

different from named forms. Now we are said to have an illusion of willing when we somehow will but do not will the particular content that we claim to will. We may think we are running of our own accord when we are being mainly dragged along a slope or that we are speaking to a person for his good when we are really speaking to him in anger or that we are acting on principle when really some unavowed selfish motive is operative. What does such an illusion imply?

The consciousness of not having willed a content is always consciousness of having positively willed not to will it and not simply of having willed some other content. In the moral valuation of an act of choice, we consider not simply the content that we have not chosen but also the fact of having positively rejected or willed not to will it. So generally we cannot be conscious explicitly of the *subjective fact* of not having willed a content unless we are conscious of having rejected it. Unless we are so conscious, we should only say that *another* content was willed but not that there was *no willing* of this content. The fact of willing or no-willing is not known but is only conatively believed. So the correction of the illusion of an act of willing means awareness of having willed not to will it. But then it may be said we are not actually conscious in the valuation of an act as evil of having willed not to will the act. There is however an unspecified consciousness, in all retrospective consciousness of an act as evil, of having willed not to will in the form of willing to remain what one is, the will to spiritual indolence. That is the general willing of omission that is bound up with all consciousness of willing—even of good willing: it is the consciousness of not having sufficiently exercised one's freedom. The consciousness of freedom in fact is belief in it as not completed, as having no being.

Moral self-approbation is not complacency but the

consciousness of having exercised our freedom which could have been however further exercised. To exercise our freedom is always to work against the radical evil in us of the will merely to be or the will to indolence, against the downward current—what has been called *pāpavahū nadi*—which however is still will or freedom and not nature, the freedom to be not free, freedom to suicide. Moral self-condemnation is the feeling of not having exercised our freedom against this will to be, of not having shaken off the will to indolence, of having willed to drift or not to will, of having only had an illusion of willing otherwise. All consciousness then of *having* willed wrongly—as distinct from that of the willing in operation—is consciousness of having had an illusion of willing. The consciousness of wrong willing in the willing itself is however not being aware of the willing as illusory. In fact it is to be more explicitly aware of it as willing, aware of *individual* freedom, than in the case of right willing. To the retrospective valuating feeling however, what was believed as a specific wrong willing was not that specific willing but only the radical will to indolence. What we are conscious of as right willing in the willing itself appears to the valuating feeling as a finished act that is good. It is the valuating feeling that on the one hand turns the process of willing into a finished act with bare position in time and distinguishes its freedom on the other as its constitutive reality. To say that an act is good is to say that it was free, that it was genuinely willed. Moral value is the *reality* of the act willed and does not even appear as its *character*. While the subject of the so-called moral judgment gets bare objectivity through it, the predicate viz. good is not objectified into a being at all, being only freedom that is felt as negation of the objectivity of the subject and yet as its constitutive reality. We have pointed out that it is not for the same reason that aesthetic valuation and moral valuation are denied to be judgments.

. We have discussed the form of the moral judgment that is furthest removed from the aesthetic judgment. Still it is valuation so far as it is aesthetic, so far in fact as free willing is aesthetically represented as an act with the form of being. The aesthetic character is more prominent in the valuation of an empirically embodied willing as noble or magnificent and still more so in the valuation of an object as clean or sacred. In the aesthetic judgment proper, the joy that is embodied as beauty in the object completely loses its naked subjectivity. We have here in fact the least mystical and the most self forgetful mode of embodiment of subjectivity. In the judgment of an object as sacred, the spiritual value retains a raw subjective character though mystically referred as a character to the object. In the judgment of an empirically embodied act of willing as noble or splendid, not only the value but also the substrate of it has an element of subjectivity. In moral judgment proper, the substrate of value has only bare being as its objectivity and the value itself is felt as freedom or subjectivity and not objective *being* at all.

Valuation means aesthetic valuation which though not judgment may still be regarded as information and as such the least removed from logical judgment which is no valuation. On the other side, the consciousness of willing being right or wrong *in the willing itself* is no valuation and the moral valuation of a finished willing as good may be taken to be just on this side of purely subjective willing. Valuation then in its different forms may be conceived to be a process intermediate between knowing and willing.

Reality and Value.

By

G. R. MALKANT.

I. Value as a Substantive.

The conception of reality is ordinarily taken to be distinct from the conception of value. A thing may be said to exist for itself. We however do not generally think of it as having value for itself. It has value only for some-one who can appreciate that value. Indeed when a thing has value for some-one, we often understand this to mean that it is also valuable in itself. We recognise that sometimes a thing has value for one while it has not the value for another. But at the same time we suppose that there are certain things which have intrinsic value or value in themselves, and that therefore they ought to have value for all. What those things are which have intrinsic value cannot be known through any process of reasoning or logical argument. Intrinsic value is ultimately a matter of direct intuition.

A thing may exist and have value in itself. Still it cannot be argued that the two concepts are not distinct. A thing exists *and* has value. The question naturally arises, how is existence related to value? Common sense would answer that a thing can exist without having any value. A piece of stone which exists has no value in itself. It is merely a certain kind of material stuff. Its value lies only for the architect or a possible artist who regards no object as too mean to express beauty. But if we take away the architect and the artist, the stone is a mere stone, a physical entity of a certain kind. Existence thus does not necessarily entail value. We cannot however argue with regard to value in the same way. We cannot think of value except as realised, i. e. as a certain character of the existent and the real. Value cannot be all in

and beauty are *not* subjective, and that they do share with "yellowness" and "containing pleasure," the property of depending *solely* on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them, I confess I cannot say."²

A natural criticism is prompted by this confession. Value is not in the thing. It has no being like unto the thing and its existential properties. It is what accrues to the thing or is produced in it through a certain relation, namely the relation to a feeling subject. Value is not in the feeling either for the same reason. Value simply does not exist in the sense in which the thing or the feeling exist. This view would also be in harmony with certain facts about beauty. Whenever and wherever any-one appreciates a value he does not simply cognise it to be there. He does with it what a creative artist does with a picture or a symphony. In this sense any-one who has an eye or an ear for beauty is an artist himself. Hence some "philosophers have maintained that the essence of beauty lies in expression, and that there is no beauty except in the artistic presentation of it. This is a paradox; but what is meant is that beauty is not passively received. We have to look at it with a creative eye"³ If this is true we cannot really argue that what we call intrinsic value is wholly independent of all appreciation, and that it is in the thing whether it is appreciated or not. There is something to be said about the subjective origin of value.

But what exactly is the nature of this subjective origin? Is value superimposed upon a thing which in itself does not have any value? But this is *not possible*. Superimposition, even if it is admitted in some sense here does not appear to be arbitrary. The intrinsic nature of the thing appears to

2. P. 274.

3. J. S. Mackenzie: *Ultimate Values* P. 140

contribute. What it contributes is indeed not determinable as value; for value is not an existential property of the thing. Still we cannot deny the objectivity in some sense of the value character. Value therefore cannot be said to be superimposed where it is not. Can we say that it is really produced in the thing by the relation to it of the feeling subject? But such production is quite unintelligible in view of the fact that the subject is not conscious of doing anything or initiating any process. Value has some connection with what *is*, and not with what *is to be*. Also we cannot be said subjectively to act upon things outside and to produce anything in them except through bodily action; and that action is here out of place.

The only conclusion to which we are inevitably driven is that value is not intrinsic to the thing; it is not falsely superimposed upon it; and lastly, it is not really produced in it through any kind of subjective action. The judgment then that a thing *x* has value is really inadmissible. Value does not exist, and is not known. It is felt only, and as such it is quite inexpressible in any form appropriate to thought.

We now come to the second contention, namely that value is itself a substantive. It is evident that when I say that something has value, I mean that it is somehow related to something that pleases or satisfies. If the thing is not thus related, it is a mere existent to which no value attaches. What now is this something that pleases or satisfies? It is certain that nothing that is merely perceived of the thing is what satisfies. The perceived thing only expresses or bodies forth what is really idolised or felt as valuable and which can only be called in contrast an ideal content or an idea that satisfies. Let us take the case of beauty. Beauty is not composed of the perceived characters of a thing, but something of a very different nature from these. What this something is we cannot define. We are sure that it is what pleases.

Is it there in the thing? Without doubt; and yet not quite there. It is something ideal, that has the perceived characters as its body or as its outward form. We are pleased by seeing the body, but it is not exactly the body that pleases us, but the soul behind that body. It is an ideal something that is quite real and alive. It is in its own way a true substantive which has the perceived characters as an adjective. It is only when our chief interest is in *being* that we regard beauty as an adjective of being, although even then we are bound to recognise that it is a floating adjective that is freely associated with it, it rests on it as an ornament, but does not enter into its being and become of it.

The question might be asked,—does not this ideal content exist? If it does not exist in the thing, it must exist outside it in an ideal realm or even in an appreciating mind. It cannot be altogether non-existent. If it were, value would be unreal. But if it exists in whatever way, it has being; and this would lead to a regressus ad infinitum which would render the concept of value meaningless. A has value because it has a certain ideal content B; but since B itself is an existent, it has no value in itself but only because of a certain ideal content C, and so on. Value simply cannot be freed from being and regarded as a different kind of substantive which has being itself for its adjective. Our reply to this objection is that value cannot be cognitively placed anywhere and does not therefore exist; and yet it is quite real.

It might be objected that this language is mystical. Value cannot be real, and yet not exist. Is there not a simple sense of existence in which value either is or is not? There evidently is such a sense. Does value then exist in the simple sense of the term or not?

What now is this simple sense? It is supposed that existence is not further definable. It is an ultimate and unanalysable concept. It is however evident that for purposes

of argument, this conception of existence is valueless. Anything might be held to exist, because it conforms to this unanalysable notion of existence which cannot be more explicitly stated. Indeed where there is agreement as to the application of the notion, or in other words where we agree what things exist and what do not, this general definition of existence which is really no definition, may pass. But it becomes useless directly we differ. How are we to prove another man to be in the wrong? Not by an appeal to the simple sense of the term, unless it is more specifically stated. I must for example be able to show that when a thing exists that thing at least is not of the class of the things that are non-existent. I can specify the latter without much difficulty. I can say that anything that is self-contradictory cannot exist, *e. g.* the son of a barren woman. The existent then must not involve self-contradiction. Similarly, what I merely imagine or fancy, *e. g.* a gold-mountain, is also excluded. The existent then must not be fancied, but as against this it must be capable of being known. But that is not enough. Things may appear to be quite properly known, and yet may not be truly known, *e. g.* illusory objects. The existent then must be really known and not appear to be known. There again might be a doubt whether anything is really known. The existent then must be known beyond the possibility of doubt. The last two conditions evidently cannot always be fulfilled. But this much is certain that something must at least be known before it can offer a problem in *being* or *existence*. What appears to be known has at least an appearance of being. If there is coupled doubt, the being is indeterminate; and if there is cancellation, the being is illusory. I shall therefore substitute for the simple sense of the term "existence" a more specific sense. I shall say,—existence is defined by the knowing attitude. Here there can be common agreement. No one is in doubt as to what this attitude is. What we

appear to know has at least a *prima facie* being; and we never have this attitude except to being. I shall go even further and say that the conception of being is really meaningless unless it involves this relation to knowledge. Being apart from knowledge is as good as no-being.

The question arises: Can there not be something to which the knowing attitude is not possible? The Absolute, if there is any Absolute, would be an entity to which the knowing attitude is not possible. And yet it would not be capable of being denied, for it would realise the very ideal of knowledge. Is there anything else in our experience about which also we can say that it cannot be denied, and yet it cannot be said to be known? Evidently, if there is anything which we regard as merely felt, that something would be a matter in question. What we call the value-character of a thing does not seem to sustain any knowing attitude. We must therefore either deny it altogether (which we cannot do), or accept it as something real which yet is distinct from being as defined by us. I define reality as what may transcend the knowing attitude, but what does not transcend all attitudes such as feeling or willing. If anybody says that nothing that sustains any attitude and is real in our sense of the term, does in fact transcend the knowing attitude, he might be right. But that would be a question of facts only, or a question of our analysis of experience. It would not be a question regarding our meanings of terms. The conclusion is that in so far as it is admitted that value is what is felt only, value cannot be denied to be real, and yet every question as to its mode of being is pointless; for we may as well admit at once that it has no kind of being understood in our sense of that term.

The above argument carried to its logical conclusion would amount to saying that value, being a matter of feeling only, cannot be really and intelligently related to being, and that therefore the Absolute of value will be found in the end to be

a different Absolute from the Absolute of Knowledge. This view appears to me to be mistaken. The thesis which I want to maintain as against this is that value has no *locus standi* except being, and that in the end the truest being must coincide with the highest value.

2. The ideals of thought and Feeling.

It will be generally agreed that there is no pure state of the mind such as feeling only, or cognition only, etc. Each state is in a sense complex. All that we can hold is that in each state, a certain aspect of experience predominates over the rest or reduces them to subordination, so that we can more or less truly speak of that state as a cognition, or a feeling, etc. The important question that arises here is whether each different aspect of experience has a different *kind* of content,—whether the content of cognition is intrinsically different from the content of feeling, and so on. I believe it will be generally admitted that what we feel is a different *kind* of content from what we can be said to know. But in conformity with our subjective states, no content is a pure content. There are elements of other contents present that are merely reduced to subordination. Let us take the so-called judgment " x has value." Here x is cognised. Value is not cognised, but felt only. We have already seen that in every case of appreciation of value, the felt content is the real substantive, and existence is subsidiary to it; existence is an involute of value. The judgment "this is beautiful" should therefore be paraphrased into "how beautiful is this!"

This view is quite intelligible. The wholeness of experience is kept intact, and no aspect of it is entirely disregarded or disowned. But it gives rise to an important philosophical problem. If there is after all a difference in *kind* between a known content and a felt content, is not their "togetherness"

ultimately illusory? Can we not through progressive interpretation reach different ideals of thought and feeling which have nothing in common? It is no longer a question merely of emphasis, but of ultimate divorce. Is this possible? It appears to me that it is not, that there is a fundamental "unity of experience without any aspects" within which alone these aspects have a seemingly independent life, and that therefore the ideal of any aspect of experience will not be the ideal of that aspect unless it is at the same time the ideal of all other aspects as well.

Let us start with feeling. The simplest form of feeling would be unreflective feeling. One merely lives in the enjoyment of it so to say. But such feeling is not a *datum* to anybody. It cannot be asserted and it cannot be denied. All our data are data of reflection. We must therefore suppose that this feeling to be spoken about at all must already have been reflected upon or introspected into. The question now is whether any introspection of feeling is introspective feeling. One thing appears certain. We cannot introspect into a feeling unfeelingly or without feeling. Nobody can remember a past joy without feeling joyfully towards it at the time of remembering, or a past sorrow without feeling sorrowfully towards it. But is this introspection of a feeling itself a feeling. It appears to me that although feeling cannot be denied to be involved, introspection is essentially a knowing attitude. One notes the original feeling. Indeed this *taking note of* may in certain rare cases bring about a powerful feeling reaction in which case the original feeling may be repeated with greater intensity but that cannot properly be called introspection at all, but a certain by-product of introspection. The chief interest of introspection is cognition, whatever the sort of mental state that we introspect into. We cannot therefore accept the view that the introspection of a cognition is a cognition, and the introspection of a feeling is a feeling

An objection might be raised here : We have admitted that in introspecting into a feeling, we feel towards it. This feeling evidently is not a repetition of the old feeling, but a new feeling which can only properly be described as a feeling of a feeling. The original feeling was a feeling of some objective content. The new feeling which we have admitted to be involved in introspection has a different content altogether, namely the original feeling itself. We feel a feeling here. More than that. This feeling of a feeling which we have admitted to be involved in introspection is not involved in it as something subordinate to cognition. It is the only proper introspection of a feeling. The introspection of a feeling is necessarily a feeling itself. It cannot be cognition. The reason is evident. A feeling cannot be the content of a knowing ; it cannot support a cognitive attitude. A felt content is felt and not known. For the same reason, we can have a feeling of a feeling but not knowledge of it ; for knowledge is essentially unfeeling and cold.

The above argument starts with a wrong premise, namely that the content of a feeling can be felt *only* and not known, and *vice versa*. In our opinion, the contents are distinct in emphasis only, and not in themselves and absolutely. There is no being or existence cognised by us which is not also felt. Or what is the same thing, we cannot distinguish the content of thought from the content of feeling absolutely, but only relatively ; i.e. in reality the two contents are not distinct. What we simply know is just what we also feel as unfelt or as insipid ; it is thus a feeling-content as well. Similarly, what we feel is also what we know as *being something* of a sort. It is *the same thing* to which we have these different attitudes. What we thinkingly know is *what* we feelingly feel. Being and value are in reality not distinct or ultimately distinguishable. They become distinct only by a certain stress

which we lay upon aspects of reality separated not in themselves but through our own attitudes towards it.

The introspection of a feeling is not feeling exclusively or even predominantly. All introspection is essentially cognitive in its interest and form. We shall go further and say that a man who feels but does not know that he feels, does not really feel at all. Let us think of a situation in which a man has tooth-ache but does not know it. Can he be said to *feel* the pain of the tooth-ache? It would be absurd to suppose that he does.

We may grant, for the sake of the argument, that the introspection of a feeling is itself a feeling. But even so, how shall we explain the preposition "of?" The original feeling is objective to the introspective feeling. There is a feeling of a feeling. Can this objectification be the function of a feeling? Can the objectivity of an object be felt? If it can be felt, then being can be felt. If it cannot be felt, then how do we justify, on the ground of mere feeling, a feeling of a feeling? It appears to me that a feeling must be of something. And yet this *otherness* of the content cannot be felt, but only known. The truth is that there can be no feeling which does not involve thought as a necessary element of it. A pure feeling, even if it were possible, might be a subjective state; but it would have no content of *which* it can be said to be a feeling. The attempt therefore to set up feeling as an independent function of the spirit, having a distinct ideal of its own that has nothing in common with the ideal, say of cognition, is doomed to failure.

It will now be argued that after all value is a matter of feeling only; and in that sense thought has no determining character with regard to value. But even this is only partially true. When I say that value is what is felt, I cannot deny the possibility of satisfactions that are illusory, and therefore the possibility of illusory values. I may set a high

value upon something because it satisfies me. Alcohol or sense objects in general give satisfaction which may appear to be very real. But such satisfaction can be shown to be illusory. The feeling can be criticised and better directed. Taste can be educated. That we seem to feel a satisfaction may not be doubted. But it can be doubted whether a certain satisfaction is a real satisfaction, or that it is all that it presumes to be. Herein comes the function of thought in the determination of values. Feeling by itself is not capable of self-criticism and so of directing itself.

It will here be said : How do you know a certain satisfaction to be illusory, unless you feel towards it in a certain way ? The satisfaction which you now reject, you feel to be inane or a satisfaction that does not satisfy. What then makes a satisfaction illusory is not your thinking about it, but your *feeling* towards it. You feel a certain satisfaction to be no satisfaction. The illusoriness of a satisfaction then is not a matter of thinking or of reasoning but of feeling only.

This however does not appear to me to be the whole truth. We cannot rely entirely upon uncriticised feeling. If feeling is to guide thought in the appraisal of value, it must in turn be guided by thought. Without criticism, no feeling is a safe guide. This criticism consists in intelligently correlating the ideals of thought with the ideals of feeling. Feeling is too subjective. It may be very entrancing, and yet it may have no more reality than the passing colours on an unstable and moving back-ground. It lacks that stability which thought alone can give to it. Our satisfactions must be grounded in the nature of things. This alone can protect us from illusory satisfactions. Reality must be in its nature satisfying, if we are not to fall a prey to the seductions of our own untutored feelings.

It is evident that every feeling that signifies value has a necessary reference to a felt content. Without such reference, there is nothing to distinguish or to render comparable the pleasure of sense and the radiant joy of spiritual love. No subjective state merely as subjective has any distinguishable character. There are no distinctions available in pure subjectivity. The only way therefore to criticise a feeling is to criticise it in relation to the felt content. It is the felt content which is said to have value, and not the feeling of it. It may be that the fact that we feel towards a certain thing in a certain way is sufficient to invest that thing with a certain value. But that is the more reason why we should look more closely into the matter and try to see whether the values thus created are stable or not. We can never know that a satisfaction is not fancied only, and so illusory and unreal, unless the feeling is purged of its subjectivity. It is not sufficient that a thing satisfies me. Dissatisfaction and disillusionment may come late. It is necessary that the thing should be capable of satisfying by its very nature and of sustaining the highest feeling of appreciation. Or in other words, the real satisfactoriness of something depends not merely upon the fact of its being felt to satisfy, but upon its innate power to satisfy or upon its satisfactory being. Value must be correlated with being.

These two, ordinarily, are distinct and not relatable intelligently. But so far all satisfactions are also not what they should be. They are more or less subjective and so illusory. It is only when we find that the ideal of feeling coincides with the ideal of thought, that our satisfaction becomes purged of its subjectivity. It becomes real and complete. The ideal content of value becomes the only true being. Being becomes blissful. Deceit is no longer possible. We value what is in itself the truest value. Short of this, and within

the pure subjectivity of feeling, deceit is the rule. It simply cannot be eliminated. For this reason, all forms of mysticism based on an over-emphasis of feeling, can only make for subjective value and not for value that is real and eternal; to realise the latter, we must find the highest ideal of feeling in the highest ideal of thought, and *vice versa*, and not set these as unrelated and independent ideals.⁴

Finally, we should note that all feeling that indicates value has an inherent reference to being. A feeling taken by itself, and without any reference to a felt being, is a mere feeling that indicates nothing. It can indeed be contemplated as a feeling of pleasure merely. In that case it is a certain state of being, or even a quality of being that does not signify anything beyond itself; such feeling simply is. But we may regard the feeling as signifying something. It signifies value, as when we say, "value is what is felt." Here value is the content of the feeling. If that is so we have already gone beyond the subjectivity of pure feeling. We have in this conception of the "felt content," the minimum of objectivity needed. The felt content may not be apart from the feeling, but feeling has already gone beyond itself. It has referred itself to an objectivity which cannot be wholly analysed away in feeling as such. In other words, feeling to signify value

4 Compare the following: "I repeat that before we can dismiss this conception of an identical criterion in truth, reality, and satisfaction we should have to deal with the whole argument by which Plato leads up to the form of Good.....The principle of these arguments in a word is this, that positive pleasure and all satisfaction, as distinct from an intensity of feeling which there is reason to suspect of being illusory, depends on the character of logical stability of the whole inherent in the objects of desire, and that what in this sense is more real, that is more at one with itself and the whole is also the experience in which the mind obtains the more durable and coherent satisfaction, and more completely realises itself." Bosanquet's *The Principle of Individuality and Value*. PP. 298-99.

must refer itself to being ; otherwise, it is a mere subjective state that cannot signify anything in the way of value. This explains the common contention that value must be realised value,—that it must be rooted in being. Feeling as such has a being, it is a state of being. Is value real, because it is involved in this feeling which is real (in which case we should have to say that the feeling has value as part of it), or because feeling has a reference to a felt content which has let us say the minimum of objectivity ? However we may take it, value cannot be dissociated from being. Indeed at the lower stages of experience they seem to fall apart. What we seem to know is not what we exactly seem to appreciate as valuable. But even there the two cannot be separated. It is however only when we reach the highest value that the unity of being and value is fully realised ; for then the *feeling of* disappears in the purest feeling which is at the same time true being; being is bliss.

(To be continued.)

Whitehead's View of Philosophy and its method.

By

RASVIHARY DAS.

It is not of course expected of a person, who is not himself a philosopher or a student of philosophy, that he should know exactly what philosophy is, what its ends are and how it tries, or should try, to achieve those ends. But it is certainly expected of a philosopher that he should have a clear understanding of his own business. Now it may be a fact that a philosopher in every case has a definite idea of his work ; but it is also a fact that different philosophers hold widely divergent views as regards the nature of their work and the method of its procedure. This is surely unfortunate. If each philosopher is right in his peculiar view of philosophy, from which other philosophers differ, then it means that philosophy as a definite branch of knowledge or a coherent body of knowledge does not exist, and that the name philosopher is not applied to these different persons in one definite sense of the term. But although it is certain that all the different views cannot be right, it cannot be said that none of them is right. The only difficult question is to decide which of them is right. But there is little possibility of our finding out the truest view of philosophy by apriori considerations. In fact no definition of philosophy, in the absence of any clear agreement as what philosophy is, can really be refuted. We can only discuss the different views and compare them with one another and it is very likely that in course of time some of them will cease to interest men and will become obsolete without undergoing any strictly logical refutation.

But when we do not exactly know what philosophy is, how can we even discuss a view about philosophy, seeing that

we are provided here with no standard of judgment? This difficulty is real, if the aim of our discussion is to arrive at a decisive conclusion whether a particular view of philosophy is true. But when we discuss a particular view about philosophy, our aim may not be to know whether it is true or false, but simply to know what it actually means and implies. Besides, although there is no clear cut definition of philosophy, which is acceptable to all, we have some rough idea of what philosophy generally speaks about. If we wish to make this idea more definite, we can probably do so only by trying to learn what eminent philosophers themselves think of the nature of their subject. When a philosopher has achieved great distinction in philosophy, it is always to be expected that he has a definite idea of his subject and if he chooses to speak about it, we can reasonably expect some welcome light from him.

Professor A. N. Whitehead is unquestionably one of the leading philosophers of the present day. He has done solid work in philosophy, and his view of philosophy, judged from every point of view, certainly deserves consideration and merits discussion (in the sense indicated above). He has at different places spoken of the nature and function of philosophy, and especially in the first chapter of his great book 'Process and Reality' he has dealt with the subject somewhat at length, and recurring to it in his latest book 'Adventures of Ideas' in a chapter on 'Philosophic method'.

'Speculative philosophy' as defined by Whitehead 'is the endeavour to frame a coherent logical necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted'. We see at once from this definition that philosophy has to do with the intellectual construction of a scheme of ideas which will explain all facts of experience. But what is the meaning of explanation or 'interpretation' as Whitehead calls it? A fact is interpreted, in the sense

intended here, when it is shown as an instance of a general idea. Philosophy explains our experience when it exhibits every item of our experience that is everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed or thought as an instance of the general scheme of ideas which it has constructed. Thus the system of ideas has a theoretical and a practical side. It should not merely be entertained in theory but should also be capable of being applied to the facts of experience. On the theoretical side, the system should be coherent and logical. It should be coherent in the sense that it should constitute an inter connected whole so that no one of its important ideas should be capable of being abstracted from the rest. The different ideas in the system should presuppose one another, not in the sense of being definable in terms of one another, but in the sense that each is significant only in relation to the others. It is presupposed that every entity in the universe is what it is by virtue of its determinate place in the universe and can not be conceived to have a being outside this universe. This character of the universe, as reflected in the scheme of ideas is its coherence.

It should be logical in the sense that the scheme of ideas should be framed in accordance with the logical principle of self consistency, and general logical notions should be illustrated in it and also the scheme should provide room for the principles of inference. It is not meant that logical principles are to be placed above philosophical notions and are to be regarded as the ultimate first principles. It is of course true that our philosophical ideas should not violate logical principles and should be framed according to them, but then the logical principles themselves should find their place in the general scheme of philosophical ideas.

On the empirical side the scheme should be applicable and adequate. It is applicable if some fact of our experience

can be shown as an instance of the general scheme, and the scheme is adequate when it is applicable to every such fact. In other words, all facts which we have experienced and in which we can believe as actual or possible, should be interpretable in terms of the scheme. It should be universally valid, and in this sense the system of ideas may be regarded as necessary.

It is thus clear that metaphysical principles should be illustrated in all facts of our experience and there should be no facts which can be regarded as exceptions. It might appear that, the metaphysical principles being universal, we could elicit them from a study of any fact. But their very universality is a ground for our not being able to find them out easily. We generally observe by the method of difference. What is found in one place and is not found in another easily attracts our attention. But what is to be found everywhere is apt to be missed by us. Thus we cannot easily discover metaphysical principles although they are present in all facts. The power of free imagination helps us in our philosophic discovery. In imagination we are not restricted by what we actually see. We may first imaginatively construct ideas which may afterwards be found present in actual facts. Many mathematical ideas were constructed in this way long before their application to physical reality was suspected. Moreover we may imagine things which are not actual at all and thus get the requisite basis of difference for the better observation of actual facts. Thus we see that imagination is a valuable gift for the philosopher. Even the scientist cannot achieve anything of value without this gift. Mere empiricism without imaginative construction leads us nowhere.

But philosophy is not pure imagination. Philosophy requires imagination in the service of knowledge. In all imaginative constructions, such as are necessary in philosophy, we have to be strictly faithful to facts; we have to see that

our imaginative constructions are illustrated in actual facts. Besides they should satisfy the rational tests of logical consistency and coherence. Empirical verification and logical consistency are the two supreme tests for the sanity of a philosophical scheme. Otherwise it would be indistinguishable from poetry and fiction.

What is said above represents only the ideal which philosophy tries to realise ; but it is not to be supposed that any particular philosophy has realised or is likely to realise this ideal completely. From our present knowledge of the complexity of fact and the weakness of human intelligence, we can only suppose that we may approach the ideal nearer and nearer but it is vain to hope that we shall be able to realise the ideal completely. We cannot think of a final metaphysical scheme which will explain all facts completely without leaving anything further to be explained. As we see things at present, there is little likelihood of our attaining a stage when no further progress in philosophic generalisation will be necessary or possible. It seems there will be always materials at our disposal to call for better systematisation of our metaphysical scheme, for enlargement of its scope and increase in its logical rigour. This only means that philosophy, as it is viewed now, is assured of indefinite progress, if only requisite intelligence be forthcoming to carry on its work.

It is clear that Whitehead takes the ordinary method of scientific generalisation to be the method of philosophy. It is eminently rational and can be used by ordinary intelligence. One cannot of course use the method mechanically and become a great philosopher. No method by itself leads to any such result. We require insight and that cannot be provided by any method. But what we achieve by our insight should admit of rational presentation and application and be intelligible to ordinary understanding. Here Whitehead sets his face against all anti-intellectual

intuitionisms which make the possession of some uncommon faculty a necessary qualification for discovering or understanding any philosophical truth.

Thus for Whitehead philosophy does not represent a peculiar kind of knowledge having a peculiar field of its own and differing essentially from scientific knowledge in its character and scope. But if the method of philosophy is essentially the method of science and if philosophic knowledge is not different in character from scientific knowledge, how is then philosophy at all different from science? We may readily admit that there is no essential difference in character between philosophic and scientific knowledge. Still what we learn from philosophy is not what we learn from the sciences. A particular science studies a particular set of facts in abstractions from other facts which may be related with them but being of a different kind do not fall within the scope of this science. Thus a special science is always limited in scope and studies facts in abstraction. There is no science which studies all facts, or at least, aims to arrive at principles that will be applicable to all facts. This work is reserved for philosophy. So the old saying that philosophy is the science of sciences may in a sense be true. Two objections may be raised. First, it may be asked, when the facts are studied by the different sciences, what is there left to be studied specially by philosophy? and, secondly, is it possible for anybody to study all facts?

Facts, we have said, are studied by the sciences under limited aspects. Thus the different sciences give us only the partial views of facts, and the partial views themselves cannot constitute the whole view unless they are properly synthesised and unified. So in order to give us a complete understanding of facts, the work of philosophy is necessary over and above the work of the sciences. The question now comes whether it is possible for any individual to study all the facts which

are severally studied by the different sciences. It is obvious that no individual can study all the facts, but it is also true that one does not need to be acquainted with the detailed work of all the sciences in order to become a philosopher. A philosopher may study a few facts in order to arrive at his general conclusions, but these conclusions must be applicable to all facts. The material for philosophy as well as for science is supplied by experience. If the sciences give us reliable knowledge about the facts of experience—and they have no other aim—and if philosophy also is an interpretation of the same facts, then it can ill-afford to neglect the evidence of the sciences. It may be difficult to master what the different sciences have to say about the different aspects of reality which they study. But a philosophy, which is already familiar with such systematisations of facts as are found in different sciences, is likely to do more substantial work than one which ignores the work of the sciences or formulates its principles in defiance of their evidence. Moreover in philosophy we are concerned with ultimate generalities which are applicable to all facts, and we do not need to know facts in their particular character; and the ultimate conceptions, which any special science uses, are not I suppose, many. So, I think, even to-day it is not an impossible task for a philosopher to acquaint himself, as Whitehead has done, with the broad general conceptions of different sciences, before he ventures upon any metaphysical constructions.

The method of philosophy then is the method of 'working hypothesis.' Whitehead calls it also the method of 'descriptive generalisation'. We tentatively formulate a general metaphysical scheme and the truth of the scheme depends on the success with which it can be used to interpret the facts of experience. The aim of philosophy is not to give us a peculiar intuition into some transcendental core of reality or to

justify our belief in some supersensible entities accepted on faith, but merely to give the most general description of facts.

Whitehead has come to philosophy from mathematics and science and he has been able to point out certain defects in the methods of modern philosophy. Those of us who have been trained in the tradition of modern European philosophy can hardly think of them as defects. We should think it a good point in a philosopher that he starts with some propositions which are clear and distinct and are absolutely certain. It is sometimes supposed that real knowledge is that which cannot be doubted, and if philosophy is to give us real knowledge, it should start with some indubitable principle, for starting with doubtful premises, it can never arrive at indubitable conclusions. Whitehead boldly inverts the whole idea. He says that there are no irrefragable, clear and distinct, absolutely certain first principles to start with. Clarity and certainty are gradually to be attained in our knowledge and they cannot characterise our starting points. This is evident from the method of working hypothesis which, according to Whitehead, philosophy embodies. When we frame a metaphysical hypothesis, we cannot initially be certain about its truth or very clear as to its exact significance. As the hypothetical scheme receives verification in empirical facts, we feel more and more certain about its truth and see more and more clearly its exact significance.

Modern philosophy has also erred, according to Whitehead, in regarding the five senses as the sole gates of our knowledge of the external world, and in relying exclusively upon introspection for the examination of experience. Through the senses we get the knowledge of the contemporary world as illustrated by the sense-data. We know nothing of its past or future, and entirely miss the all-important fact that the

present is derived from the past. We should rather regard the whole body as the organ of knowledge. The environment is pressing itself upon the whole body and through indistinct bodily feelings we become directly aware of the causal derivation of the present from the past. Through the senses we know the world in 'presentational immediacy' and through the bodily feelings we know it in 'causal efficacy.' In the former mode we know the world merely as static, and it is only in the latter mode that we know the world as a causal process.

Introspection similarly gives undue prominence to some aspects of experience, relegating others into the background. The data of sensation are marked clearly but 'the compulsions and derivations which form the main stuff of experience' are not noticed in introspection. "In particular it rules out that intimate sense of derivation from the body, which is the reason for our instinctive identification of our bodies with ourselves". Thus through the senses and in introspection we do not find all our available experiences, and in order to discover the main categories, under which the facts of experience can be classified, we should examine experiences of all kinds whether normal or abnormal, physical or mental.

It is sometimes urged against philosophy that it is a curiously unprogressive branch of knowledge. While the sciences and other branches of knowledge are making rapid progress, we seem to be discussing in philosophy even to-day in the same inconclusive manner the eternal problems which Plato and Aristotle discussed. Whitehead does not share this pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that progress is possible and philosophy has actually progressed in the course of history. The different systems of philosophy which have appeared represent no doubt different views of reality, but they are not to be regarded as absolute alterna-

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 ives equally to be condemned for their invalidity. They rather express 'a variety of general truths about the Universe', and we make progress towards a final view by co-ordinating and synthesising these partial truths. The chief error in philosophy, according to Whitehead, is its overstatement. Every system of philosophy expresses some truth about reality and the mistake lies in regarding this truth as the whole truth. And we find that the overstatement of one philosophy is corrected by the counter-statement of another philosophy. After we have heard a great philosopher, we see even the old problems in a new light and we can no longer regard them in the same old fashion. "Philosophy never reverts", says Whitehead, "to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher."

The main objection against philosophy, however, is that it serves no useful purpose. Those who urge this objection seem to think, as Bacon thought, that we should faithfully observe only particular facts and discover the laws governing them; but the broad generalisations and interpretations with which philosophy concerns itself are of no use for this purpose. But unfortunately there are no bare facts. The facts that we find are already viewed under the aspects of general concepts, and are found connected with their contemporaries and referring to a past and to a future. This means that the observation of facts itself is possible in the light of some interpretation and generalisation. In this sense nobody can avoid metaphysics, good or bad. Philosophy does not initiate interpretation but tries only to make it systematic.

There can be no arbitrary limit to generalisation, and every science rises to philosophy when it carries its generalisations beyond the limits of its particular sphere. Facts are never fully understood unless their place in the universe is

truly seen. This can be done only by a systematic coherent interpretation. As we saw above, the truths of science, viewed absolutely in regard to reality, would be but half-truths. Philosophy serves a very useful purpose when it co-ordinates these half-truths of science and supplies the qualifications under which alone they can be regarded as true.

There has been purely scientific philosophy as well as philosophy with a religious appeal. Whitehead has the great distinction of making philosophy closely associated with both science and religion. He has thereby made philosophy a highly effective and useful activity of the human spirit. Our contact with reality is in the experience of particular facts and in the enjoyment of subjective being. Science arose out of the former and religion out of the latter. The demand for intellectual justification for the brute facts of experience is at the root of science. This demand and the corresponding devotion to truth are fit parallels of religious sentiments. Only in science we are concerned with objective facts and not with subjectivity which is the concern of religion. In religion we seek to realise in the particularity of feeling the general conceptions which can properly be provided by philosophy alone. Religious emotions find their justification in philosophic generalisations, and the philosophic generalisations find their illustration in religious feelings. Both philosophy and religion gain in content and depth by this mutual service. The conceptual scheme, provided by philosophy, may appear, in its abstract general character, almost valueless, but it acquires supreme value when it is grasped in the immediacy of a feeling, as we try to do in religion. The tendency towards abstract generalisation and the tendency towards emotional realisation are both present in the human spirit. They are somewhat opposed in character, dividing science from religion. Unless they are reconciled and fused together, life is sure to suffer

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Knowing, Feeling and Willing as Functions of Consciousness.

By

T. R. V. MURTI

An attempt is made in this paper¹ to lay the rudiments of an apriori or transcendental psychology—to use a more ambitious title. Our task is to fix the precise meaning of the terms Knowledge, Feeling and Will and their sub-forms, and also to show the sense in which every psychosis can be said to involve all the three forms.

There may be some thinkers who might consider excursions into psychology as of no value or at least as having no relevance to epistemology or metaphysics; because such enquiries are not calculated to determine the ultimate nature of things. This is clearly a mistake. For, when we employ such concepts and terms as perception, memory, judgment, feeling, willing etc. we would then be uncritically accepting what certain psychologists have said about them. But such a use of these terms may not be in accord with our metaphysics. In fact, just as an uncritical and realistic view of our knowledge of objects is unacceptable, so we should discount an account of our mental functions that is not explicitly epistemological. There is thus the need for bringing our psychology into accord with our epistemology. Rather, the contention is that psychology, if it is to be of any significance for philosophy and not merely be of literary value, has to be merged into epistemology; it should not be, as it is at present, a superficial description of what appears to untutored introspection. As such, our enquiry sets itself against the commonly received notion about the infallibility of psychological introspection or

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from inner deficiency. Merely with science, we get knowledge without value and with unenlightened religion, we get value without truth. But the rational beings that we are, we can be satisfied with neither alone. Philosophy synthesises science and religion and confers value on our knowledge and reality on our value.

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the deliverances of the inner sense. We have just to appeal to introspection to determine the nature of our states, it may be said; and being a direct and immediate awareness, there can be no illusion. One can easily have illusions about external objects, but the possibility of their occurrence with regard to mental states is hardly conceivable. Our contention, however, is that the deliverances of the inner sense are as much fallible and misleading as those of the outer senses; no special privilege can be claimed for them. It is only our habitual attitude of distraction that prevents us from realising this fact. Some grounds for this contention will be adduced later on. To distinguish our psychology from the one that relies too much and too readily on introspection, and from all forms of "behaviourism," which denies introspection only to reduce conscious functions to certain "reflexes" and their compounds, we call it *a priori* or transcendental.

I.

Beginning with an *a priori* scheme we shall try to justify it by an appeal to experience. We start with two entities—consciousness and content. Content can be understood as the object in any sense, the presented something. We need not, at this stage, enter into the discussion whether it is a physical object or merely a thought-content, or even an image. It is something basic to all—a presentation. Nor should any question about the reality or unreality of the object be allowed to engage us at present. The object may thus be understood; but what is consciousness in general which is not knowing, feeling or willing, it might be asked. We can however take it as attention which is basic to all the three; attention is the factor which distinguishes conscious from unconscious existence. Knowing, Feeling and Willing may be conceived, *prima facie*, as modes of attending to the object, as modes of relation of attention to object. The relation itself is to be conceived as one of determination. In this scheme, 'deter-

mination of one entity by the other or by both' is taken as the fundamental meaning and type of relation between two entities. For, relation of one entity with another actualises or limits the capabilities of either, at least their possible relationships. The one may be said to be defined or determined by the other and *vice versa*.

There can be three sets of relation between consciousness and content : one in which the content determines the mode of attention ; attention is, as it were, entirely lost in the object, but not *vice versa* ; or second in which consciousness determines the content and not *vice versa* ; or that in which the determination is either way. If the third alternative is not to be a mere repetition of the former two, it must mean that attention and consciousness mutually determine each other, i. e., their determination is not separately distinguishable ; the whole thing is indeterminate. Fourthly, it might be thought that neither determines the other ; the two things are separate and unconnected. But this is clearly tantamount to denying all relation ; the two things fall asunder, and we cannot even speak of them as two. This is pure agnosticism. Our apriori scheme has thus really yielded only three modes of relation between consciousness and content. And these can be identified with Knowing, Willing and Feeling respectively.

II.

The notions of truth and falsity imply that knowledge is a mode of consciousness which is, or should be, determined solely by the object.* Consciousness or subject must merely reveal or discover the object neither adding anything to it nor

2. cf. "Jñānaṁ tu pramāṇajanyaṁ, pramāṇaṁ ca yathābhūtavastu viṣayaṁ ato jñānaṁ kartum akartum anyathā va kartum aśakyaṁ kevalaṁ vastutantra meva tat, na codanā tantraṁ nāpi puruṣatantram" Sankara's Bhāṣya on the Br. Sutr. I, 1. 4 "Na vastu yātaṁya jñānaṁ paraśabuddhyapekṣam, kim tarhi, Vastutantra meva tat", *Ibid*, II. 2.

distorting it. To be discovered, the object of knowledge should exist prior to and independent of the knowing; it must be an accomplished fact—a *siddha vastu*—, one that is not brought into being through the knowing. If it were simultaneous with knowledge or were created by it, how can any knowledge be true or false? The perception of the "rope-snake" would not be an illusion and would not be recognised as such any time, if the rope were not conceived as existing both during and before the illusion; it must be something absolutely independent of our knowing of it. Once this is granted that the object of knowledge should exist prior to it, we cannot also assign any period or limit to its priority. For, to do any such thing, we have to reach a stage when consciousness alone existed and the object was ushered into being later on, presumably by the former. It is evident that such a consciousness is not knowledge; it is will. However far back we may trace our knowledge, it will always presuppose the object as something prior to it. This priority is not primarily temporal, but only signifies the accomplished character of the object.

Similar considerations require that the object of knowledge should not be subject to the accidental conditions of the percipient. To take the example of perspectives. If a certain object were to be known from a certain position at a certain time and by a certain person only, we cannot call that object real, nor that knowledge true. For, we have absolutely no means of deciding whether the object is not our creation or a joint product of the conditions of the percipient and those of the object. Thus the object of knowledge cannot be particular; it must be universal, free from all conditions. And if this were pushed further, it would mean that strictly speaking only pure Being can be said to be the object par excellence.

Not only is the object to be independent of knowledge but

we have also to regard the object as not requiring its being known by any consciousness not even the possibility of such in the last resort. When we know an object we need not at once be conscious of this very knowing. For, the object, which alone should determine the nature of consciousness in knowledge, says nothing about its present knownness or past unknownness. A self-conscious knowing is possible, as will be shown later, through its complication with will.

The above contentions about the ideal of knowledge run counter to the commonly received principle of idealism that the object is mind-dependent in some way or the other. But all arguments of idealism, *e. g.* those of Berkeley and Hegel, rely upon feeling and will and misapply them to knowledge. The knowledge-absolutist agrees with the realist and with Kant, as against the idealist, that the object of knowledge is, or should be independent of the knowing consciousness. There is profound disagreement however with realism in another respect; the realist uncritically believes that what is ordinarily given is knowledge. The *a priori* psychology adumbrated here holds, with Kant, that knowledge as we generally understand is invariably mixed up with other functions; much of what passes off as knowledge is feeling and imagination (will) especially. There is thus a call to purify the given to arrive at what is really known. This comes to mean that what passes for knowledge is illusory, phenomenal. Knowledge-illusion is possible through the complication, in varying degrees, of knowledge with feeling and will; the latter are mistaken for knowledge. And it is the peculiar feature of transcendental psychology to justify this contention by showing the complication and the resolution of the functions.

III.

We take the second kind of relation between consciousness and content, namely that in which the former determines the

distorting it. To be discovered, the object of knowledge should exist prior to and independent of the knowing; it must be an accomplished fact—a *siddha vastu*—, one that is not brought into being through the knowing. If it were simultaneous with knowledge or were created by it, how can any knowledge be true or false? The perception of the "rope-snake" would not be an illusion and would not be recognised as such any time, if the rope were not conceived as existing both during and before the illusion; it must be something absolutely independent of our knowing of it. Once this is granted that the object of knowledge should exist prior to it, we cannot also assign any period or limit to its priority. For, to do any such thing, we have to reach a stage when consciousness alone existed and the object was ushered into being later on, presumably by the former. It is evident that such a consciousness is not knowledge; it is will. However far back we may trace our knowledge, it will always presuppose the object as something prior to it. This priority is not primarily temporal, but only signifies the accomplished character of the object.

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strictly to the deliverances of the object. Not so in willing. Self-consciousness, self-assertion, seems to be inseparable from willing. When we are willing, we can not be self forgetful. The self conscious or reflective character of the functions is thus due to the presence of will. Reflection in all cases means an arrest of functioning. The functioning itself acquire an interest, which may be either in the service of further and efficient functioning, as when we examine an instrument to improve its efficiency, or purely to understand the function itself without any ulterior motive. The former attitude is that of science; the latter is that of philosophy.

We have to controvert the position that willing can be reduced to either knowledge or feeling and that it is itself known. In knowing our consciousness is that we are merely discovering an existent being; in willing it is just the reverse; the willed being what is formed *through* the willing. Nor is will known; for an object of knowledge on our definition, is an accomplished fact, and willing is not a piece of thing that you can find lying about somewhere; it is precisely the activity itself and is not to be had before or after the willing. How then do we speak *about* will, if it were not known? Precisely the same question might be asked about knowing. Speaking seems common to all the functions. It might be thought that before we can will anything, we must know what to will, and only then can we desire to bring it about through our willing. This seems so axiomatic and unquestionable that no further argument seems necessary. So knowledge precedes willing, it is concluded. But things might be put the other way round. Before we could know an object, our consciousness must reach up to it, and this reaching itself cannot be actuated by a knowledge of the thing to be known. This difficulty is obviated, one may urge, because we already know the thing. In that case, however, we cannot assert we know anything; for how could we say 'we know', if we have been knowing an

latter. This can be identified with willing. Willing is to be defined as the consciousness of a content that is brought into being *through* the willing; the content is consciously felt to have had no being apart from the willing of it; it is as we will it, neither before nor after the willing. The content is conditioned and determined wholly by consciousness. This definition of will is satisfied with regard to our activity in the physical and psychic spheres. When we will any action, e. g. a certain changed position of our limbs, we are at once conscious that the object of our will is not an existent fact, which we could have come across in the natural course of things—that would precisely be Knowing—but as one about which there is the consciousness of our *freedom* in bringing it about, alter or even abandon it.³ The same attitude is illustrated in pure imagination or conscious dreaming. Pure imagination is to be distinguished from reproductive imagination or memory and from hypothesis—all of which is in the service of knowledge. In these, we recur to a fact already known, accomplished. Pure imagination creates and shapes its object. The difference between the two is analogous to the difference between history and story. Construction or imagination may be necessary in history too, but such imagination is strictly subordinated to the accomplished facts.

In contradistinction to knowing which is surrender to the object, willing is just the reverse. If truth be the ideal of knowledge, freedom is the ideal of will. There is also another difference. When we know an object there is not at once the knowledge that we know it, or even that we were not knowing it before, for we have, in knowledge, to confine ourselves

3 cf. "Kṛiyā hi nāma sā yatra vastu svarūpanirapekṣaiḥ cedyate, puruṣa cittavyāpārādhlā ca." Sankara's Bhāṣya on Br. Sutr I i. 4. "Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum laukikam vaidikam ca Karma" *Ibid.* I. I. 2.

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entity always, invariably? There must therefore have been a time when it was unknown, unreacted. Some self alienation or factual gap is pre supposed in the assertion 'we know it'. And for this gap to be transcended, a pure activity is needed. Willing is thus a mode of consciousness co-ordinate with knowledge.

Illusion in willing happens when what is really knowledge or feeling is mistaken for will. For instance, in most of our volitions we are actuated by feelings, by desires and passions, the apparent exercise of freedom notwithstanding. That we should incline towards one course of action out of several equally possible alternatives can never be explained on the basis of pure will alone. Will has no content, no material pattern by which it could prefer one and reject others. To say that we choose what is rationally higher or the good and that therefore we are free agents is to beg the question. For with regard to the next questions what is good or in the interests of the true self etc. our only appeal would be to feelings, to what we feel as pleasurable. Thus in any exercise of volition, which ends in commitment to a positive course of action, it is not pure will that is functioning. Something else, some content which has become a mode of the subject, is getting things done through us. Illusory or wrong willing is no willing at all.

IV

To take up the third and last kind of relation that can obtain between content and consciousness, that in which the determination of the one or the other is not emphasised. Knowing involves the distinction of the object from consciousness; the object is something accomplished and independent. In willing, consciousness is distinguished from the content, which is immediately felt as having a being only through the former. In both of these, a distinction between content and consciousness seems necessary and can be validated by experience.

Now if we could prove that there is a mode of consciousness in which the distinction between consciousness and content is either not made or only very imperfectly made, we could have evidenced feeling. Feeling is the contact or identification of consciousness with object. It is the nature of feeling that it is a unity which militates against any aloofness or emphasis of one side against the other. It is not contended that feeling is possible without object but only that it is a state in which consciousness and content are not distinguishable; and this very fact of non-distinction becomes evident only when we pass over from the unreflective to the reflective stage.

It might be contended that feeling is of the nature of pleasure or pain, there being no feeling which is neither of these, and that it is always known. But, being opposed to each other pleasure and pain cannot both be considered feeling; it should be either the one or the other. That both are considered feeling implies that there is something common and more basic to them. And this can only be the contact of the subject with the object; if the contact is favourable, the feeling is one of pleasure, if otherwise pain is the feeling. It will be shown that pleasure and pain involve willing, reflection. Pain is the consciousness of the unavailing efforts to get away from contact with some undesired object, while pleasure is the consciousness of the success of effort.

Is feeling known? By knowing we should always take the apprehension of a content which is an accomplished fact and independent of the apprehending consciousness; the object is distinguished from the knowing of it. Feeling is not known and this for two reasons. Feeling is not an object existing by itself, an accomplished fact, which we only view calmly and dispassionately. There cannot be feeling, if such a detachment or distinction is made between consciousness and content. Secondly, the difference between feeling, if it were objectified, and knowledge would not be a functional or co-ordinate

difference, for feeling would be a species of object as red or the table and not a mode of relation between consciousness and content. The difference between feeling and the table would be sought to be made on the ground that the latter is an outer object while the former is an inner one. But this very distinction of the 'inner' and the 'outer' would involve feeling; we call that 'inner' with which we are identified intimately and perhaps inseparably.

Hitherto we have essayed to show that feeling is a mode of consciousness that is different from either knowing or willing, something more basic and primitive to them. It might be thought that feeling as such is unreflective and that there is no reflective, or reflection into, feeling. In one sense it must be admitted that each feeling is particular and unique; the very same feeling can not be resurrected; and this because of some obvious considerations. Even if we had the identical feeling once again, we would still have to account for the consciousness of two occurrences of the same feeling; the second and later occurrence is thus an individual feeling different from the previous one, though it might have a feeling reference to that. The essence of feeling is not its unreflective character which may be its limiting case, but the comparative non distinction between consciousness and content. This is available in a reflective state too. A reflective feeling can be defined as that state in which to feel and at once to be aware of it as feeling are not distinct, distinguishable.

An explicit case of such a reflective feeling is present in recognition. In recognition there is the feeling of familiarity, of encountering the same object. Recognition can be roughly taken as the collation of two percepts. How are we to account for the feeling of familiarity without having recourse to a reflective feeling? It is obvious that the object, in its first or second encounter, does not carry with it any mark that it

is the same object encountered before. It might be said that the identity of the object in the two occasions accounts for the feeling of familiarity. But the question is how is the identity of the object in two or more occasions ascertainable at all without bringing in two experiences, without feeling the two experiences to be the same. If this is accepted, we must also guard against the error that the first experience is somehow made the object of the second and so on, as some realists hold. For this would raise precisely the same difficulty about the identity of the first experience with what is objectified in the second one. Nor is the one experience an identical repetition of the other, for then there would not even be the notion of two experiences; the two are not numerically one. So our ordinary notions of identity based on the object of knowledge are inapplicable: the identity here is compatible with difference: there are two numerically distinct experiences but still the later experience is direct and self-conscious. We have thus to grant that in recognition the feeling of familiarity is to be accounted for by the supposition that the two experiences without losing their uniqueness as two are in same sense indistinguishable from each other. Therefore we cannot say that the first experience is the *object* of the second; if it were so, it would amount to knowledge, not feeling. Because the two experiences are imperfectly distinguished, we should call the state feeling, and as there is a distinct reference by the one to the other, it is reflective. The whole thing is felt as feeling without the mediation of any other state. How precisely is the one experience included in the other is more than what we can say. Possibly, there is a re-enactment of the first feeling in an attenuated form in the later stage.

What is true of recognition or re-perceiving the same object is true of any determinate cognition, reflective thought. We have to show that determinate cognition is really re-cognition.

Reflection is, for our purposes the consciousness of a content as to a consciousness. That is, we are attending more intensely to that object which we were attending to unreflectively; we are merely making things more definite, determinate. Thus the identity of the object presented to us in the two stages is necessary for reflection. But has not the very attempt to make things more determinate constituted a break in our experience, made one reflective and the other unreflective in contrast? Now the identity of the object, *i. e.*, the identity of the substantive, is necessary; otherwise our judgment will be a mere fancy; it must refer to the 'that' or the given. How is this identity of the substantive accounted for? Not as the realistic view as exemplified in the Nyāya, would have it that the indeterminate cognition (Nirvikalpa) is made the object of a subsequent determinate cognition; for we still have to account for the identity of the first indeterminate cognition with the object of the subsequent cognition. The only feasible solution is that the identity of the substantive is felt, not known: the reflective is at once directly aware of the unreflective not as an object distinctly presented before it but as one with itself, indistinguishable from, though not completely merged with itself. What is true of the reflective and unreflective consciousness, *i. e.* of the adjective and the substantive, is true of all relations as well. The being of a relation is really a mode of feeling, though ordinarily relation is taken as an accomplished object of knowledge.

Pain and pleasure are also feelings on the reflective level. They are reflective in the sense that to feel pleasure or pain and to be aware of feeling it are one and the same thing. This is not to be construed, as already shown, that pleasure and pain are presented as objects of knowledge. Cancellation of an illusory feeling is also of the nature of reflective feeling; for cancellation has a reference to the prior illusion and to itself as a correction, both rolled into one.

V.

These three modes of consciousness—Knowing, Willing and Feeling—thus represent three different and complementary ways of attending to the object. All mental life is compounded of these. Any particular indeterminate element or any related whole is to be traced to feeling; self-consciousness, reflection and the transition from one state to another are due to will, determinateness—describability and universality—is to be attributed to knowledge.

Though not reducible to one another, each is expressible negatively in terms of others, as all are speakable. Willing, in terms of knowledge, is conscious absence of knowledge, which amounts to no knowing at all. When will is complete, as in absolute negation, there is no object left; knowing is eliminated. Feeling, with reference to knowledge, is something unknown, vague—one that is mere datum requiring determination. It can be said to be known as unknown. Knowing, in terms of willing, is dependence, a surrender to something non-existent, and if knowing were complete, as in pure contemplation, there is an end to will. Consciousness is absorbed and lost in the object. Feeling, with regard to will, serves as a basis for its exercise. Knowledge in terms of feeling, is what is unfelt, indifferent, something lacking in the subjective side. Will, in relation to feeling, is intense desire, something lacking in the objective side. It might be seen that feeling is more primitive and basic than the other two; it is 'thicker.'

VI.

Such is our *a priori* scheme. It is to be seen whether it can be useful in interpreting our mental states. We have a two-fold thesis to maintain. One is that each state—not the pure abstractions we have been considering—is compounded of all the three, and we have to find the precise meaning of the involution in one mode of the others. Secondly, we must,

by emphasising one of the modes to the exclusion of others, arrive at an absolute and pure form in each case, as Pure knowledge, Pure willing and Pure feeling. These are incapable of entering into any further combination and are, what may be called, 'incommensurable absolutes.'

To elucidate the first thesis. Any text-book on psychology acquaints us with the notion that every psychosis is not expressible in less than three attitudes towards a presentation. We know a certain thing, feel towards, *i. e.* affected by it in a certain way, and there is conation. But the way in which these modes are present in a psychosis is left vague. It is evident that the modes are not precipitated together either simultaneously or together. For both will militate against the unity and continuity of mental life; there will be no sense in one involving the other attitudes; they would be merely juxtaposed, and the utmost that can be said is that they are close to each other. A more plausible view is that one mode appears unitary and single, but it implicitly contains others; greater attention is required to bring out the complication. This hypothesis has at least the merit of explaining how, for introspection, the states appear entire and unitary and also make provision for critical analysis. Each state is thus an illusion, only waiting to be resolved into its components by analysis, which thereby constitutes its cancellation.

It might be urged that there are no subjective illusions; for introspection—which is the only evidence available here—is not liable, being a direct and immediate awareness, to error. Our hypothesis, however, questions the infallibility of introspection. The very impossibility of having any objective illusion without confusion of subjective functions is an argument in our favour. Take for instances, the 'rope-snake' illusion—"This is a snake." The 'this' before me is apprehended as the snake. Analysis here shows that I am in actu

contact with the 'this'—whatever that may be ; it is not determinate ; we merely feel it, perceive it unreflectively. Simultaneously, there is the knowledge of the 'snake,' which is a universal in the sense that it is a character which has no habitation, and has certainly nothing to do with the 'this' before me. There are thus two distinct functions—feeling and knowing, and because of a confusion of these two there is illusion, does the 'snake' confront us as the 'this.' Cancellation merely analyses the apparently unitary nature of illusion into the different functions, and at the same time evidences that the different functions were present at the time of illusion but as confused, not carefully attended to as they should have been. The 'this' which was indeterminate, feeling, becomes more determinate as the rope ; the 'snake' which though a universal, was tied up with the presentation 'this,' is contemplated, after cancellation, as a pure universal. All this comes to mean that the confusion of the subjective functions of knowing and feeling ceases. To take another instance, Intense brooding or even dreaming, when beguiled by feeling, results in the apparent confronting by us of an accomplished object out there. The willed or imagined character of the content is lost sight of ; it appears as an object of knowledge, accomplished and independent. There is illusion because the two functions are not kept separate, and cancellation, when it follows, brings out the purely willed character of the content.

The second thesis is that the contention about these functions being confused usually requires their being available in a pure form. As a matter of fact, if the functions were not analysable and available separately, the first contention itself could not have been made. It is because after the cancellation of an illusion the components can be had without confusion of the one with the other are we able to say that in illusion there was no such discrimination, that anything appeared

unitary and simple. The thesis can be put in more general terms: any distinction demands the experience of the distincts in a pure form. Distinction cannot be precipitated all at once in one etago of consciousness; it presupposes a prior non-distinctive stage and points out to a subsequent one of distincts in a pure experience. For instance, if the judgment were a distinction of the 'what' from the 'that' or as the bringing of a percept under a concept, our thesis demands a state wherein these distinctions are not made, e.g., the perceptive or non reflective consciousness, and another wherein the 'what' is contemplated. We should be able to point to a stage prior to the judgment and one supervening it.

Both these theses will be illustrated if we began with the less developed states and by proper arrangement reached up to the pure forms. This will at once show that ordinary forms of Knowing, Feeling and Willing are really compounded of all the three, and that the functions are available in their pure form only as absolutes. We can but indicate the general trend of such an arrangement leaving, for a future occasion, the detailed working out of such a series in each of these functions.

VII.

Taking the judgment as on the reflective level of consciousness, which may be knowing, will or feeling as already shown, we should be able to posit an experience prior to the judgment and another beyond it. The judgment stands midway between the unreflective and eupra-reflective or transcendental consciousness.

Any genuine judgment is of the form—"This is A," involving belief in the existence of a fact, a given something is judged. Judgment may thus be said to work upon a percept. The content of a judgment is thus necessarily differentiated into the 'that' and the 'what', the whole judgment however

is but very imperfectly distinguished from the judging consciousness. Our first contention is that the 'that' refers to a fact, a percept and is a unique particular, while the 'what' is a concept, universal. As Bradley says, Reality must fall outside the judgment, so that it can be predicated of that. Slightly changing this, we might say that the 'that' must refer to an actual perception; otherwise the entire judgment would be a fiction, surreptitiously put in the form of a judgment; moreover, if all judgments were such creations implying no reference to a reality outside the judgment, the distinction of the 'what' from the 'that' would not itself be made.

Ordinarily, there is much reason to regard the unreflective or the perceptual stage as feeling, as it is indeterminate. But it can be interpreted on the knowledge-side too, if the subsequent reflective consciousness is informative and not affective or conative. The transition from perception to judgment is coincident with greater determination, universalisation and idealisation, of the content. To discriminate is to disengage; the 'what' is disengaged from the 'that.' The transition is engendered by recognition and judgments of quantity. Recognition, as the collation of two percepts helps to free certain characters common to both, helps in the disengaging of the adjective from the substantive.

In a judgment the 'what' is no doubt distinguished from the 'that'; but it still seems to be tied up with, or to belong to, the 'that'. There is a demand to completely free and contemplate it as a pure universal. The transition from the judgment to the contemplative stage is engendered through the disjunctive and the hypothetical and culminates in the negative judgment. Now the disjunctive and the hypothetical fall short of the judgment-ideal which is an affirmation or ascription; the 'or' and the 'if' do not amount to any information but suggest the possibility of the freedom of the 'what' from the 'that'; and as such they point to a stage of

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no-judgment or negation. Negation presents itself as correction or cancellation of illusions. The ultimate import of negation may be viewed in two different ways: one in the service of knowledge and the other in that of will. What all can we negate is wrong ascription, all relation in the last resort; the essential speakable character of an entity can not be denied; for to deny is to speak it and evidence it as an essence. What all can we deny of the rope-snake? Only its relatedness to other entities; to the 'this' etc. and its temporal and spatial position, bringing out thereby its essential indescribable character. The 'snake' will still be an object of contemplation. Interpreted on the will-side, negation would mean the utter nothingness of the negated; it would not even be a speakable. For, it may be urged about the 'snake' etc. that when all its relatedness is denied, nothing is left over; the 'snake' never appeared except in the related way; it has no provable existence apart from the relation.⁴

We now reach a stage in which the objects of knowledge are universals or essences; there is no relation, reference or implication; everything appears entire; there is nothing dark or confused about the essences. This is the stage of contemplation. Even here some stages may be imagined. First, the sense of transition from one universal to another has to be eschewed, for this smacks of distraction of attention. Likewise the feeling of one's subjective act (the 'I') contemplating such forms has also to be transcended. In the last resort the subject must merge, as it were in the object—pure Being. This would mark the culmination of knowledge-series; the absolute of knowledge, Pure Being, is reached. Thus we could

4 These two ways of interpreting negation correspond roughly to the two theories of illusion—*Anirvacanīya* Khyāti and *Asat* Khyāti, advocated by the Vedāntin and the Sāṅhya Vādin (*Mādhyaṁika*) respectively.

indicate three stages—the unreflective (perceptual), reflective (judgment) and the contemplative stages. *Mutatis mutandis*, these stages exemplify those of feeling and Will.

Some general and baffling questions arise here. One is the question whether the Absolutes of Knowledge, Feeling and Will are really incommensurable. Is not there a very deep and inexpressible identity of all the three, the differences being due to the different modes of approach and not to any essential diversity? The second question is about the necessity of a spiritual discipline, in each of these functions, for reaching the absolute, how much do they have in common and what are their specific features.

Bosanquet on 'Religious Consciousness.'

BY

BENOY GOPAL RAY, M.A.

Religion is for Bosanquet the central experience whose understanding carries us towards a comprehension of Reality. Hegel declares 'Religion is the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as Absolute Mind.' Bosanquet mingles his tune with that of Hegel when he says 'Religion is just the weld of the finite and the infinite.' Religious consciousness then amounts to the recognition of its own nature by a finite-infinite creature. When the finite-infinite nature asserts itself with any approach to completeness, then we have not merely self-transcendence of the finite but a present realisation of perfect satisfaction. The perfect satisfaction is to be the Absolute. But the present realisation of the perfect satisfaction which the religious consciousness offers does not carry us to the Absolute, the complete individuality. It is simply the recognition by the finite being of its own incapacity for such an attainment and the insistence, in spite of this, on its own unity in principle. 'Every satisfaction and achievement—every self-transcendence in which we become united with something which was beyond us—may be religiously felt, if it is taken as involving recognition of a higher perfection, that is, as coming to us not in our own strength, but as a pledge of our absorption in the greater world.'¹ The true religious attitude is felt when we find a devotion which makes the finite self seem as nothing and some reality to which it attaches itself seem as all. The finite self cannot exist in its own right. The finite self is not self-subsistent and would be nothing by itself. Apart from the context and reactions of other things the finite self is nothing. The whole, the complete individuality, is the

1. *What Religion is*, p. 62

2. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 227.

true reality. Every finite self has a nisus towards the whole. The true value of the finite self lies in its being the member of the whole. Thus we see that repudiation by the finite of its exclusiveness is an important phase of the religious attitude. The finite self contributes to the unity of the whole in its religious experience. The finite being feels his will and emotions absorbed and transfigured in the perfect will which is also his will but this will is realised through conflict so that pain, evil, effort and aspiration are present in the finiteness by which the individual contributes to the Divine perfection as a depth or tension or seriousness of the religious experience.³

The essential character of the finite life is rooted in its double nature. Being double-natured, it is torn between its existence and its self-transcendence. The self in the striving to complete itself will welcome the accidents, conflicts and adventures. Hazards and hardships attend upon it not incidentally but inherently. The finite self is very insecure in itself. But the vice of finiteness can be cured and the genuine stability and security of the finite self can be guaranteed. The final stability of the finite self is in the self-recognition of the self in the religious consciousness. This recognition will be represented as maintaining itself throughout by means of the pangs of self-formation and the adventurousness of finite living. 'The value of the individual lies in his contribution as offered to the Absolute, and his destiny, in its essential features, must be the detail of the self-recognition on which the offering depends.'⁴ Self-recognition is another name for religious consciousness. Thus we see that our value lies in the religious consciousness. The troubles and adventures of finite life are instrumental to self-recognition.

3 *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 227.

(Some phrases that occur in this page have been pieced together).

4. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 18.

Religious consciousness gives us salvation. It is by way of religion that man attains to a basic confidence in life and comes 'to be at home' in the universe. Salvation comes only though 'giving ourselves to something which we cannot help holding supreme.' Thus to give one's self is the attitude of faith. Hence the whole meaning of religion might be summed up in the well-known expression 'justification by faith.' The universal basis and structure of religion appears wherever man is devoted to a cause 'where his personal fate seems to him as nothing in comparison of the happiness or triumph' of the cause." The question may here arise: 'Wilt thou be made whole?' Bosanquet replies: 'Yes.' How? Bosanquet says, we are made whole through joining a whole. A finite being is not an individual. It exhibits discordant ideas and attitudes, conflicting systems of thought and habit. The soul which constitutes the finite being is the principle of nationality. This generates the effort of readjustment, reconciliation and incorporation into more comprehensive non-contradictory wholes. The world of claims and counter claims with its typical manifestations is incapable of independently maintaining itself. It can exist only within the deeper and more comprehensive order of spiritual whole.

Is the religious consciousness only to be had through philosophy? Philosophy depends on the religious consciousness but the latter does not depend on the former. 'Religious experience comes to include the vision of all that has value united in a type of perfection.' Metaphysics only attempts at a theoretical interpretation of it. But metaphysics helps religious consciousness in separating the essential from the unessential. Bosanquet asserts that religious consciousness is different from morality. His philosophy of religion centres in the doctrine that the perfection to which we aspire can

only be enjoyed in the recognition of our membership in a whole which is perfect. The man for whom morality is the last word will try to gain an end by 'good works.' But the very nature of finite life in time makes such an end unattainable. On the other hand, the religious man is delivered from the 'feverish anxiety induced by the belief that the good depends upon the efforts of himself.' He believes in the eternal perfection of the Ultimate and Absolute Reality of which he is but an organ. He believes that 'only in an assurance of Unity with the Eternal won through the surrender of all finite claims is the supreme satisfaction that religion promises attainable by man.' In morality the individual seems to sustain the weight of the world. All is on his shoulders. But in religious consciousness such exclusiveness never arises. It may be remarked here that morality cannot go without religion. In morality the individual takes everything on his shoulders. But if the question be asked—What is the individual? The answer is given by religious consciousness. Here morality comes within the arena of religion proper. Religion is the last word, and not morality.

The doctrine of the Incarnation meant to Bosanquet this that while we can attain that perfection after which we aspire in so far as we find our satisfaction not in anything which is ours as separate individuals, but only in the perfection of the whole whereof we are members, we learn to do this first through the identification of ourselves with social wholes which are indeed less than the absolute whole but which serve as surrogates of that absolute whole.⁶ The significance of group-life for the understanding of religion is emphasised here. The Divine is immanent in the social life of man. This alone makes it possible for religion to develop through the experience of human fellowship. Bosanquet holds that the

6. *Hibbert Journal*, vol. XXII. pp. 79, 80

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

have truth is expressed by the Christian doctrine that God has been made man and manhood has been taken into God.

What does religion yield? It does not yield escape from effort, release from pain or respite from evil. These are involved in the very structure of finitude and it cannot be expected that they will vanish either now or hereafter. Religion affords emancipation but it is emancipation through these experiences and not *from* them. Bosanquet declares: "In the broadest sense wherever man is devout—wherever he places his value in something beyond his private self, and that something taken to be real—there he has set his foot on ground which so far emancipates him from the hazards and hardships, the discipline of finiteness; or rather emancipates him not so much from these incidents as actually through them".⁷

Bosanquet is very eager to maintain the practicality of religion. He does this by drawing an arbitrary distinction between God and the Absolute. We shall see presently, that the conception of God is loosely connected with the rest of Bosanquet's philosophy. In religion good is still loaded with the inherent contrast to evil, and if evil were to disappear the practical attitude of religion would vanish. The inherence of evil within the religious consciousness proves the presence of evil in the consciousness of God. 'God conceived as identified with the finite struggle against evil, cannot be perfection—the Absolute—in which all evil is absorbed ...the fact that the religious attitude is largely practical, and the fact that religious tradition, with one voice, admits that it contemplates God in imaginative shapes, are thus obviously in agreement. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Lord Omnipotent, Creator, Providence—none of these terms can apply to a universe or an Absolute which has nothing outside it'.⁸ God of religion is not a being for

7. *Value and Destiny*, p 239

8. *Value and destiny* p 249

whom evil is annihilated. In the Absolute evil is absorbed and annihilated. Religion for Bosanquet is not the ultimate. It is difficult to reconcile this view with the contention as earlier set forth that man's religion offers him the clue to reality. How is it possible for Bosanquet to assert that in religious recognition man is secure? God of religion is an appearance of Reality. He is distinct from the whole and ultimate reality. Bosanquet promised at the outset security and stability to finite creatures in their religious recognition. In the end he declares, religion is not ultimate. It is only a step towards the Absolute, the complete individuality. Bosanquet is helpless whenever he makes a distinction between God and the Absolute. If Absolute be the ultimate reality, how can we attain the Absolute? Is it through religious recognition? No. Religious recognition gives us appearance only. 'The conclusion is, in a word, that the God of religion, inherent in the completest experience, is an appearance of reality as distinct from being the whole and ultimate reality.....' Bosanquet himself raises the difficulty and tries to offer a solution. "If the standpoint of religion is as we held, not ultimate; if it is possible and necessary to conceive of the Absolute as something of which religion itself, with the conflict of good and evil, is not a complete account, to what attitude or mode of recognition on our part does such a conception correspond? We have definitely rejected the idea that philosophy is superior to religion. But there is something more to be said. There is always, I suppose, a normal and general mode of consciousness, an awareness of a certain kind of object, corresponding to every reflective attitude which really proves distinct and well-grounded; and to this philosophy, as the theory of the Absolute, is no exception."⁹ Here we find, Bosanquet at first

9. *Value and destiny*. p. 255.

10. *Value and Destiny* p. 311.

repudiates philosophy and takes up the cause of religion. In the long run he reverses the process and lapses back to philosophy. He says: "The universe is the magnificent theatre of all the wealth of life, and good and evil are within it. This I think, we are aware of when at our best, and this awareness corresponds to the sense of the Absolute whole within which religion itself is a feature.....Here in passing, we have elucidated our common sense of the Absolute, the real awareness of an inclusive world to which philosophy as a reflective theory corresponds, and which widens and sweetens our religious consciousness."¹¹ Now we find our knowledge and attainment of the Absolute are dependent on 'the awareness.' When have we the awareness? Bosanquet replies—we have the awareness when we are at our best. Let the question be pushed—How do we know that we are at our best? Bosanquet here does not give a clear and decisive answer. Are we then at our best in religious recognition where we make the finite selves seem as nothing and some reality to which we attach ourselves seem as all? Bosanquet answers—No. Consistently he cannot show us any way to the Absolute. All difficulties are due to the arbitrary distinction which he makes between God and the Absolute. He could have avoided all difficulties if he had confessed that there is no inherent distinction between God and the Absolute. God exists only as a self communicating life. The eternal fashion of the cosmic life is that creation is a self-revelation of the Divine in and to finite spirits. 'This then' Priogle-Pattison says, 'is the true Absolute' 'The Absolute then means God as thus organic to the world.'¹² The Absolute is 'God-and-the-world.' What is the good of making God an appearance of the Absolute? The arbitrary distinction only augments our troubles. Let us repeat. Absolute is God-and-

¹¹. *Ibid*, p. 312.

¹². *Idea of God* Supplementary notes p. 433

the-world. And what is God? Let us say with Pringle-Pattison that God means not simply the existence of another self-conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which His life is the eternal fruition. Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love—these constitute the being of God.

One meets with another difficulty. An unbiased perusal of Bosanquet's account of religious consciousness and metaphysics reveals the fact that Bosanquet treats the finite individuals as vanishing points. He states in his Gifford volumes that selves are formally distinct. The formal distinctness of selves is not affected at all by the extent of knowledge or sympathy they have in common. Bosanquet suggests that two minds may be so nearly identical that the one seems to reduplicate the other and yet they remain two minds to the end. But there is a strong tendency in Bosanquet to rebel against the formal distinctness of finite selves. The strongly monistic trend of his thoughts leads him to treat the individual as a negligible feature of the world. Our author emphatically asserts—It is true that the finite individual makes a contribution to the ultimate Reality, but this contribution is to be conceived as the contribution of an element or quality. "The finite self, like everything else in the universe, is now and here beyond escape an element of the Absolute"—to which we have the foot note: "I do not say a member of the Absolute". Such an expression might imply that it is separately and with relative independence a standing differentiation of the Absolute."¹³ The finite selves are made adjectives to the Absolute. Quite in the same spirit Bradley remarks, "To gain consistency and truth it (finite self as appearance) must be merged and recomposed in a result in which its speciality must vanish."¹⁴ "Taken together in the

13. Quoted by Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 270

14. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 306

whole, appearances as such cease.' In another place Bradley says—"We have a re-arrangement not merely of things but of their internal elements. We have an all-pervasive transfusion with a re-blending of all material. And we can hardly say that the Absolute consists of finite things, when the things, as such, are there transmuted and have lost their individual natures".¹⁵ We shall not multiply quotations. All the metaphors in which Bradley and Bosanquet so abound, expressive of the merging of the finite selves in the Absolute depend on the assumption that the finite individuals as such have no value. They treat them as adjectives of the One Reality.¹⁶ The world is dissolved into a collection of qualities which are housed in the Absolute. Both Bradley and Bosanquet are labouring under a misconception. The universal is no less an abstraction, if it is taken as real independently of the individuals whose living tissue it is. They realize themselves through it. It realizes itself in them. A social whole is the permeating life of the individual members. But it is nothing if we try to treat it as an entity apart from them. It follows then, that every individual is a unique nature. It constitutes a unique focalization of the universe. Bosanquet could have avoided all difficulties if he had substantially developed his idea of 'the concrete universal'. He says, "A world or cosmos is a system of members such that every member, being *ex hypothesi* distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctness.....Thus the true embodiment of the logical universal takes the shape of a world whose members are worlds.....The universal in the form of a world refers to diversity of content within every member, as the universal in the form

15. *Ibid.*, p. 529

16. Bosanquet expresses similar view in the symposium :—Do finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of Being?—*Life and Finite individuality.*

of a class neglects it. Such a diversity recognised as a unity, a macrocosm constituted by microcosme is the type of the concrete universal".¹⁷ The concrete universal is the true reality. In his *Logic* he hints at a similar conception.' The disjunctive judgment means not the bare 'either-or' of *Formal Logic*, but the system of subordinate forms into which the whole differentiates itself. But Bosanquet did not develop these ideas. In his *Gifford* volumes he started with these ideas but he discarded them in the long run. He holds in 'his account of religious consciousness that we have a devotion, a self-surrender. We make our selves seem as nothing. Our will is absorbed in the will for perfection. The strongly monistic trend of his metaphysics and the idea of utter and all-round dependency in religious recognition have undermined the organic conception of Reality which Bosanquet outlined in the beginning.

Another difficulty arises in this connexion. If religious insight is the recognition of dependence, we can recognize and affirm the dependence only when we have a certain independent status. When the religious man identifies himself with the perfection of the whole, the very act of self-identification implies the individual differences of the self that makes it. Otherwise, as Pringle Pattison suggests, "The whole thing is a puppet show, and we fall back on the vulgar pantheism which makes the Absolute the direct agent in everything that is done. The religious attitude—all that we mean by worship, adoration, self-surrender—is wholly impossible, if the selves are conceived as telephone wires along which the Absolute acts"¹⁸

The chief merit of Bosanquet lies in his rich conception of self-recognition. In religious consciousness the finite-infinite

17. *Principle of Individuality and value*, pp 37,38

18. *Idea of God*, p. 291

Indian Philosophy.

(A REVIEW)*

Prof Hiriyanna is to be congratulated on his giving us such an admirable introduction to the different systems of Indian thought. He knows the texts very well and has succeeded in conveying their philosophic import in clear and precise language easily intelligible to a student of western philosophy. Not all writers on Indian philosophy are thoroughly conversant with the original Sanskrit texts, and even those who are, are not always able to translate the original ideas into the language of western thought. Thus we sometimes get presentations of Indian thought which are verbally true to their original sources, but which utterly fail to bring out the philosophical significance of the original. Prof. Hiriyanna combines in himself the merit of a Sanskrit scholar with that of a philosophic interpreter, and has given us a work which on the whole is very reliable and can be recommended to all beginners in Indian Philosophy.

Still we should like to make some comments on certain points. Our first point is not specifically against Prof. Hiriyanna's book but against all treatises which purport to deal with Indian philosophy and give special treatment to the Vedas, Upanisads, Bhagavad gita, and such other works, besides the various recognised systems. It seems to have become an established tradition with the writers on Indian philosophy, whenever they give a comprehensive survey, to begin with the philosophy of the Vedas. We do not understand why it should be so. Philosophy means systematic thinking, and the works mentioned above, do not seem to embody any systematic thinking. There may be some

philosophic ideas in them, but this should not entitle them to any special treatment in a serious work on philosophy. Browning and Wordsworth have given expression to philosophic ideas in their works, but they are never treated as representatives of British philosophy. We should like therefore that a treatise on Indian philosophy should devote itself to recognised systems of philosophic thought and should not treat of the Rig-Veda or the Mahābhārata. If we are to include in a work on philosophy the consideration of any work which contains some philosophical ideas, it will be difficult in principle to set any limit to those which will have to be considered. I think many Purāṇas and Tantras have better claim to be treated philosophically than the Vedas. We do not minimise the scriptural value of the Upanisads and the Bhagavad-gītā; but all scripture is not philosophy. A scripture should be treated philosophically only when it forms part of a philosophical system. We may construct philosophies to suit the scriptural texts, but it is too much to claim that they form themselves a philosophy.

Our next point is that our author does not seem to have given equal treatment to all systems. Jainism seems to have suffered worst. The account of Jainism is not included in the third part of the book which is devoted to the age of systems. Prof. Hiriyanna knows full well that the different systems of Indian philosophy have not historically grown one after another but have developed side by side with one another. So in a strict sense we cannot have a *history* of Indian philosophy, as there is a history of European philosophy. Prof. Hiriyanna has wisely named his book *outlines of Indian Philosophy*. But then why is Jainism put outside the age of systems? Is it because Jainism is not a system or because Jainism, as we know it today had completed its development before the age of systems began? We notice another fact. In the body of his treatment of

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(A REVIEW)*

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Jainism, our author has not mentioned any book or author on Jainism. He could have easily mentioned many authoritative works on Jainism, as he has done in the case of other systems, and this would have served as a valuable guide to advanced students.

He has offered his criticisms also. But in many cases we felt it would have been better if he had confined himself merely to the task of interpreting the various systems. He seems to have criticised other systems from the advaitic standpoint. This is apparent not only from the terms of his criticism but also from the fact that no criticism has been offered of the advaita-Vedānta. It may be that in the opinion of our author, while other systems are defective and so deserve criticism, the system of advaita-Vedānta suffers from no defects and so does not call for any criticism. But we cannot hope that this opinion will be universally accepted. In any case, the value of his work would have been enhanced if he had written as an impartial interpreter of different systems and had not given the impression that he was writing with an advaitic bias. But it must be admitted that although his bias is evident from the nature of his criticisms, it is mostly held in check and is not generally allowed to interfere with his interpretation. Perhaps it is too much to expect that a single individual will be able to deal with the entire range of Indian philosophy quite satisfactorily. The different systems of Indian thought represent, as it were, different types of mind with fundamentally different standpoints in logic and epistemology. If we do not possess the type of mind which a particular system represents, it is impossible for us to understand sympathetically the true meaning and the entire significance of the various concepts which the system uses. As we ordinary people possess individually but one mind, we can truly assimilate the teachings of one system only. So for ordinary people the ambitious attempt to write a book on

all the different systems of Indian philosophy is foredoomed to failure. It is only rare individuals who can genuinely sympathise with minds of different order and can view things equally well from different standpoints.

There are some minor points on which Prof. Hiriyanna appears to us to be slightly inaccurate. On pp. 221-2, he speaks of the *Mādhyamika* as a nihilist, because he has been so represented by his Hindu and Jain critics. But we cannot always get a correct idea of a philosophical theory from what its critics say about it. From the statements of the *Mādhyamikas* themselves it is not possible to conclude that they were nihilists, if by a nihilist we mean a supporter of the view that the ultimate fact about reality is pure negation.*

Our author speaks of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* as reduced, in its third stage of development, 'to a position ancillary to the study of philosophy in general and of the Vedānta in particular' (p. 225). A study of the *Nyāya* in its developed form as logic provides always a very good training in abstract thinking and so it may be studied with advantage by all students of philosophy and by the students of the Vedānta as well. But there have always been people, at least in Bengal, to study the *Nyāya* for its own sake. In fact those who took seriously to a study of this subject found little time and interest to study other subjects.

While speaking of the *Navya-Nyāya* Prof. Hiriyanna refers to Gaṅgeśa of Eastern Bengal as its founder. Gaṅgeśa, we know, belonged to Mithila which is probably to be identified with modern Darbhanga in Behar. Even if we suppose that at one time, Mithila was included in Greater Bengal, it cannot certainly be spoken of as Eastern Bengal. The name of Jagadīśa also might be mentioned along with that of

*Na punarabhūvaśabdasya yorthaḥ sa śūnyata (śabdasyārthah)—
Mūla-mādhyamika-kārikas Louis de la Vallée Poussin's Edition p. 49.

Gadādhara among the authors who are studied even now on the *Navya-Nyaya*.

We do not know who the 'modern writer is whom Prof. Hiriyanna has honoured with a quotation and according to whom Bacon's denunciations of Scholasticism may be 'most appositely illustrated by extracts from Gadadhara's writings' (p. 22). We doubt very much whether the writer in question has any acquaintance with Gadadhara's writings or knows what the Schoolmen wrote. It is unfortunate that a Sanskrit scholar like Prof. Hiriyanna should encourage such ignorant views about one whom we are accustomed to regard as a flower of Indian logical intellect.

Prof. Hiriyanna speaks of 'the realistic and pessimistic outlook' of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika. We understand the realistic character of this system. But why it should be described as pessimistic, we do not know, except in a sense in which all systems of Indian philosophy are pessimistic, because they believe in the painful character of worldly existence.

While dealing with the Nyāya view of the self, our author says that the self 'differs from matter only in that it may become conscious and not in that it is itself mental in nature' (p. 230). We do not usually speak of the self as mental. He no doubt means that according to the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, consciousness is not an essential character of the self.

When on the same page, he says that the mind (*manas*) 'does not give rise to a product,' he means that *manas* is never a material cause and not that it is not a cause or condition of any effect. It is certainly a cause or condition of knowledge which is an effect.

Prof. Hiriyanna says that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 'qualities are independent realities' (p. 23). This is bound to be misleading. The system in question does not hold that qualities can exist by themselves and they would be independent realities if they could so exist. And if they

could so exist the relation of *samavāya*, which is an inseparable relation, would not subsist between them and their corresponding substances. The quotation from *Nyāyamanjarī* (*pratīti bhedaḥ bhedosti*) given in a footnote (p. 232), does not primarily refer to qualities but to universals, and even if it is taken in connexion with qualities, it simply means that a quality is different from a substance, because our notion of a quality is not that of a substance. It cannot be construed to mean that a quality is an independent reality. Similarly, when he speaks of the independent reality of karma we should understand his statement in a qualified sense.

Our author says that relations 'are generally included in *guṇas*' (235). There are only twenty-four *guṇas* but any number of relations are accepted in the Nyāya system. This mistake is corrected in a footnote where it is said that strictly speaking there is only one relation that is included among the *guṇas*, viz. *Saṃyoga*. But it ends with another mistake when it is said that by *Saṃyoga* and *Samavāya* alone one of the relata can be said to be in the other. Things exist in time and space or in one another (when they are temporal) in different places, neither by *Saṃyoga* nor by *Samavāya*. When a term is related by a *Kālīka* or a *Svarūpa* relation with another term, it is said to exist in the latter, because these relations too are *vṛttiniyāmaka*, that is, they too regulate existence.

While discussing negation (*abhāva*), Prof. Hiriyanna seems to suggest that it is merely a mode of predication (p. 237). We should rather think that *abhāva* is not a mode of predication with the Naiyāyikas. It is as objective with them as any quality or substance.

When it is said that the effect 'inheres in the cause' (p. 239), we should understand the term 'cause' in the sense of material cause. The pot does not inhere in the potter

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but only in its parts, although the potter is also a cause of the pot.

Prof. Hiriyanna conceives the Naiyāyika self as inert (jaḍa) and finds it difficult to understand how knowledge can arise in it (p. 260). The term jaḍa is a technical term very current in Vedāntic literature and means anything that is objective. So what is jaḍa from the Vedantic point of view is not always inert as we ordinarily understand this term. When the self is credited with the capacity of knowledge, it is evident that the self is not inert like a piece of stone. The question, of course, is how the self, which is not in itself endowed with knowledge, can yet come to know. This presents no difficulty for the Naiyāyika, who believes that new effects can always come into being.

The Nyāya view of *mukti*, in which the self is supposed to have no knowledge at all, is condemned as 'repugnant to the common mind' (p. 226). By knowledge the Naiyāyika always understands empirical knowledge in which some object is known. Many others, including the advaitists, do not accept such knowledge in the state of *mukti*. The common mind will not certainly be more mystified by the statement that the self does not know in the state of release than by the saying that there is knowledge in that state, although nothing is known. The conception of *mukti*, however, is not a matter for the common mind to decide.

We wish Prof. Hiriyanna had given a more sympathetic interpretation of the Sāṅkhya system and had tried to bring out the philosophical significance of its theory of evolution. He might also point out the difference of opinion between Viśvaṇabhiṣu and Vacaspatiśiśra as regards the genesis of empirical knowledge.

We do not understand in what sense he speaks of this system as 'derivativo' (p. 292).

His account of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is particularly good. The philosophical views of the Mīmāṃsakas are not very widely known. But Prof. Hiriyanṇa has explained their tenets very well and has brought out the difference between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara school.

We have already referred to the fact that Prof. Hiriyanṇa seems to have criticised other systems from the advaitic point of view. From this we expected that his treatment of the Advaita Vedānta would be particularly illuminating. But we cannot say that our expectations were fully satisfied. It seems he has been much influenced by western thought. He is afraid of solipsism (p. 350) and subjectivism (p. 377) and likes to keep his advaitism free from these absurdities. He does not like to disturb the common view of the world and deprecates the suggestion that the world is unreal (p. 367). According to the Advaita-Vedānta the world no doubt has empirical reality (Vyavahārika sattā). But this only means that while we believe the world we cannot disbelieve it at the same time. This does not mean that the belief is right. Truly speaking for the Advaita-Vedānta the world is not.

Prof. Hiriyanṇa has tried to bring out the significance of the conception of Is'vara. But we must confess that we have not quite understood the meaning of his following statement. 'He (Is'vara) identifies himself with the whole world and the identification is not.....due to any confusion (adhyāsa) between the self and the not-self, but is the outcome of a continual realisation of the true nature of both' (p. 266). How can the self be identified with the not-self and that without confusion? And how is the identification a continual realisation of the nature of both? He says that the contradictions of ordinary experience have to be resolved in the seeming orderliness signified by the ideal of saguṇa Brahman, 'if we are to reach the advaitia ultimate unerringly' (p. 377). Do we have it from any reliable authority that the unerring path to

Her books are out to 'primarily enquire into the history of how to fit the nucleus of Pali Thought into the history of Indian religious ideas and to show in that nucleus an attempt at an expansion in that history, followed by a number of contracting changes (in the south) with a re expansion of distinctive character in the Far East' They are 'relatively less concerned with the domestic or topical history of either the founder or the church, but are rather a guide for advanced students for thoughtful and critical study Her books, we are sure, will serve as a pole star in the trackless jungle of Pali literature, as they embody the best fruits of the life long research of this world famous orientalist

Like all world teachers, Buddha came not to destroy but to fulfil, great teachers have their setting in the historical tradition of their own countries, they are both reformers and innovators Buddha is not an unconnected appearance in the religious evolution of India To understand the history of Buddhism we must never forget to wash off the complexion given it by 'alien' skies Buddha did uphold the Upanishadic teachings about the reality of the ultimate self, and there are passages, especially the metrical ones in the Pitakas which speak distinctly about the doctrine of self "To deny this," says the orientalist Edmond Holmes—the author of "The creed of Buddhism"—"is to wipe out the whole preceding religious teaching of India in force before and during the day of Buddha and to imagine a man like Gotama of the Sakjans trampling upon the Upanishadic teachings is to libel him unspeakably" "When I first read about Buddhism" reiterates the English Orientalist in support of Dr Rhys David's views, "I believed what I was taught in it, I believed that Buddha denied the soul and that Nirvāna, the goal of Buddhist aspiration and effort, was nothing more nor less than the annihilation of human personality I remember thinking myself rather c'

saying to a friend that christianity tells us to deny ourselves in order that we may die. This was nearly fifty years ago. Some twenty years later having made acquaintance with the Upanishads and having convinced myself that the soul is deathless and timeless, I renewed my study of Buddhism. It did not take me long to realise that if Buddha's teaching is to be understood it must be affiliated to the spiritual idealism of the Upanishads; that Buddha was the practical exponent of that philosophy; that whereas the Upanishads taught us what we really i. e. ideally are, the Atman and the Brahman being ideally one, Buddha taught us how to become what we really are. Had he denied the soul, had he meant by Nirvāna annihilation his teaching would not have dominated India for a single day, let alone for many centuries. It was, as Mr. Rhys Davids has pointed out, the monkish misinterpretation of his teachings—a misinterpretation which is preserved in the (Hināyana) Buddhism of to-day—which helped to alienate India from Buddhism. I say "helped", because other influences were at work. The emancipative trend of Buddha's teaching, its revolt against ceremonialism, its exaltation of conduct above ritual was one. But on that I need not dwell." "Buddha, or Gotama as I suppose I ought to call him was I think the greatest of India's sone. Will she not take him back to her heart, rescue him from monkish misinterpretation and encourage her sons to walk in the path of Becoming which he marked out for them? I owe so much to the Upanishads and the Rishis and so much to Buddhism that it goes to my heart to see the Founder of Buddhism, the greatest of the Rishis, still an exile so to speak from the land in which he was born and in which he lived and worked."

In India's religious teachings of 600 B. C. neither soul
nor mind ever meant the whole man. Beyond *that*

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About the life in the other worlds we find nothing in the Pitakas save echoes from the Upanishadic teachings; nor do we find a high cosmology evolved, that was unknown to the latter. Yogic Jnana for a gradual becoming along a More towards a final Most is emphatically of the older stratum. The inner guide or monitor-self was called Dharma thus shifting the emphasis from self and lending a new weight to the word 'Dharma'. That the inner Dharma had become worded as a formulated Dharma is a later formula alien to the main teaching. In the Anguttara Nikāya (Nipata 3, Dominance Sutta) self is worded in the verses (Versees betray more than Prose an older stratum of Indian thought) as the inner Witness in close conformity with the Upanishads as follows: "The inner Self of all, the Overseer of Karma is all-abiding, the Witness."

The doctrine of the God in man as self became rigid for lack of the idea of becoming and Buddha only stressed that but Sankhya swept the rising young Buddhist world under its influence. The decadent view of man as a bundle of transient factors or Karmas transmigrating without a doer is a formula of the Monks, not of Buddha. The first Sakyan missionaries were mainly Brahmans and the teachings were fundamentally their own but progressive radicalism of Sankhya mind-study strangled them. Ancient and genuine Sakya teachings laid utmost stress on the reality and the possibility of the very man or self while the trend of Pali Books written in alien skies is a poor ideal of questioning away the man and teaching less about his reality and ultimate destiny.

The Buddhist writers have regarded all sects other than Javada as mere heretical mushroom growths. The hour is at hand for better vision and for discerning the cancerous growth of changed and decadent values at a later age. This

visible man) and Nāma (the mind) there was the very inexpugnable 'me' in the innermost way. Both Sankhyan and Sakyan psychology disentangled the very man from body as well as mind to establish and separate Being for the very man even more clearly than before. The word for Divine immanent self and human self being same it is the empirical self that is being denied or rather dropped in the Pali Suttas and the empirical self i.e. body and mind is called Anatta or not-self. In the Pali Suttas, due to later quasi-scholastic paraphrasing, the shrinkage of the Indian concept of self is remarkable. But the quest of the highest self in the very words used by Gotama is as follows: "What is here in this Brahma citadel that must be searched out—that one should want to understand. Skt. Purusha (Pali Purissha) as synonymous with Divine self was retained for a time and then dropped at a much later date at the full outcome of the Sankhyan influence upon the Sakyan tradition. With the growing divergence and final severance of Buddhism from Brahmanism this new wording and reform came. The age leaning away from the static notion of Divine Being to the dynamic notion of Becoming. The immanent Deity had been renamed as Dharma. The mystery of ultimate source came to be worded as Avijja (nescience), man as body was called Bhava (Becoming) and as mind, Vijjāna; but when life in the other world is included Vijjāna meant spirit or soul Prajñā, an Indian religious term, meant the development of divine nature or the very God in man. And finally the Indian doctrine of Man as a wayfarer in the more bound for the immortal Most, the deathless Highest was discarded. But Buddha taught That which is Highest Brahman or Atman as follows: "Wherefore by one desiring the Self, longing for the great self the Dharma should be held in great reverence." Dharma is such an outstanding feature in the Pali Tripitakas that somehow Dharma has come to have the weight the Atmān

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had, much as the Atman came to have the weight Brahman alone had.

About the life in the other worlds we find nothing in the Pitakas save echoes from the Upanishadic teachings; nor do we find a high cosmology evolved, that was unknown to the latter. Yogic Jnana for a gradual becoming along a More towards a final Most is emphatically of the older stratum. The inner guide or monitor-self was called Dharma thus shifting the emphasis from self and lending a new weight to the word 'Dharma'. That the inner Dharma had become worded as a formulated Dharma is a later formula alien to the main teaching. In the Anguttara Nikāya (Nipata 3, Dominance Sutta) self is worded in the verse (Verse betray more than Prose an older stratum of Indian thought) as the inner Witness in close conformity with the Upanishads as follows: "The inner Self of all, the Overseer of Karma is all-abiding, the Witness."

The doctrine of the God in man as self became rigid for lack of the idea of becoming and Buddha only stressed that but Sankhya swept the rising young Buddhist world under its influence. The decadent view of man as a bundle of transient factors or Karmas transmigrating without a doer is a formula of the Monkdom, not of Buddha. The first Sakyan missionaries were mainly Brahmins and the teachings were fundamentally their own but progressive radicalism of Sankhya mind-study strangled them. Ancient and genuine Sakya teachings laid utmost stress on the reality and the possibility of the very man or self while the trend of Pali Books written in alien skies is a poor ideal of questioning away the man and teaching less about his reality and ultimate destiny.

The Buddhist writers have regarded all sects other than Theravada as mere heretical mushroom growths. The hour is now at hand for better vision and for discerning the cancerous growth of changed and decadent values at a later age. This

up-hill task has been done most wonderfully by Dr. Rhys Davids in her latest three books. Such a higher criticism of Buddhism was a had need of the Buddhist world. After an exhaustive study of the Pitakas and the commentaries critically and historically she has elicited what in them is left of the 'primitive' teachings. She has brought out a truer and sounder view of the New Word in Indian religion offered by Buddha. She has proved that Buddhism is emphatically an unbroken continuity of Indian religion in which Gotama was born and brought up, lived and died. She has redeemed the Buddhist world from the hell of atheism and Nihilism.* No other person to-day is fit for this arduous task of the reinterpretation of Buddhism. And to help posterity she is now busy in preparing a concordance of the Tripitakas for the study of Buddhism.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA.

*I have almost quoted the lines of the authoress very frequently to summarise her views to the reader without adding any personal effection.

The Life of Swami Vivekananda.—By His Eastern and Western Disciple. Published by Swami Vireehwarananda, Adwaita Ashrama, Mayawati, Almora, Himalayas. In Two Volumes. Price Rs. 4 (or 6s.) per volume.

This is the second edition of a most valuable and instructive work, considerably shortened and brought within a reasonable compass. Swami Vivekananda is one of those greatest sons of modern India whose signal services to the Hindu religion and culture will be remembered gratefully for centuries to come. In an age when orthodoxy was running rampant and when narrow religious conceptions accompanied by hatred towards other religions were the order of the day, he, a worthy disciple of a worthy Master, preached undaunted and singlehanded the glorious lesson of universal toleration and sober reforms. We in India often lack the authentic records of the lives of our most revered saints and instead have in most cases only some exaggerated accounts broadcasted by their ignorant and blind followers. We, therefore, congratulate heartily the Adwaita Ashrama on its having given to an eagerly awaiting world, in a reasonable compass, an authoritative and complete account of the life and career of one of India's great masterminds—one who made his irresistible influence felt not only throughout the length and the breadth of his own native land, but even in the far away nations of the earth and among people of a very different culture and religion.

What is the purpose and use, one may well ask, in writing the biographies of the great men of the world? Lives of great men, since the poet truly, are meant to remind us that we can make our lives sublime. To the ordinary reader, therefore, it is not primarily such events as Naren's feeling

an "inexpressible bliss" in the near presence of a dangerous cobra (Vol I, p 16), or the appearance between his eyebrows, every time he went to sleep, of a "wonderful spot of light of changing hues which would expand and burst and bathe his whole body with a flood of white radiance," (*Ibid* p 15), that create a permanent interest in any account of his life—though they may produce a passing thrill of awe and reverence—as his relations to his great Master or his active services in the cause of the Hindu religion. It is not certainly meant that such incidents as referred to above should not at all be mentioned in an account of his life, but any unnecessary importance attached to these in a work of this kind at the cost of the other more important and valuable aspects of his life will undoubtedly make it so much the less useful to a common reader. And we are glad to note here that the reader of the book under review need entertain no such apprehensions in connection with it, for he will find therein an adequate account of Swami Vivekananda's relations to his divine Master as well as of his great work of interpreting Hinduism to the western world.

Entering America as an unknown Indian Sannyasin, Swami Vivekananda soon emerged out of the Parliament of religions at Chicago as a great religious teacher. At the commencement of his famous speech, there however he appears to have been under the same usual influence of a stage fright as other common young novices in the art of public speaking. But the analogy between the man in the street and this great singular personage who was destined later on to address—oftentimes, *extempore*—mass meetings composed of unprecedented audiences and to preach Vedanta as much on open platforms as through private discourses,—this analogy held true only in the beginning. When, once

he opened* his mouth he was a different man. In the book itself :

"His face glowed like fire. His eyes surveyed in a sweep the huge assembly before him. The whole audience grew intent ; a pin could have been heard to fall." Bowing to Devi Sarnawati, the Goddess of Knowledge, he addressed his audience as, "Sisters and Brothers of America." And with that, before he uttered another word, the whole parliament was caught up by a great wave of enthusiasm. Hundreds rose to their feet with shouts of applausé. The Parliament had gone mad ; every one was cheering, cheering, cheering". (Vol. I. p 369).

Apart from certain slight mistake of geographical details, the book is certainly an excellent production. There are about three dozen excellent photographs in the whole book, and though it is 'professedly' written by a number of writers, the continuity of style and of presentation is somehow maintained. The printing and the general get-up too leave little to be desired. And we heartily endorse the publisher's hope that "the work in its new garb will be heartily welcomed by the reading public"

G. W. Kaveeshwar.

The Metaphysics of Berkeley by G. W. Kaveeshwar, M.A.,
Published by Mrs. A. Kaveeshwar, Mandleshwar, c. 1.
Pp. vi+360+ii. Price Rs 2-8.

Within the compass of a handy volume the author—Mr. Kaveeshwar presents a clear and readable account of Berkeley's philosophy. He has spared no pains to bring out all the salient features of Berkeleyanism ; its historical significance, the distinction between "ideas" and "notion" and their consequences. The criticisms levelled against Berkeley go

home, they show, what has been very well pointed out by several writers, the weakness and ambiguity of "esse is percipi," the untenable and uncritical assumption of God and other spirits and the various make shifts of Berkeley to save his system from being an unmitigated solipsism. All this is familiar ground.

The one novel feature claimed is the comparison that is drawn—in the foot-notes—between Viṣṇāna vāda and Berkeley. There are of course profound differences between the two, as Mr Kaveeshwar himself would admit. Viṣṇāna vāda declares all things false, unreal, because they are perceived—just the reverse of "esse is percipi". Secondly, Viṣṇāna vāda knows fully that with the abolition of external objects the 'ideas' too are dissipated, pure knowledge (Viṣṇāna mātra) alone is left. Nowhere is any external agency, as God, invoked to save an awkward situation. All this is fully worked out in Vasubandhu's "Viṣṇapti mātrata siddhi". Mr Kaveeshwar's comparison based as it is on Sankara's scanty and biased account in the Bhāṣya on the Brāhma Sūtras naturally suffers on that account. This does not however affect the merit of the work, it is but very secondarily a comparative study. The student especially the beginner, is sure to find Mr. Kaveesbware's work quite useful and interesting; its usefulness is increased by an index and a select bibliography.

T. R. V. MURTI